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Abstract
In the 1930s U.S., a set of social forces and crises pushed forward state energy regulation. As
states struggle to end greenhouse-gas emissions from fossil fuels, the threat of climate change
demands new explanations for how energy policy emerges. In this dissertation, I explain the
period of U.S. natural gas regulation between 1938 and 1978 from critical political economy and
Marxist state theoretical perspectives. My main conclusion is that the capitalist state stabilizes
markets for energy to serve capital with an auxiliary means of production. Based on that
conclusion, I recommend that Marxist state theory be class-centered, i.e., recognize that the
agency of mass movements and state workers to reform the capitalist state is structurally
constrained by the state’s role of maintaining capitalist class relations. In the introduction I
explain how it is important to consider capital-gas relations because natural gas is a greenhouse
gas and burning of gas by capital is causing climate change. In chapter one I explain how energy
is a means of production, how the state relates to it and the class politics that result when the
state allows markets to provision energy. In chapter two I show how, why, and for whom the
state stabilized natural gas markets during the Great Depression. In chapter three I argue that the
state governed natural gas for capital as a whole instead of fractions of capital in the postwar
period. In chapter four I argue that the state allowed gas into markets previously served by coal
because it strengthened capital’s control over the means of production. In chapter five I argue
that state gas law throughout the Fordist-Keynesian period locked industrial and commercial
capital into patterns of high natural gas consumption. Along the way I engage with academic
debates and literatures from energy studies, value theory and political ecology, among others. I
conclude with a suggestion for state-energy relations that could replace capitalist state-energy
relations and explain why that replacement is necessary given the threat of climate change.
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Introduction
Natural gas is easy to forget, ignore, or just overlook in the first place. It comes to homes,
businesses, and industries in underground pipes and is colorless, odorless and tasteless. A rottenegg smell (a sulfuric odorant called mercaptan) must be added so that if we forget to turn the
stove off we don’t fill the room with gas and asphyxiate. Gas’s impact on the landscape, after
pipelines are installed, is minimal. Innocuous utility markers and tiny plastic flags are sometimes
the only indication that explosive fuel is flowing three or four feet below a road median.
It’s so easy to overlook natural gas that even when disaster strikes gas infrastructure it
doesn’t attract much attention. In the autumn of 2015, workers discovered a massive gas leak
from an underground storage facility at the Aliso Canyon oil field outside Los Angeles (McNary
2016). A subsurface well casing installed in 1954 when the well was drilled to extract natural gas
failed (Byington 2017). It was repurposed in 1972 for gas storage without updating the
equipment to handle accidental leaks or blowouts (Ibid.). As many as 20% of the underground
natural gas storage sites in the U.S. are vulnerable to the same structural failure (Ibid.). The leak
lasted 16 months and was the worst human-made greenhouse-gas disaster in U.S. history,
according to atmospheric scientists at UC-Davis (Warrick 2016). It released 97 thousand tons of
methane, with a global-warming potential larger than the 2010 Deepwater Horizon leak (Walker
2016). The Pew Research Center found that the Deepwater Horizon oil spill was the mostcovered news story for nine straight weeks in 2010 (Statler-Throckmorton 2016). The
mainstream media, however, was relatively quiet when it came to Aliso Canyon, treating it more
like a local news story than a national, environmental disaster (Ibid.). We can ignore natural gas
even when major disasters strike but gas is vital, and it affects us in ways that we may not
realize.
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Gas permeates the commodities that capitalist societies require to reproduce themselves
every day. It’s a feedstock in the production of fertilizer, which has allowed the human
population to grow well beyond previous limits (Huber 2017a). Its hydrocarbons are also a
building block of many plastics, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals (NGSA 2013). Natural gas is a
fossil fuel, and like oil and coal, when burned, it releases a significant amount of energy that can
be used as heat or to generate electricity. In heat processes, gas is used to make paint stick to all
types of metals including vehicles, household appliances, electronics, and parts of homes like
windows and doors (PCI 2016). Gas is used for food processing, for baking grain into breakfast
cereals, and for melting sugar into candy (Busby 1999, 87). It’s used to heat process iron, steel,
glass, cement and water for industrial boilers (UCS 2015).
In Marxian terms, natural gas is an essential means of production for a broad swath of
goods. How did it reach this position with such little attention paid to it? In this dissertation, I
argue that the capitalist state made it possible for natural gas to become a critical means of
production for capital. I discovered that the taken-for-granted aspect of gas in the U.S. resulted
from decades of gas regulation that took this resource from a fringe source of energy to a
mainstream one. I explore the regulation of natural gas based on a wager that 20th century gas
regulation holds important lessons for how the current gas system might be transformed to deal
with global climate change. As I will explain, markets alone are not doing enough to either stop
methane leaks or hasten the transition away from natural gas. Despite its relative advantages, gas
still emits carbon when burned, which makes its use a part of the overall climate change
dilemma.
To avoid the worst effects of climate change, high-energy consuming societies must be
weaned off gas, but energy markets aren’t making this happen by themselves. If the U.S. state
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adopts a plan to mitigate climate change, it will have to take a greater role in markets.
Approaching that likelihood, it would help to know the purposes the state set up the gas system
to serve. By knowing the purpose the gas system was built to serve, we can better understand
how to alter it to serve new ends. One of the state’s primary objectives in regulating natural gas
was to serve capital with an essential means of production at prices that allowed for profit
maximization. As the state addresses climate change, it will once again be confronted with
capital’s imperatives when it drafts new energy policy. Policy that ends fossil fuel use and
transforms energy systems to run on climate-stabilizing energy will most likely not always allow
for profit maximization by many fractions of capital that depend on fossil energy for high profits.
Therefore, it is important that civil society push actors within the state to deprioritize capitalists’
profits and thereby change the capitalist character of the state as it relates to energy.
A dissertation devoted to natural gas is unusual within the broader context of energy
studies, where even the experts choose to pass (over) gas. Although reflecting on academic
literatures in political science, Balmaceda’s recent argument (2018) on the conflation of fossil
fuels with oil is more widely applicable. She finds that while authors implicitly or explicitly refer
to fossil fuels (Ibid., 131), the literature on other fuels remains much smaller than that of oil
(Ibid., 130). “We have been so overloaded with oil-related discussions, that we have forgotten oil
is far from the only game in fossil energy town” (Ibid.). Fossil fuels include petroleum (oil), coal
and, critically, natural gas, and their conflation is problematic for understanding the dilemma of
fossil fuel addiction in the age of climate change. Following President George W. Bush’s
diagnosis of U.S. “oil addiction” in his 2006 State of the Union address, many energy experts
have widened the scope of this “addiction” to include all fossil fuels. Despite broadening the
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‘addiction’ to include fossil fuels, most devote their discussions to oil (Braml 2007; Klare 2014)
or to coal (Perera 2008).
When natural gas is mentioned it is frequently treated as somehow outside the category of
fossil fuels, which it is decidedly not. In an article where he compares fossil fuel addiction to
tobacco addiction, Suranovic (2013, 601) says that natural gas is a suitable replacement for coal
in power plants used to generate electricity and for home heating. Tollefson (2018) mentions
coal eight times, yet only includes gas in a passing statement about how it releases less carbon
dioxide than coal when burned. Thompson (2014) praises gas for having “eaten into the coal
share of the energy mix,” even though he is allegedly decrying fossil fuel addiction. Goswami
(2006, 39) proposes hydrogen fuel as a cure for fossil fuel addiction, despite his own admission
that a principle source of hydrogen is natural gas. Goswami’s proposition epitomizes the
tendency to place natural gas somehow outside the category of fossil fuels, and it parallels
another argument about natural gas serving as a “bridge” fuel (Levant 2015, 27). Analysts
suggest that gas may serve as a less-carbon intensive bridge between a fossil-fueled present and a
renewably-powered future (Ibid.). Regardless of whether that prediction should prove true,
natural gas releases climate-warming carbon dioxide when it is burned (Cooper 2018). It is still a
fossil fuel, despite its advantages over coal and oil. Overall, the general neglect of natural gas
conforms with trends in the discipline of geography where natural gas is a neglected resource
compared to oil (Haggerty 2017, 66). 1 This gap will be of interest to geographers of energy, but
why should anyone outside of that small cohort care about gas?

Haggerty doesn’t mention the geographer, James Parsons, whose article (1950) offers an historical/idiographic
approach (albeit dated) to the U.S. natural gas system.

1
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Climate change is a global dilemma demanding that scholars and citizens pay more
attention to all fossil fuel resources, including the neglected (up until now) natural gas. One
geographer, Vaclav Smil, author of over 40 books and 500 papers on energy, 2 has not been
neglecting gas (2015a). Gas is, in Smil’s view, “a preferred fuel” (Ibid., 192) because it is a lesspolluting alternative to oil for heating, or coal for electricity generation (Ibid., 154). Renewables
trump all fossil fuels, including gas, when it comes to reducing pollution and greenhouse gas
emissions (UCS 2017). Smil, unfortunately, doesn’t see renewables replacing fossil fuels. In
1990, 88% of the world’s total energy supply came from fossil fuels (2015a, 154). Twenty-two
years later, that share had decreased only one percent (87%) (Ibid.). With nuclear generation
stalled or stagnant in most cases, Smil considers (mostly methane-based) gas the “best option”
for decarbonizing the world’s energy supply as it is currently constituted (Ibid.). However, he is
not overexaggerating its importance.
Smil tempers claims made by the International Energy Agency (IEA) that we are living
through a “golden age of gas” (Ibid., 196). “A more accurate characterization of the coming
decades of changes in global fossil fuel composition would be not an age of gas but the era of
rising natural gas importance” (Ibid., 219). Smil anticipates gas will never attain the same level
of dominance that wood had in the preindustrial era or coal in the late-19th to early-20th centuries
(Ibid., 215), but it will still be a key ‘card’ in the energy ‘hand.’ Even as wind and solar
electricity generation expand, there will still be a need for baseload generation on calm or cloudy
days, at night, and during the winter (Ibid., 207). Electricity storage would eliminate the need for
non-renewable baseload generation, but it would require storage options (batteries, among

Bill Gates claims to have read all 40 books (Voosen 2018) and recently said “I wait for new Smil books the way
some people wait for the next Star Wars movie” (Ibid.).

2
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others) that could hold gigawatts of electricity, which Smil thinks are unlikely to be invented
given present market conditions (2015b). Therefore, because of gas’s relatively low carbon
content and its potential to complement renewable generation, fellow energy scholar Daniel
Yergin concurs with Smil that gas is a “fuel of the future” (2011, 340).
Even if Smil’s and Yergin’s predictions fall short, at the moment gas looks like a rising
contender in the global fuel mix. There is no shortage of supply, and demand is rising, with U.S.
natural gas exports quadrupling to two billion cubic feet a day over the last year (Butler 2018).
High-volume hydraulic fracturing in the U.S. has made gas inexpensive, and prices are expected
to stay that way for the near future (Smil 2015a, 199). In China, gas has grown from two percent
of final energy demand in 2000 to six percent today, with most of the supply coming from
imports (Butler 2018). Gas is the largest source of electricity in the U.S., at 32% of total
generation, and the U.S. Energy Information Administration (U.S. EIA) expects that more than a
quarter of added capacity will be gas-fired in the coming decade, at a cost of over $500 billion
(Crooks 2018a). Small-scale gas-fired power plants are gaining in popularity in Southeast Asia,
Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa (Ward 2018). However, the story of gas’s rise in
importance is not an unalloyed good for the environment.
The IEA credits the slowdown in greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) in recent years to
U.S. power plants switching from coal to natural gas, which slowed anthropogenic emissions of
carbon dioxide (CO₂) into the atmosphere (Reed 2017). Natural gas releases less CO₂ than wood,
coal, or oil when burned, but its chemical composition is almost completely methane (CH₄),
which is itself a potent GHG (Smil 2015a, 169). According to the United Nations
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), CH₄ is 21 times as potent as CO₂ as a GHG
(Ibid., 170). CH₄ is responsible for one fifth of anthropogenic climate change since the start of
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the Industrial Revolution (Ibid., 169). Its CO₂ savings are thus cancelled out by CH₄ leaks from
gas pipelines, compressor stations, gas flaring at oil wells, and deliberate or accidental gas well
venting (Ibid., 170). The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimated that in 2013 30% of
the U.S. natural gas supply leaked out of the oil and gas supply chain (Economist 2016a). A more
recent study in Science claims that the rate is 2.3% of total gas production per year, 60% more
than the EPA estimate (Schwarz and Plumer 2018).
Experts assume that oil and gas companies would try to plug leaks to conserve their
product and sell it to customers rather than waste it into the atmosphere (Crooks 2018b). That
assumption is mistaken. Small producers have been chafing against regulations passed under the
Obama administration that require gas infrastructure be tested for leaks with more regularity
(Economist 2016b). The head of the Texas Railroad Commission called the regulations part of
Obama’s “war on fossil fuels” (Ibid.). Before resigning as head of the EPA, Scott Pruitt tried
unsuccessfully to block the implementation of Obama’s new rules about leakages (Loria 2018).
ExxonMobil unveiled plans to phase out valves and controls in oil fields that vent methane and
replace them with compressed air (Krauss 2017), but the oil major is under no obligation to
follow through with these plans and could cancel them at any point. Left to themselves, private
companies are not doing enough to reduce CH₄ leaks, but this is a similar story to how humanity
is responding to climate change in general. Climate change is increasing the power and
frequency of heat waves, floods, sea level rise, hurricanes (NASA 2018) and decreasing the
ability of humanity to survive and flourish especially in the developing world (Parenti 2011).
Although the IEA estimated that GHG emissions have slowed down in recent years,
significant growth in global energy-related emissions resumed in 2017 (Pfeifer 2018). This rise,
according to the IEA executive director, Fatih Birol, indicates that “current efforts to combat
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climate change are far from sufficient” (Ibid.). The current paradigm of non-legally binding
treaties by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) and a
market-led, private energy sector is failing to mitigate climate change. Newly built, gas-fired
electricity generation plants will have to operate for at least two more decades to recoup their
construction investments (Smil 2015a, 205). Markets alone are not reducing dependence on gas
or other fossil fuels, and this is a major problem. Energy companies and utilities are more
concerned with showing their shareholders steady returns on investment than ending climate
change. Therefore, regulation will have to play a key role in ending fossil fuel use in order to
slow down and potentially reverse climate change.
Natural Gas, Capitalism and The State
This dissertation makes both empirical and theoretical/conceptual contributions to
geography. The topic is natural gas, which is a neglected energy resource compared to oil in
energy geography (Haggerty 2017, 66). The approach I took to studying natural gas is political
ecological but rather than looking at the politics of gas extraction (Perreault 2006) or rent
distribution (Perreault and Valdivia 2010), I explain how massive demand for natural gas was
produced. A great deal of this explanation leans on how the state facilitated gas’s adoption by
industrial and commercial users as a preferred fuel. Political ecologies have made great strides in
recent years integrating environmental concerns in political geography (Robbins 2003). I
contribute a theory of state-energy relations inspired by Marxian state theory to conversations on
the political ecology of the state (Ioris 2014; Whitehead et al. 2007).
In writing about gas policy I depended on an interdisciplinary body of scholarship as a
springboard for my arguments. Compared to geography, much more research has been done on
natural gas by historians, political scientists, economists, and scholars of energy working in
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interdisciplinary departments (Peebles 1980; Sanders 1981; Davis 1984; Tussing and Barlow
1984; Vietor 1984; Clark 1987; Yergin 1991; Castaneda 1993; Castaneda and Pratt 1993; Vietor
1994; Tussing and Tippee 1995; Castaneda and Smith 1996; Castaneda 1999; MacAvoy 2000;
Yergin 2011; Makholm 2012; Waples 2012). Policy-centric and political science scholars use
gas as an object through which to test theories of American political behavior (esp. Sanders
1981; Clark 1987; Makholm 2012; Vietor 1994). These authors share a technocratic approach,
emphasizing control of the natural gas system by elite, technical experts in government and
industry. I corresponded with one of these authors – a gas industry consultant – about how he
thought the modern gas market came to be. I asked him who he thought was most responsible for
creating the modern market in natural gas. “Who created it? As much as anybody, representing
dozens of distributors for years in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) proceedings
against the pipelines, I did (his emphasis).” According to him, the market is notional; it can be
created out of thin air by business consultants in Washington, DC. His statement showcases the
elitism of technocracy that overlooks the social forces of capital, labor and the state that produce
the natural gas system through political struggle and contestation.
These readings of the origins of the gas system are also economistic, emphasizing the
impersonal forces of supply and demand over any specific person, expert or otherwise. IN this
frame, government intervention in gas markets is a response to price signals getting temporarily
distorted and needing to be restored, rather than from industrial and commercial consumers
demanding the state restore the provisioning of an essential production input. In these narratives,
supply imbalances indicated by changes in the price of gas precipitate policy solutions for
meeting demand, usually by altering incentives and adjusting levels of market oversight (Peebles
1980; Davis 1984; Vietor 1984; MacAvoy 2000). Some adopt a similar economistic approach
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but credit cunning and brave entrepreneurs willing to take risks for increasing supply in the face
of fuel scarcities (Yergin 1991; Castaneda 1993; Castaneda and Pratt 1993; Castaneda and Smith
1996; Castaneda 1999; Zuckerman 2013). Although entrepreneurial gas drilling and exploration
was obviously important to the formation of a national gas market, the government stabilized the
young industry, built some of the earliest gas pipelines, facilitated its successful competition over
other fuels and directly and indirectly facilitated gas becoming a favored fuel by industries and
commercial users.
Another common approach to natural gas focuses on issues of international sovereignty
around gas pipelines. Like Sanders (1981), these works approach natural gas as a political object,
the study of which can be used to advance theories of governmentality, territory, sovereignty,
etc. These include studies of Russian-European pipeline politics by geographers and political
scientists (Bouzarovski and Konieczny 2010; Schmidt-Felzmann 2011; Bradshaw 2014;
Bouzarovski et al. 2015; Mišík and Prachárová 2016; Stephenson and Agnew 2016), the
disruption of continental markets by liquified natural gas (LNG) (Bridge 2004; Harrison 2008;
Bradshaw et al. 2015; Bridge and Bradshaw 2017), or a combination of those topics (Grigas
2017). These approaches share a tendency to reduce economic geographies of energy to conflicts
between states, focusing on conflicts around “access points, conduits, and chokepoints through
which energy flows” (Sica and Huber 2017, 339). Energy is not just a chess piece in a game of
territorial competition between nation states. Flows of investment in energy systems cross
borders within and between nations. States cooperate with other states and investors from other
countries to ensure energy projects generate profits and tax revenues. States also repress
opposition within their own borders all in the name of ensuring that energy systems remain
stable and the energy continues flowing.
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Political ecologists also have examined the distributive politics of resource rents and
struggles around extraction of natural gas (Kaup 2008; Nevins 2009; Perreault and Valdivia
2010). Most recently, interest in natural gas has followed the rise of hydraulic fracturing
(fracking), a technique for extracting oil and natural gas from shale rock formations using highly
pressurized water, sand, and chemicals that has allowed a new oil and natural gas boom in the
U.S. (Andrews and McCarthy 2014; Lave and Lutz 2014; Wylie 2015; Sica 2015; Sneegas 2016;
Sica and Huber 2017; Murphy et al. 2018). The object of study in these literatures is local
environmental and social impacts of gas extraction rather than natural gas demand or
consumption. Research on extraction and fracking takes the massive demand for natural gas in
the U.S. for granted because it narrows the historical lens from the mid-2000s to the present.
This makes sense if fracking, and especially the laws that allowed it to flourish (Andrews and
McCarthy 2014), is the main object of inquiry. Focusing on fracking or the politics around gas
production obscures how massive demand for gas from fracking came about, which also has a
political ecological explanation.
This scholarship shows natural gas governance evolving in response to changing regimes
of technocratic control, price signals, international competition, and the rise of new technology.
My study was built on these insights, but by focusing on relations between natural gas and the
U.S. state, I came to some different conclusions. Technocratic explanations overestimate the
impact of individual experts (like government bureaucrats) on the gas system, which is a
cooperative effort between thousands of workers, consumers, capitalists, and state agents.
Economistic analyses either grant too much agency to capitalists or collapses capitalist social
relations to impersonal forces of supply and demand. Studies that frame gas as an object for
inter-state competition omit the cooperation within and between states that pipelines and gas
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markets require just to function day to day. Studies of struggles over gas extraction and the
distribution of gas rents take for granted the demand that natural gas systems have locked-in
through decades of oil and gas capitalist development and state intervention in energy markets.
As I explain in the body chapters of this dissertation, the U.S. state stabilizes the gas
system during moments of market turbulence because gas is a critical means of production for
capital. In recent years, scholars have begun to offer explanations of mass politics and culture
that place fossil fuels at the center of historical change (Mitchell 2011; Szeman and Boyer 2017).
More critical contributors have explained how capitalism depends on fossil fuels (Altvater 2006;
Urry 2014) for making capitalist relations of production possible (Malm 2016) and for fueling
the social reproduction of capital (Huber 2013a). Less attention has been paid to the crucial role
that fossil fuels play as a productive force (although see Christie 1980). The bulk of Marxian
approaches to energy also focus on coal and oil to the exclusion of natural gas. Huber’s analysis
of oil finds it to be central to social reproduction of capitalism and neoliberal individualism in the
postwar U.S. (2013a). Malm’s research on coal concludes that it allowed early industrialists in
England to move factories into towns where labor power could be more easily found and
controlled (2016). Although these literatures have shown how energy is an essential foundation
for capitalism, Marxist state theorists have yet to integrate energy into their theories of the
capitalist state.
Understandably, Marxist state theory focuses on political systems, ideology and political
philosophy, and theories of the welfare state (Jessop 1990; 2008; Poulantzas 1973; 1978;
O’Connor 1973). These studies have illuminated how the capitalist state becomes involved in
reproducing capital-labor relations, alienation and exploitation, maintaining stable accumulation,
and restoring capitalist social relations following crisis. I argue that the capitalist state also
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intervenes in energy markets to restore the provisioning of this vital means of production for
capital. Unregulated markets are too turbulent and prone to ruinous competition or oligopoly to
provision energy unsupervised. As I argue in chapter one, when energy markets fail, the
capitalist state steps in to ensure that energy is provisioned to society because it is a vital means
of production for capital. This point has also eluded theorists of the environmental state, who
study the politics of environmental agencies within states but avoid the environmental impacts of
fuel and industrial policies (Whitehead et al. 2007; Harris et al. 2017).
Methods and Plan of Work
This dissertation is based on primary source, archival research conducted at the National
Archives at College Park, Gerald Ford Presidential Library, Jimmy Carter Presidential Museum,
Eisenhower Presidential Library, and the Penn State Special Collections between 2015 and 2017.
While reading archival records, I looked for public responses (letters to the president and
members of congress) and moments of conflict (between energy companies, unions, civil society
groups etc.). Many of the secondary sources I consulted before conducting my own original
research gave fine-grain, day-by-day historical narratives of gas legislation as it proceeded
through the legislative or executive branches of government. I wanted my approach to be
different because I was interested in understanding the broader social forces that motivated the
state to intervene in energy markets. My aim was not to represent the history of natural gas
regulation, but to describe the general thrust of the state as it related to energy and uncover the
base of popular support for that general thrust.
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds in five substantive chapters. Chapter one
engages with academic discussions regarding energy and the state and offers a conceptual
argument that joins Marxist state theory with an analysis of energy markets. I argue that energy
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is crucial to the functioning of capital as a critical means of production that is very difficult to
substitute for other resources. The remaining four chapters are built around historicalgeographical case studies drawn from primary source, archival research. In chapter two, I argue
that the state intervened in 1930s energy markets to restore the proper circulation of capital
through natural gas. Here, I engage with geographical literatures on Marxian theories of value
and capital circulation. In chapter three, I engage with political ecologies of the state and the
work of the political sociologist, Nicos Poulantzas, through a case study of a 1954 Supreme
Court decision. I argue that when the state governs natural resources, it does so with an eye
toward issues like sinking the value of labor and the cost of constant capital. In chapter four, I
argue that the politics of energy transitions have a class dimension, with a case study of the state
using natural gas policy to weaken coal miners’ unions. The final chapter uses the deregulation
debates of the 1970s to argue that scholars of neoliberal nature need to contextualize the rise of
neoliberalism within the contradictions of Fordist-Keynesianism. I show how state institutions
made gas cheap and more widely accessible, allowing capital to become dependent on it as a
means of production. In the conclusion, I argue for a state energy policy to address climate
change that serves people instead of capital.
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Chapter 1
Fanning the Flame: Energy, The Means of Production, And the Capitalist State
There are few beliefs more important to the health of the status quo than the one
which treats state institutions as neutral in the political economic clashes between
different groups, such that each of them has a more or less equal chance of winning
the support of these institutions.
-

Bertell Ollman 1993, 95

Introduction
If you want to get the latest news about energy you might pick up a copy of The New
York Times or go to their website. There you would find that most energy news is listed under
four sections: business, science, technology, and politics. In industrial societies, it’s common
sense that you can’t run an economy without energy and that society’s ability to harness energy
progresses with the frontier of science. But energy also shows up in the national news because it
is a subject of great concern to the capitalist state. Every day there’s some new story about a
government agency or politician passing a law or making a statement about the energy supply,
the types of energy we should be harnessing, or how we should be using energy. In this chapter I
explain why energy is such a central concern to the capitalist state and how the state relates to
energy based on that concern. To begin, I’ll review how academics already explain energy-state
relations to better contrast it with my own.
The literature on the relationship between energy and the state is overly focused on states
that control lots of oil and gas. State-owned oil companies like ARAMCO use the revenues from
selling oil to “stave off criticism, dissent and potential revolution” (Jones 2010, 5). The
“development tap” used to quell dissent among the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s subjects can be
turned off at any point at the king’s discretion (Vitalis 2007, 213). In Ba’athist Iraq, Saddam
Hussein used oil revenues to fund welfare programs and wage war against neighboring Iran
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throughout the 1980s (Le Billon and El Khatib 2004, 112). Russian state-owned oil and gas
enterprises built during the Soviet period were sold to a financial oligarchy, following the
breakup of the Soviet Union (Labban 2008, 115). The period of Russian reconsolidation in the
2000s coincided with an oil boom, and Vladimir Putin’s pre-presidential dissertation charted a
modernization path for the nation paid for by oil rents (Rogers 2015, 147). Following the rise of
tar sands in the Canadian province of Alberta, oil rents grew to constitute 20% of the provincial
government’s total annual revenues over the past five years (Adkin 2016, 14). Revenues
generated from Chinese state-owned oil and gas companies flow directly into the coffers of the
Chinese Communist Party, empowering its energy fractions (Isoaho et al. 2016, 10). In
Venezuela, oil wealth is the basis for political power (Coronil 1997, 8), and the Ecuadorian
government uses oil patronage as a “vehicle for progress” (Valdivia 2008, 473).
Terry Karl uses the term “petro-state” to describe governments that control large flows of
rent from oil sales but lack strong democratic institutions (Karl 1997). 3 Some of these states are
under a “resource curse” (Ross 2012; Le Billon 2015), meaning that exporting large amounts of
resources like oil, diamonds, and copper afflicts states with “high levels of corruption,
authoritarianism, and poor governance” (Kennedy 2014, 264). When applied to oil-and gasproducing countries, resource curse arguments reproduce a type of oil-based fetishism (Huber
2011a, 33). This is the idea that oil itself causes social relations or is the main explanation for
how social formations arise and persist. (See Watts [2004] for a damning critique of resourcecurse thinking.) In direct opposition to resource curse narratives, Walker shows how California’s

3
Karl says her petro-state category applies only to “capital-deficient oil exporters” (1997, 17). Using GDP per capita
as a measure of capital, she avoids making claims about “capital-surplus,” i.e. rich countries, like Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Libya, and Iraq (Ibid., 18). She limits her petro-state thesis to poor countries like Algeria,
Indonesia, Nigeria, Venezuela and Iran, even though Iran had a higher GDP per capita than Iraq according to her
own data (Ibid.).
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rich resource endowment became a springboard for strong capitalist growth and the formation of
a robust capitalist state (2004, 190). Natural resource development also can lead to positive
feedbacks that strengthen economies and governments in unpredictable ways (David and Wright
1997; Wright and Czelusta 2007). Oil and gas cannot distribute and exert legitimate force and
power throughout society because they have “no inherent power outside the social and political
relations that produce (them)” (Huber 2013a, 3). 4
Despite oil not determining the state’s structure and orientation, large oil and gas
producing states other than the U.S. still share things in common. Governments like the Saudi
monarchy and the Maduro administration in Venezuela control and direct rents gained from the
sale of oil to non-market institutions of government. That said, states are not monolithic entities
that act as unified actors in anything, including their relation to resources. Indeed, this form of
“state fetishism” (Huber 2012, 402) obscures how states are made up of thousands of people with
their own agency to change the way state policies are implemented. However, it is fair to assume
that state employees’ agency is limited by the related material needs (1) not to get fired and (2) to
continue earning the wage they need to pay their mortgage. Also, the distribution of rents from
oil in many oil-producing countries is deeply contested from within and without the state (Bridge
2008; Kashi and Watts 2008; Valdivia 2008; Perreault and Valdivia 2010; Valdivia and
Benavides 2012; Zalik 2012). The politics of state-energy relations in many of these cases is a
distributional one (Emel and Huber 2008), focused more on the parceling up of rents than on
how energy is used in capitalist production (cf. Huber 2009a, 105).

This has not stopped Karl’s petro-state thesis from being applied to Russia (Goldman 2010) and Canada (Nikiforuk
2012).
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The above-mentioned literatures explain the distributional struggles around rents from
energy sales, which is one essential energy-state relation but perhaps not the most essential one
for thinking about energy’s role in capitalism. The focus on rents shows that many states
experience energy primarily as a windfall that can be used to fund non-market-based institutions.
The capitalist U.S. state also collects rents on oil/gas produced on public lands (including
offshore) and taxes oil and natural gas companies, employees, etc. However, energy also is a
central concern to capitalist states because it is a vital means of production for capital.
Energy: A Vital Means of Production
The means of production are the raw materials, tools, facilities etc., that capitalists buy to
produce commodities. Marx broke the means of production down into three categories: raw
materials, auxiliary materials, and instruments of labor (1867a, 209). Instruments are the things
that come between the worker and her object of work (Ibid., 179). “An instrument of labor is a
thing, or a complex of things, which the labourer interposes between himself and the subject of
his labour, and which serves as the conductor of his activity” (Ibid.). They include not only the
tools and machines but also the factory where she works (Ibid., 203). Raw materials become the
substance of the product after their form is changed through the labor process (Ibid.). Soy beans,
for example, are fed by workers to cattle that metabolize the beans into muscle fibers that form
the product, beef. Auxiliary materials are substances combined with either the raw materials or
the instruments of labor to modify the product (Ibid., 181). 5 These include grease used to

Marx uses the words auxiliary (1867a, 203; 209) or accessory (Ibid., 181) interchangeably when referring to means
of production that vanish during the labor process but modify the product. I picked auxiliary because scholars
working with Marx seem to have converged around the term auxiliary to describe energy as a means of production
(Harvey 1982, 206; Heinrich 2004, 136).
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lubricate wheels and gears (Ibid., 203), dyes used to color cloth (Ibid., 181), and coal used
“under a boiler” (Ibid., 181; 203).
Coal is useful for turning water into steam in a boiler because when burned, it releases
energy. Coal, oil, and gas were once immense quantities of photosynthetic plants that were
fossilized and retain solar energy in a highly concentrated form (Crosby 2006, 62). “Fossilized
sunshine” (Ibid., 59) gave capital access to unprecedented amounts of solar energy compared to
our previous sources: plants, human and animal muscles, winds, and flowing water (White 1943;
Cottrell 1955; McNeill 2000; Huber and McCarthy 2017). The incredible energy density of fossil
fuels (Smil 2015c, 97) made it possible for capitalists to replace waterwheels with steam engines
and move factories from rural riverbanks to cities with exploitable proletarians (Malm 2016,
146). Beginning in the late-19th century, the core productive force of capitalism became
automatic machinery (Huber 2009a, 108), and from then on modern industry became completely
dependent on inanimate forms of energy (Christie 1980, 15). 6
The dominant theme of technological innovation throughout history has been the
effort to shift the burden of energy use from human muscles to other physical and
biological systems, such as animals, machines and computers. The expansion in
mechanical output facilitated by technological progress typically leads to more
energy-intensive societies where those who control the means of production can
generate greater surpluses and profits. (Kolasi 2018, 39)
Boilers, furnaces, ovens, lights, conveyor belts, robots, punches, presses, hoists,
assemblers, sorters, saws, sprayers, water systems, communications, transportation and logistics
systems, computers, security systems, quality control systems would be so much wasted space
without the coal (for use in electricity generation especially), natural gas, oil, hydroelectric,

It’s true that fossil fuels are an indispensable feedstock (“raw material” in Marx’s terms) for fractions of capital in
petrochemicals (Huber 2013a, 61-95) and fertilizer production (Huber 2017a) but I’m mostly interested in energy as
an auxiliary means of production here.
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nuclear energy, renewables etc. that energize them. Whether the capitalist adds auxiliary means
of production at the point of production or takes energy from a pipeline, electrical grid, or tanker
truck alters the geography of production, but not the dependent relationship of industry on
energy.
The capitalist state, because it is ultimately dependent on surplus value production (Block
1987, 62), tries to ensure that capital receives adequate energy supplies to serve as this essential
means of production (Jessop 1982, 234). Marxist state theory has three main approaches to
conceptualizing state-capital relations. The instrumentalist theory espoused by early Miliband
(1969) and Marx and Engels of The Communist Manifesto (1848a) says that the state is basically
captured from the inside by the bourgeoisie. This theory is criticized because sometimes the
capitalist state must act against the interests of particular capitalists. In other words, the capitalist
state cannot just be a tool of the bourgeoisie because the bourgeoisie is made up of competing
interests (Das 2006, 65-66). Structuralist state theories say that the autonomy of capitalist state
action is constrained by the need to reproduce capitalism as a whole (O’Connor, 1973;
Poulantzas 1973; Miliband 1977; Hirsch 1978; Holloway and Picciotto 1978; Offe 1984).
Poulantzas encapsulates this thinking with his concept of relative autonomy: the capitalist state
has to be free from the control of any particular fraction of the bourgeoisie in order to safeguard
capital as a whole (Poulantzas 1973, 284-5). 7 One drawback of structuralist theories is they don’t

Even though Poulantzas says that states operate under the control of a dominant group of capitalists, his idea that
states retain their own autonomy relative to any particular fraction of capital was embraced more often by the
Marxist state theorists who followed. Like a lot of Marxist state theory from the 1970s, Poulantzas’s work is
complex and hard to follow, and he contradicts himself in places. (This might stem from errors in translation, and
there is a need for a reading of Poulantzas by a French-speaking political ecologist.) For example, he contradicts his
own notion of the state’s relative autonomy in the same book where he introduces that concept, “The relation
between the capitalist state and the dominant classes or fractions pushes them towards their political unity under the
protection of a hegemonic class or fraction” (Poulantzas 1973, 239).” Regardless, relative autonomy was picked up
and developed by the scholarship (Das 2006) and improved upon by the likes of Clarke (1983).
7
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leave enough space for the agency of class struggle and state employees to influence the state
(Das 2006, 74). State-centered state theories highlight the agency of class struggle (Poulantzas
1978; Clarke 1983; Wright 1978) and the workers within the state itself (Skocpol 1985) to
change how the capitalist state functions.
Using energy-state relations as a basis for understanding the capitalist state, I argue that
the agency of state employees and mass movements is limited by the capitalist class relations
that the capitalist state upholds. In the language of Marxist state theory, I espouse an updated
structural theory that takes agency seriously while recognizing the structural constraints the
capitalist state is under. The agency of mass movements and state workers is limited by the
capitalist state’s imperative to maintain capitalist class relations. No amount of struggle can
overcome the structural limitation of needing to reproduce capitalist class relations without
changing the character of the state itself. I call this theory of the capitalist state class-centered.
Centering the capitalist state on class allows theorists of the state to understand the limits to state
reform of capitalism. Under capitalism, exploitation of labor by capital must be maintained if
capital is to survive. The state can change how that exploitation is expressed or the form it takes,
but it cannot eliminate it entirely. Doing so would risk capital’s survival and would change the
character of the state from capitalist to something else e.g., socialist or communist.
Scarcities of energy pose an existential threat to capitalist class relations, and the
capitalist state responds by stabilizing energy markets. Even before production came to be
dominated by engines, crucibles and electrified motors running on oil, gas and coal, capitalist
production was dependent on the energy in human and animal muscles, powered by food
calories, or by the windmills and waterwheels, powered by the sun and gravity. If the capitalist
state were to be forced by state agents or a mass movement to stop the flow of energy to capital,
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the state would oversee the collapse of capitalism as a whole. Without energy as an auxiliary
means of production, the other means of production (raw materials and instruments of labor)
cannot be animated by labor power to produce surplus value. Inanimate energy (coal, oil, gas,
uranium) powers machinery and is tremendously important for modern industry. However, at a
very basic level, energy expended by laborers’ minds and animate bodies is still (despite fears of
automation and robotization) irreplaceable to a capitalist mode of production. Capitalists buy
labor power not only can it can produce value like the means of production, but because workers
can produce more value than they require to survive (Marx 1867a, 193).
Scarcities of energy were dangerous to capital even when labor was only formally
subsumed to capital i.e., when workers still controlled the means of production, even if their
labor was directed by capital and capital profited from it. Despite cottage industries or puttingout subcontracting systems not being heavily reliant on mechanized production, the energy
provided by human muscles and food calories was still an irreplaceable input to production even
at smaller scales of production. However, under the real subsumption of labor to capital,
productive forces have advanced in a technical sense, and their continued functioning has
become dependent on more energy than labor power alone can provide.
In terms of energy use, the significant capitalists aren’t dropping in on their cottage
industries at the end of month to drop off steel thread and collect pins from workers using their
own hammers, tongs, and fireplaces. Modern industry chews through 51% of the world’s energy
supply (Huber 2017a, 154) because capitalists demand that workers strap in and hitch on to blast
furnaces, 13,000 ton, open-die, forging presses, bucket-wheel excavators, battalions of electrified
robots, and factories lit for day, swing, and night shifts. Asking the capitalist state to relate to
energy differently, perhaps by stopping the flow of fossil fuels to industries that burn them, is to
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ask the capitalist state to kill capitalism (or at least put it on life support). It could be demanded
that the state cease being a capitalist state, but that is a different type of demand and deserves to
be recognized as such.
Capitalist state interventions into energy markets vary in their depth of state control. In
Fordist-Keynesian France and the U.K., the capitalist state nationalized coal, gas, and electricity
to avoid the disorder of privately controlled energy markets (Miliband 1969, 97; O’Connor 1973,
184). In the U.S., the capitalist state allows industries that produce the means of production to be
profit-seeking, but steps in at moments of crisis (Hirsch 1978, 93). Examples include the
National Guard stepping in to restore profitable oil markets in 1930s Texas (Huber 2011b) and
governor Charles Bryan taking over Nebraska’s coal market to end a monopoly in the 1920s
(O’Connor 1973, 197). Given energy’s importance to capital, U.S. capitalist state intervention in
energy markets is a logical response to market failure.
Intervention has also led to a false narrative that energy markets are apolitical when the
state isn’t intervening. Historically, U.S. energy markets have been constructed as a realm
beyond politics (Huber 2013a, 125), where actors like the Saudi royal family or Russian
petrogarchs cannot meddle with the forces of competition. Free markets were supposed to
resolve the 1970s energy crises that were blamed on political manipulation of otherwise
apolitical market forces (Ibid.). Markets exist in many different political-economic
configurations (Lindblom 2001) and are not inherently exploitative or undemocratic (Frase 2016,
112). Markets are a technology, and like other technologies, their social impacts depend on the
economic logic guiding their use (Ibid.). By allowing energy to be provisioned by markets (as
opposed to nationalizing it, for example), the U.S. capitalist state grants the capitalist class
considerable influence over energy. If energy systems are allowed to be run for capitalists’ use in
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profit maximization, then climate change demands that civil society must push the state to end
market-provisioning until markets are not controlled by capitalists.
Energy Markets Under Capitalism
A market is a cash nexus between buyers and sellers, but this nexus does not just
exist; it has to be made… To be sure, there is government intervention in markets,
government regulation and guidance… but intervention and regulation simply seeks
to influence the terms on which capitalist enterprises exercise their power to make
markets…
-

Diane Elson 1988, 10

Under pre-capitalist social formations like feudalism, most people lived as peasants under
the supervision of a lord (Harman 1999). Control over the means of production (land, first and
foremost) was the basis of survival for the peasantry, and access to land was granted to the
peasantry in exchange for tribute to the lord (Ibid., 140). An individual’s access to the food, fuel,
and materials they needed to survive was dependent on usufruct rights to land rather than on
market transactions. Capitalism is marked by a “market compulsion,” where workers and noncapitalists (i.e., most people) are divorced from the means of production and must sell their labor
power for a wage to buy the means of subsistence in the market (McNally 2011a, 37). 8
This situation doesn’t arrive out of nowhere; it takes a sustained effort on behalf of the
capitalist state. Geographers have a longstanding interest in state policies that bring about
neoliberalization, i.e., the deregulation of state functions and their reformation into market-based
provisioning systems (Peck 2001, 445). Much of this work focuses specifically on the state as a
critical “resource actor” that intervenes to allow capital to acquire and mobilize natural resources
(Bridge 2014, 124). Many case studies examining the neoliberalization of the environment
For the purposes of my argument I’m leaving aside how rentiers and other non-capitalist, yet non-productive (of
surplus value), members of society figure into the analysis. In general, they depend on the goods and services
produced by workers, so their class (though not always personal) interests align more with the capitalist class than
the proletariat.
8
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(Heynen et al. 2007; Castree 2008a; 2008b; Bakker 2010a) share the theme of how state policies
“create the conditions for market to function – via licenses, emission credits, privatization
programs, and so on” (Huber 2017b, 1852). The focus on the state serves as a corrective to the
relative dearth of scholarship on the “specific roles, capacities, and shortcomings of the state
itself in environmental governance” (McCarthy 2007, 177). Work on neoliberal environmental
governance acknowledges that alongside the “roll back” of state functions came an institutional
reconfiguration to “favor market-based actors” (Bridge and Perreault 2009, 487). To sharpen this
analysis, we might ask who are “market-based actors?” And how are they favored under
neoliberal governance regimes?
Under capitalism, the great mass of society depends on markets for their day-to-day
survival. Capitalism offers few other ways of getting by other than buying commodities in
markets. It’s this observation that led David McNally to say that under capitalism the market
becomes “the central regulator of our well-being” (2011b, 69). What differentiates capitalist
markets from markets under other modes of production is that a class of capitalists determines
which products reach the market because they control the means of production.
One thing is clear – nature does not produce on the one side owners of money or
commodities, and on the other men possessing nothing but their own labourpower. This relation has no natural basis, neither is its social basis one that is
common to all historical periods. It is clearly the result of a past historical
development, the product of many economic revolutions, of the extinction of a
whole series of older forms of social reproduction. (Marx 1867a, 169)
The capitalist state’s actions to stabilize markets are “absolutely essential to sustain the operation
of capitalist production and market relations” (Jessop 1982, 80). This is especially true in the
case of energy markets because energy is such a vital means of production as I argued in the
previous section. Despite being essential, capitalist state interventions in energy markets are
restricted by the need to retain capitalists’ control over the sector. The state is obliged to
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compensate for the failures of energy markets but without dominating or usurping the capitallabor relation by extending “non-commodity forms of social relations” (for example,
nationalization and provisioning for social need) (Jessop 1982, 109). State policy is “imprisoned”
by the need to maintain capitalist control over the means of production (Barrow 1993, 62).
Capitalists decide what to produce, what technologies to use and how, where to do business, how
to allocate resources within the enterprise, etc. (Lindblom 1977, 171). Although businesses are
dependent on wider organizational relationships beyond their own shop, establishing these longterm relations also is entirely under the control of company management (Sayer and Walker
1992, 205). Capitalists decide which goods to produce, and then workers and non-capitalists face
a “pre-specified set of goods at pre-specified prices, which households are free only to take or
leave” (Elson 1988, 7).
Capitalists may whimper that once a commodity is produced, they are at the mercy of the
consumer, who makes the final decision on whether to purchase it (Ollman 1971, 154). For
example, when the “coercive laws of competition” compel capitalists to speed up commodity
production while reducing overhead costs (Marx 1867b, 433), capitalists face the possibility of
drowning in overproduced commodities and paying ruinous storage and warehousing fees.
However, capitalists are not subject to the same levels of deprivation that workers and noncapitalists face every day. 9 The capitalist state will bail out bankrupt companies in the name of
saving capitalism if those companies are essential for the functioning of daily life under
capitalism (Harvey 2010a). While consumers in capitalist societies face decisions over which

I’m talking about major fractions of capital that consume significant amounts of energy, not petty bourgeois small
business owners although politically, they constitute an important fraction of capital. Sadly, mom-and-pop
operations can go out of business and leave their owners destitute, but the mass of society doesn’t depend on these
companies to reproduce their daily lives like they do Exxon Mobil, American Airlines, or DHL. If you don’t get gas,
you can’t get to work, you’ll lose your job, and your means of subsistence. If you can’t get a candy bar at a corner
store or a haircut at a locally owned barber shop, you’ll just be shaggy looking and (temporarily) less happy.
9
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products to consume – if they are to survive – they have no choice but to depend on some form
of market. The case of energy shows this uneven power dynamic in perfect clarity. Non-capitalist
consumers exchange their labor for wages and buy the energy they need to keep from freezing,
fuel their car, cook their food, or entertain themselves. The “sheer need to survive” (Van den
Berg 1988, 351), once markets are established, is incentive enough to compel workers and
capitalists to enter into market-based transactions for energy. Demand for energy is quite
“inelastic,” meaning its consumers cannot simply choose not to consume it or choose some other
alternative to energy (Makholm 2012, 136).
Conclusion
The best form of state is not that in which social antagonisms are blurred or
forcibly shackled, … It is rather that in which they can freely come into conflict,
and thus be solved.
- Marx and Engels 1848b, 133
In this chapter I argued that the capitalist state stabilizes energy provisioning systems
because energy is an irreplaceable means of production for capital. This point departs from most
other literatures on state-energy relations that focus mainly on the politics of rent distribution. In
Marx’s terms, energy is an auxiliary means of production that is used up in the production
process. Both animate and inanimate forms of energy have been crucial to the growth of
capitalism through its history, but animate energy (coal, oil, gas, uranium) has become
increasingly critical as capital automates production. Capitalist states have used markets as the
provisioning system for energy because, as I argued, markets under capitalism are controlled by
the capitalist class. I conclude that if states allow capitalists to retain power over energy by
facilitating market-based provisioning of energy, they are only ensuring that capitalists will
manage energy primarily as a means of production (as opposed to a major driver of climate
change, or a means of fulfilling social needs).
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The market is the capitalist state’s perfect, ready-made excuse for policies that favor
capital’s interests at the expense of workers, their communities, and the environment. Invoking
‘the market’ is a perfect way of diffusing antagonism between social classes because it blames
no one in particular, yet so many people depend on it for their daily survival that it can appear
eternal and immutable. If a company pollutes a stream or fires a worker, it can blame the market
for its poor performance this quarter. Meanwhile, the worker must scramble to find a new way to
keeping her family indoors this winter, and the stream will need to be painstakingly cleaned up.
When states construct markets, establish the legal rules within which markets operate, guarantee
property rights and contracts, they are supporting a system of social relations based in
exploitation (Lilley 2011, 80). This is disastrous for mitigating climate change because state
energy policy is geared more toward serving capital with a vital means of production than toward
maintaining a habitable biosphere for humans (and non-human life too).
In this chapter, I argued that the state will go to great lengths to force resources into
market-based provisioning systems, which are not “class-neutral” institutions (Van den Berg
1988, 376). This does not mean that states have no role to play in creating markets, quite the
contrary. States can and should make resources available in noncommodified or de-commodified
forms rather than depend on markets that are controlled by a profit-maximizing capitalist class.
A good first step would be building new state-energy relations that prioritize meeting social
needs for energy over capital’s need for means of production. As I have argued, however, this
would require ending the capitalist state’s character from within it, specifically, by passing
socialistic energy laws instead of capitalist ones.
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Chapter 2
Plugging the Pipeline: Realizing the Value of Natural Gas in the 1930s U.S.
Introduction
For fourteen days in March 2017, California’s electrical grid paid the state of Arizona
twenty-five dollars a megawatt to accept surplus electricity generated by solar, which was
threatening to overload California’s grid (Penn 2017). Solar’s share of California’s electricity
generation grew 10 percent in the preceding seven years as the falling price of photovoltaic
panels made solar competitive with fossil fuels (Ibid.). Democrats in the state senate concerned
with climate change were in an uproar over utilities’ decisions to continue running natural gasfired power plants despite the availability of cheap, clean(er) solar power (Ibid.). Three investorowned utilities, Pacific and San Diego Gas and Electric and Southern California Edison, provide
three-quarters of the state’s electricity supply (State of California 2017). They had “legacy”
contracts that mandated natural gas be delivered, no matter how much energy was generated by
solar or wind (Gimon et al. 2015). These legacy contracts lock utilities into long-term
agreements with fossil-fuel companies and these agreements are inflexible and cannot readily
accommodate a market transition to renewables (Golden and Paulos 2015, 47). California would
not have dumped solar energy on to Arizona if the social provisioning of use values had been
prioritized over the realization of capitalist value. In terms of Karl Marx’s value theory, the
realization of value embodied in natural gas was more important than the use value of solar
power.
In nature-society scholarship there is a tendency to conduct fieldwork on the productive
stage of capital circulation (see Figure 1) when valorization occurs, e.g., farms (Zimmerer and
Douches 1991; Grossman 2000), forests (Prudham 2005), mines (Bebbington and Bury 2013;
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Perreault 2013), and fisheries (Mansfield 2004). These studies, however, miss important
socioecological dynamics of capital circulation that occur after the moment of valorization. I
argue that we can better understand the ecological waste and destruction that occur in the
productive stage of capital by also viewing production from a vantage point at the commodity
stage (C'-M'). For example, a great waste of resources can ensue if the value congealed within
them cannot be realized during a time of glut and overproduction (Huber 2011b). Agribusiness
will continue degrading farmlands if it can realize value by dumping overproduced, low-nutrition
food on poor, racially marginalized communities (Guthman 2011). Oil and gas capital will cool
natural gas to (-)163°C to transport it to markets for realization (Bridge and Bradshaw 2017,
223). The special tanker ships built to haul LNG are just one example of the extreme lengths to
which capitalists will go to ensure realization (Zalik 2008).

Figure 1: (Left side) Capital circulation and moments of valorization and realization highlighted. (Top right) The different stages
within the circuit. (Bottom right) Windows into capital circulation from the vantage point of its different stages.
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There are many more precautions taken by capital to safeguard the passage of value
through valorization and realization. Under capitalism, value is valorized and realized at
moments within the stages of the circuit that constitute the process of capital circulation (Harvey
2017, 6). Yet in geographers’ recent explorations in value theory (Gidwani 2008; Wainwright
2010; Hudson 2012; Karatani and Wainwright 2012; Henderson 2013; Christophers 2013, 2014),
including nature-society geography (Henderson 2004, 2009; Prudham 2009; Moore 2011; Huber
2013a, 2017c; Robertson and Wainwright 2013; Labban 2014; Ioris 2016; Kenney-Lazar and
Kay 2017), the moment of realization has not been dealt with extensively. Partially this focus on
valorization is an outcome of methodological decisions. Political ecologists tend to do long-term
fieldwork in developing world settings where raw materials and food are produced for export to
developed economies where those primary goods are either consumed or used to produce
finished goods. However, as I will argue, there are important socioecological effects of capital’s
value circulation at the stage of moment of realization as well.
Marx defined value as the abstract, socially necessary labor time embodied within
commodities (1867a, 38). 10 Marx adapted the labor theory of value from classical political
economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo. He added the notion that value could be
abstracted from concrete circumstances and made to circulate, or be hoarded, in the commodity
or money forms. Marx also appended “socially necessary” to his definition of value to indicate
how the coercive laws of competition force capitalists to always be reducing labor time as much
as possible (Harvey 2010b, 20). Much like the natural gas that this dissertation discusses, value is
undetectable: colorless, odorless, and tasteless. “Not an atom of matter enters into the objectivity

10

This understanding of value is a “qualitative theory that explains how and why labor under capitalism assumes
the form that it does” (Webber and Rigby 1996, 96) and has been elucidated by Elson (1979), Harvey (1982),
Postone (1993) and Heinrich (2012).
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of commodities as values; in this it is the direct opposite of the coarsely sensuous objectivity of
commodities as physical objects” (Marx 1867b, 138). Despite value’s immateriality, when the
circulation of value through valorization and realization is interrupted, the effects can be
pronounced, tangible, and objective. This is Harvey’s point when he describes value as
“immaterial but objective” (2010b, 33).
The capitalist state played a central role in reestablishing conditions for successful
circulation of capital through moments of valorization and realization. Christophers argues that
the capitalist state uses the law to strike a balance between the tendencies toward monopoly and
competition in capitalism (2016, 15). With no one coordinating their collective behavior,
individual capitalists will attempt to “overcome the barrier of the market by suppressing
competition, by fraud and, in extremis, by force” (Clarke 1988a, 124). Energy policy acts as a
counteracting force against capitalists’ tendencies to either monopolize energy markets or engage
in ruinous competition. The state reinforces markets with “institutional and fiscal
encouragement” (Ibid., 231), e.g., laws that stop monopoly (Sica 2018) or over-competition
(Huber 2011b). This balancing is especially important for the energy sector because energy
serves as a crucial means of production for so many other industries. When monopoly or ruinous
competition throws the energy sector off balance, many sectors outside energy capital are
affected.
In the following two sections, I apply a political economy lens to the historical geography of
natural gas in the 1930s U.S. I begin by making the case that most scholarship concerned with
capitalism in nature-society geography focuses on the stage of productive capital within the
wider circulation process. As I show, there are important socionatural dimensions of capitalist
value circulation during the other stages as well i.e., the money and commodity stages. In the
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next section I explain how the Power Trust used pipeline control to block the circulation of its
competitors’ value through the stage of commodity capital. This led to the waste of billions of
cubic feet of gas and the unnecessary and avoidable dumping of methane -- a potent greenhouse
gas -- into the atmosphere. In the same section I also examine the crisis of gasoline stripping and
explain how state regulation reformed gas markets. This case illustrates how the capitalist states
intervenes to restore capital circulation through the energy sector, when it is destabilized through
oligopolistic control.
Nature, Value and Capital Circulation
Most nature-society geography focuses on how capital extracts and transforms physical
objects and instruments of nature into goods and services. These studies unveil the social and
environmental processes and conditions required to produce commodities like water, timber,
meat, fiber, grain, produce, energy and minerals, and fish, among others (Bridge 2000; Braun
2002; Bakker 2003; Guthman 2004; Mansfield 2004; Moseley 2005; Prudham 2005;
Swyngedouw 2005; Eaton 2013; Huber 2013a; Emel and Neo 2015). Even studies of more
abstract commodifications of nature, like payment for ecosystem services (Lansing 2011;
McElwee 2012; Robertson 2012; Cavanagh and Benjaminsen 2014; Keul 2014; Osborne 2015),
explain the acts of measurement and calculative labor at the productive stage of capital (Huber
2018, 151). Ecosystem services are “produced” through the labor of ecologists and other
scientists who quantify and standardize heterogeneous nature into tradable credits. Geographers
critique the labor involved in valorizing natural services for being fraught with contradiction,
exploitation, and ecological destruction (Dempsey and Robertson 2012).
In Marx’s terms from Capital Vol. II, these studies explain what occurs at the stage of
productive capital (…P…) within the wider process of capital circulation (see Figure 1). Other
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scholarship examines the financialization of nature, whereby resource futures and insurance
policies integrate further abstractions of nature into the money stage (M-C(L+MP)) (Labban
2010; Zalik 2010; Johnson 2014). George Henderson also focused on the contradictions of
Californian agriculture at the money stage while framing those relations within the wider
circulation process (1999). I expand on Henderson’s work by examining the nature-society
relations caused by interruptions at the stage of commodity capital (C'-M'). Once again, there are
important socionatural dimensions of capitalist value circulation that occur at the commodity
stage.
Nature-society geographers conduct research on the stage of productive capital when
valorization occurs. Marx defined valorization as the process by which surplus value is added to
the value advanced in production (1867b, 252). In nature-society geography, valorization
includes processes through which natural resources come to objectify or materialize “congealed”
labor time (Harvey 2013, 55). Despite some exceptions (Henderson 1999; Huber 2009b; Lansing
2011; Karatani and Wainwright 2012), realization has been of more long-standing interest
outside nature-society scholarship. e.g., urban and economic geography (Harvey 1982; 2013) and
other disciplines working in the Marxian tradition (Wilkinson 1973; Boddy and Crotty 1976;
Wolff 1978; Sherman 1983; Clarke 1988a; Jessop 1990; Kenway 1990; Amariglio and Ruccio
1994; Hein 2006; Barba and de Vivo 2012; Ramirez 2012). Realization is the moment when the
abstract human labor “objectified or materialized” in a commodity (C') transitions through act of
exchange into money (M') (Marx 1867b, 129) (see Figure 1). When viewed from the window of
the commodity stage of capital circulation, realization is an essential moment when capitalists
gain the profits to finance expanded valorization.
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In a notable exception, Lansing points out how the accurate determination of carbon
offsets’ use values are essential for value realization (2011, 747). Lansing’s focus on use values
explains part of the process of commodification in Marx’s first sense of a commodity as a “thing
which through its qualities satisfies human needs” (1867a, 125; see Huber 2009b for a similar
analysis). Societies have “wants, needs, and desires” for items that originate in nature, like iron
from ore and paper from trees (Harvey 2014, 275). Nature-society metabolism under capitalism
is not directed by a will to satisfy needs, however, but by capitalists’ imperative to realize value
through market exchange.
As Michael Heinrich explains, “In exchange, the concrete acts of expended labor count as
a particular quantum of value-constituting abstract labor” (2012, 50). Marx saw that the value of
a commodity had a “dual character” (1867b, 131), first as a concrete product of labor and second
as an objectification of “abstract social labor” (Huber 2017c, 45). Every commodity is, at once,
both a useful article and the crystallized labor-time that is socially necessary for its production
(Marx 1867b, 129). It is through exchange that a commodity’s abstract value is realized as
money that the capitalist can hoard, use to consume, or reinvest in capital circulation (Ibid., 166).
Therefore, capitalism’s primary aim regarding nature is the passage of nature-derived
commodities’ value through moments of valorization and realization.
By not problematizing the realization of value, nature-society literatures are upholding
Say’s law, invented by the political economist Jean-Baptiste Say. Say posited, “It is worth while
to remark, that a product is no sooner created, than (sic) it, from that instant, affords a market for
other products to the full extent of its value” (1803, 138). Say was denying that there could be a
problem of realization because, according to his logic, the simple fact that values are produced
creates the demand for their full realization (Sherman 1983, 206). Marx critiqued this notion
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throughout Capital, Volume II (1885a), and some nature-society scholarship has shown how
scarcity and demand are produced to guarantee realization (Huber 2011b; Guthman 2011). In
Capital Vol. I, Marx suspended any realization problems for the purposes of analysis by
assuming that all goods trade at their values. As Harvey usefully explains, Marx’s purpose in
Volume I was to reveal capital’s inner workings in a “normal” state of functioning, free from
realization problems (2010b, 245). In Vol. II, however, Marx explains how capitalists are
constantly under assault by crises of realization emanating from ruinous competition and
capitalists’ tendency to restrict wages to their lowest possible price (the effective demand
problem). 11 Nature-society geography seems to adopt Marx’s assumptions from Vol. I, but as this
case will show, the realization problem (as elucidated in Vol. II) has a profound effect on naturesociety relations. As Harvey argues (2017), geographers can sharpen our focus on value by
expanding our analyses to include more of the total circulation process, including the moment of
realization.
Capital-nature relations in the stage of productive capital are affected by capitalists’ need
to avoid obstacles in the overall circulation process. California farmers decided to diversify their
crops, practice intercropping, and sell goods in fresh, dried, and canned forms so that their
lenders’ capital could circulate more quickly (Henderson 1999, 57). Banks deciding to whom to
provide credit would monitor the productive sphere to ensure that capital passed through

The classic quote on the effective demand problem appears as a footnote in Vol.II (1885a, 391, §1). Marx
explains a contradiction of capitalism wherein a poorly paid proletariat cannot adequately consume all the available
commodities (Harvey 1982, 90) and the coercive laws of competition force capitalists to continue production
regardless of consumption (Clarke 1994, 229). A realization problem occurs when the value congealed in
commodities is not realized through an exchange into the money form of value. I depart from this common
understanding of the realization problem as a lack of effective demand. I argue that an oligopoly of large producers
kept smaller, unaffiliated producers from realizing value, specifically by blocking their access to markets for
exchange. Once monopolies form, they can use their power to safeguard the circulation of capital under their control
by blocking the realization of a competitor’s value (Harvey 2013, 74). My point that monopoly power can cause
realization problems will be discussed further in the second section of this chapter.
11
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valorization successfully. “Some banks making a large number of citrus loans, check to see that
certain groves are properly irrigated in the summer, heated in the winter and treated at the proper
time for pests, for only in this way can they be certain of the value of the security” (Ibid., 69).
While Henderson focuses on capital’s socionatural dynamics from the window of the money
stage (M-C (L+MP), see Figure 1), I argue that the circumstances at other stages can have
significant socioecological effects as well.
The realization of value occurs during the stage of commodity capital (C'-M'). This stage
contains the moment of sale, when the original money plus a profit (M') is recuperated, allowing
production to proceed on an expanding scale (Harvey 2013, 55). From the window of the
commodity stage, capital circulation proceeds when capitalists use the money gained through
value realization to purchase labor power and means of production for the subsequent moment of
valorization. As Marx pointed out, realization can pose difficulties to the capitalist. “We already
know from the analysis of simple commodity circulation (Volume 1, Chapter 3) that C—M, the
sale, is the most difficult part of its (capital’s) metamorphosis, and thus forms the greater part of
the circulation time in normal circumstances” (1885a, 204). Following Marx, Henderson’s
analysis of the circulation of value through California agriculture shows how capital’s time spent
in commodity form poses risks and opportunities to agribusiness. “Capital’s time in circulation –
that is, the time capital spends in the commodity form, from the moment it is put in storage
(whether a box or a grain elevator), on through its journey to market, to the moment the capitalist
receives payment from sale – can present an obstacle” (Henderson 1999, 32). Henderson argues
that these obstacles appear as costs to be averted and are therefore opportunities for potential
capitalists willing to get involved in covering those costs (Ibid.). The blockage of capital’s
circulation in the case of natural gas presented an opportunity to gasoline manufacturers (a point
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I explain below) but created problems for the wider society and environment. However, it was
not a conventional “realization problem” as Marxist scholarship typically considers them
(Sherman 1983; Kenway 1990).
The emblematic realization crisis was the Great Depression, which was caused by what
Harvey calls the “effective demand problem” (1982, 90). This was a systemic breakdown of
circulation wherein a central contradiction of capitalism erupted into a systemic crisis. As Marx
explained, “the sale of commodities, the realization of commodity capital, and thus of surplusvalue as well, is restricted not by the consumer needs of society in general, but by the consumer
needs of a society in which the great majority are always poor and must always remain poor”
(Marx 1885a, 391). In other words, an oversupply of goods cannot be sold because the great
mass of society is the poorly paid proletariat who cannot afford to consume away the surfeit of
commodities. Although gas markets were in disarray during the Great Depression, the realization
problem in gas markets had little to do with the effective demand problem. There was no paucity
of effective demand, as evidenced by the consumer groups testifying before Congress against the
waste of gas (Herbert 1992, 63). They took offense at the waste of gas while prices for it rose,
and as upper-middle-class city dwellers, they were suffering less from an inability to pay for gas
than an inability to get it (Castaneda 1999, 76-8). The realization problem as it was experienced
by independent natural gas producers in the 1930s came less from a lack of effective demand
than from the gas industry’s structure.
The oligopolistic Power Trust controlled portions of the Texas Panhandle’s oil and
natural gas fields located near independent gas producers’ own lease holdings. The Power Trust
was competing with independent producers to realize the most value from the Panhandle’s gas
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reservoirs as fast as possible. 12 To assure the integrity of its value regime, the Trust shut out the
independents’ commodities from entering interstate pipelines. The Trust plugged the pipeline to
protect itself from competitive capital, and the independent producers were stuck. They could not
sell the natural gas they had extracted because their commodities could not reach urban markets
where they could be exchanged. In value-theoretical terms, the passage of value through the
independents’ natural gas was interrupted at the stage of commodity capital when their value’s
realization was disallowed by the Trust. In those dire straits, the independents totally abandoned
the circulation of capital through natural gas and forged ahead with an entirely new circuit based
in gasoline production. The process of gasoline stripping (a technique of running natural gas
through filters to remove traces amounts of gasoline) was extremely wasteful, which incited a
consumer outcry. It also was an ecological disaster, as it released billions of cubic feet of
methane, which is a potent greenhouse gas, directly into the atmosphere.
The following case of the massive waste of natural gas during the era of the Power Trust
exhibits the importance of realizing abstract value to the capital-nature relation. In the 1930s, gas
was scarce in urban markets, and prices were rising. By all accounts, gas demand signaled a
social need for fuel, especially for cooking and indoor heating, which grew each passing winter.
If capitalists approached nature intending to provide consumers with its use values, one would
expect them to exploit all available natural gas supplies. However, in the oil fields of the Texas
Panhandle, gas producers were venting billions of cubic feet into the atmosphere. They did so
not because gas had no use value but because its value could not be realized within the market
conditions of the time. As Marx explained in Capital Volume III, “Any commodity can realize its
In the U.S., the “rule of capture” grants property rights over oil and gas to whoever develops them first, thus
inculcating a “race” mentality in drillers who then drain reservoirs as fast as possible (Huber 2013a, 45). The film
There Will be Blood explained the rule of capture as an oilman’s strategy of using one well (or straw) to drain a
shared reservoir (or milkshake) out from under a group of leaseholders (Ibid., 193).
12
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value only in the process of circulation, and whether and to what extent it does realize this
depends on the market conditions of the time” (1894a, 777). The market conditions of the 1930s
U.S. gas sector were antithetical to realization for anyone but the oligopolistic Power Trust. Its
power over the pipelines – the means of realization – would lead to social and market
dysfunction and environmental waste and needless destruction.
Natural Gas Market Failure
By the 1930s, an oligopoly of power utilities called the “Power Trust” controlled a value
regime based on valorizing natural gas in the Texas Panhandle and realizing it in urban markets
(Castaneda 1999, 69). Harvey defines a value regime as a relatively stable, geographically fixed,
regional configuration around which value production, realization, and distribution form (2017,
157). Advancements in long-distance, high-pressure pipelines in the late 1920s allowed the
Power Trust to introduce natural gas in Eastern and Midwestern markets previously served by
coal (Vietor 1994, 4). The Power Trust was made up of four principle companies: Columbia,
Standard Oil, Cities Service, and Electric Bond and Share (EB&S). It controlled roughly 70% of
all United States natural gas production, pipeline transportation, and interstate sales (Sherrill
1983, 539; Castaneda 1999, 107). The Power Trust’s value regime was broken up into four subregional zones of influence. Columbia and Standard Oil controlled gas in the Appalachians,
Cities Service dominated the lower Midwest and upper Southeast, and EB&S served the Great
Lakes (Castaneda 1999, 89). The Power Trust used its control over the nascent interstate pipeline
network to block their competitors’ gas from reaching urban markets (Ibid., 69). In Capital Vol.
II, Marx discusses how monopoly power allows some industrial capital to “ride out” periods of
“disturbances in the repetitions of the (value) circuit” (1885a, 187). The Power Trust used its

41
oligopolistic market position to charge “monopoly rents” on pipeline transportation of natural
gas (Harvey 1982, 349-50) and to limit its competitors’ access to the means of realization.
The Power Trust blocked unaffiliated, independent producers from accessing the pipeline
network and transporting their gas to urban markets where its value could be realized.
Independent producers in the Panhandle leased gas rights from landowners, typically farmers,
who kept a gas well on their land as supplemental income (Associated Press 1934, 8). The Power
Trust bought gas rights adjacent to farming properties in the Panhandle, and independents feared
it would “drain” the shared reservoir out from under them (Amarillo Daily News 1934, 13).
Gasoline manufacturers used this blockage in the circulation of the independents’ value through
natural gas as an opportunity to form a new value circuit based on gasoline stripping.
Natural gas deposits contain only a meager gasoline content. Thousands of cubic feet of
gas yield only a single gallon of gasoline (Miller 1935, 3E). However, gasoline stripping
permitted the independents to “derive some revenue through stripping their unmarketable gas of
its little but marketable gasoline content” (Ibid.). The 41 total gasoline stripping plants in the
Panhandle used $500 million worth of natural gas to create $500 thousand worth of gasoline
(Canton Herald 1935), out of which landowners could expect rents of $300 a month (Amarillo
Sunday News-Globe 1934). Gasoline stripping was an appealing option to independents
compared to the zero remuneration they would receive if the Power Trust continued to control
the means of realization while draining the common reservoir.
The waste in the midst of price increases caused great uproar among urban consumers
who were dependent on natural gas for heat, industrial power, and lighting and had suffered price
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gouging by the Power Trust. 13 Natural gas is principally composed of methane, which is a potent
greenhouse gas (Brandt et al. 2014). Through gasoline stripping, the independents dumped a
product that was needed and useful and further aggravated climate change by disposing of
methane directly into the atmosphere. The successful circulation of capital through gasoline took
precedence over both social and socioecological concerns, as it does in contemporary capitalism.
The Power Trust and the Pipelines
In the 1930s U.S., the Power Trust controlled interstate pipelines that transmitted gas
from northern Texas to cities such as Chicago, Denver and Indianapolis (see Figure 2). Natural
gas from the Texas Panhandle was proving to be a cheaper, cleaner, and more convenient form
of energy than competing fuels. Relative to coal, which had to be blasted, shoveled, and carried
to the surface, natural forces of geologic pressure allowed gas producers to radically undercut the
socially necessary labor time for energy. 14 When oil and gas producers puncture subterranean
reservoirs, they release the tremendous pressure that formed most of the world’s known oil and
natural gas (along with heat) 100-150 million years ago (Hilyard 2012, 2). This geologic pressure
carries oil and natural gas to the surface and is appropriated by oil and gas capitalists as a “free
gift of nature” that lowers the value of oil and gas compared to coal and allows oil capital to
undersell competing fuels (Marx 1894a, 745).

In recent years, geographers have examined issues of value and waste in various subdisciplines, e.g., economic
(Herod et al. 2013, 2014; Gidwani 2015), nature-society (Gidwani 2012, 2013), urban (Gidwani and Maringanti
2016) and cultural (Henderson 2011). My argument deviates slightly from this work by considering the unused,
overproduced commodities immediately destroyed at the point of production, rather than the salvaging of value from
the unserviceable material remaining after consumption (i.e., trash or garbage).
14
Timothy Mitchell makes a similar point about fuel oil requiring less coordination within the workforce than coal
in Marshall Plan-era Europe (2011), although he doesn’t frame that conclusion in value-theoretical terms.
13
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Figure 2: Los Angeles Times 1934. Gas stripping is problem:
Missouri Valley cities call it wasteful. 4 June: financial page - oil
and mining.

Another physical property influenced the emergence of natural gas as value-bearing
capital in the 1930s. Natural gas is buoyant and must be contained in airtight pipelines and
storage containers along every step of its supply chain. Massive natural gas fields were first
discovered in the Texas Panhandle in 1918 and 1919 (Castaneda 1993, 17). However, it wasn’t
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until welding technology improved in the mid-1920s that Panhandle gas could be shipped to
faraway markets in strong pipelines that were durable and impervious. Once pipelines are
constructed, they are cheaper than any other form of bulk, overland transport (Smil 1999, 189).
However, the labor of trenching, cleaning, coating, laying, welding, and testing pipelines for
leaks is expensive and requires significant, upfront investment long before any returns are made.
Because of pipelines’ high initial costs, gas companies that might have competed frequently
ended up cooperating to finance construction projects (Sanders 1981, 26). The Power Trust’s
holding company structure allowed it to marshal tremendous amounts of investment financing to
construct pipelines, promote gas utilization, and extend gas service into markets previously
served by coal (Castaneda 1999, 89). Metropolitan gas distribution companies, nested within the
Trust’s holding company structure, built most of the pipelines between the mid-1920s and early
1930s (Castaneda 1993, 18). 15 By the early 1930s, the Trust owned and controlled a network of
gas wells and pipelines spread across Appalachia, Southern California, and the oil and gas fields
in and around Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Arkansas (Schurr and Netschert 1960, 128).
The Power Trust’s value regime expanded dramatically under the direction of oligarchs
like Henry Doherty of Cities Services. Doherty was a self-taught gas engineer, who between
1905 and 1930, acquired control of 190 utilities and oil and gas companies (Castaneda and Smith
1996, 53). Doherty was a savvy marketer, establishing demonstration programs for neighborhood
associations and their urban, upper-middle-class members (Castaneda 1999, 76-8). By 1936,
Cities Services controlled one billion dollars ($18 billion in 2017 dollars) in petroleum and utility
related assets and Doherty himself had $500 million ($9 billion in 2017 dollars) (Cutlip 1994,

A holding company is a trading company which possesses the whole of, or a controlling interest in, the share
capital of one or more other companies (Oxford English Dictionary).
15
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546). To finance the construction of pipelines, the Power Trust bought up “huge tracts” of gasproducing lands adjacent to and interspersed among independent gas producers’ lands (Sanders
1981, 25). By owning the supply, the Trust could assure pipeline investors of a return, but it also
forced independent producers that were unaffiliated with the Trust to rely on pipelines owned by
their direct competitor. The Power Trust asserted “iron-fisted control” over the pipeline
distribution system, thereby quashing competition from the independents (Herbert 1992, 64).
Prices Rise While Gas is “Popped”
When the Great Depression befell the United States, the natural gas business experienced
a full-blown “market failure” (Castaneda and Smith 1996, 75). Gas prices for residential
consumers were rising, while consumers’ average incomes fell (Herbert 1992, 61), and the prices
consumers were paying bore no relation to the actual cost of the service (Ibid., 65). Households
switched to other fuels, doubled up on living quarters, or sometimes migrated from cities back to
the farm (Dawson 1937, 126). Although there were shortages and rising prices in the Eastern and
Midwestern states, simultaneous gluts in the Southwest resulted in the massive wasting of gas
(Sanders 1981, 24). With no way to realize the value of gas, independent producers resorted to
stripping off marginal amounts of gasoline, while “popping” the associated natural gas into the
atmosphere (Zimmermann 1957, 253). Popping gas entailed using filters to strip off miniscule
amounts of gasoline mixed in with natural gas and then flaring or venting off the greater part of
the reservoir (see Figure 3). A cartoon in The Pampa Post decried the “millions of dollars of
waste” that resulted (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4: Source: Miller 1935.

Figure 3: Cartoon by John F. Knott appears in Panhandle
Conversation Association advertisement. The Pampa Post 1934 26
December: 3.

Consumer groups testified before Congress, decrying the rising price of gas despite the
“well-known surplus” in the Southwest (Herbert 1992, 63). Estimates of the natural gas wasted
totaled 50 % of total production (Ibid., 64), which in one year (1933) equaled 1.5 billion ft³,
which would have satisfied the total U.S. residential and commercial demand (Sherrill 1983,
538). Another estimate found that in 1933 producers wasted enough gas to fuel a town of 15,000
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for five years (Sanders 1981, 33). The Federal Trade Commission found that the total amount of
gas wasted in the Texas Panhandle equaled or exceeded the total U.S. natural gas demand each
year between 1927 and 1930 (Castaneda 1993, 25). Ads in Texas newspapers decried the waste,
citing how the gas wasted had an energy content of 62 million barrels of oil, enough to “form a
solid belt around the earth!” (see Figure 5).

Figure 5: Texas Natural Resources Committee advertisement. The Abilene Morning News 1934 17 October: 5.

Rising prices amid waste made perfect sense for independent gas producers from a valuetheoretical perspective. Independent oil and gas producers were desperate to realize whatever
value they could before the Power Trust drained the gas reservoirs out from under them. While
city dwellers in the Midwest and Eastern United States were literally freezing from a lack of gas
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in the winter, the Power Trust was freezing out Southwestern value from those markets (Sanders
1981, 26). Under the circumstances, the independents could either stand by and watch the Trust
drain the Panhandle or resort to popping gas. Popping was incredibly wasteful but without access
to the interstate pipelines, independents could only produce and sell gasoline, which allowed
them to realize at least some small value from their lease holding.
The presence of massive waste in a market context of rising prices eventually proved
intolerable, and the state stepped in to restore stability and the price mechanism. Officials from
Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Missouri that demanded federal authorities impose rationality and
order to the chaotic and wasteful market (Tussing and Tippee 1995, 133). Texas and Oklahoma
mobilized the National Guard and declared martial law in the oil fields to staunch overproduction
and save the industry from itself (Huber 2011b). Producers and some pipeline companies favored
government oversight if it would only stabilize to the chaotic market (Sanders 1981, 58). Texas
House Bill 266 in 1935 implemented pro-rationing plans to stop flagrant waste of natural gas in
the Panhandle (Zimmermann 1957, 255; Olien and Hinton 2000, 206). At the national level, New
Dealers ushered in a suite of laws to combat market failure, which included bipartisan
congressional support for the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) of 1935 (Castaneda
and Smith 1996, 75). These New Deal reforms ended the Power Trust’s natural gas-based value
regime by breaking off pipeline companies into smaller, separate firms not under its direct
control. Under the PUHCA, the Securities and Exchange Commission forced the Power Trust to
divest itself of stock in multiple utilities and break up their oligopoly (Vietor 1994, 99-100).
Between 1935 and 1947, 306 utility companies were spun off from the Trust, and more than a
third became stand-alone natural gas companies (Sanders 1981, 38).
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State Audits and Market Reform
In 1938, the New Deal Congress passed the Natural Gas Act (NGA) to reform the gas
business by breaking up the Power Trust. The Supreme Court would later say, “Protection of
consumers through exploitation at the hands of the natural gas companies was the primary aim of
the Natural Gas Act” (Sherrill 1983, 540). The NGA was the capitalist state’s attempt to end the
monopolistic practices that threatened an essential means of production. Under the NGA, the
Federal Power Commission (FPC) had the authority to demand gas companies involved in
interstate trade submit construction plans for approval, submit rate schedules for auditing, and
seek permission to abandon service or equipment (Zimmermann 1957, 294). The rate audits
revealed that the Power Trust was charging prices far above the socially necessary labor time for
gas. The Trust’s value regime rested on valorizing low-labor natural gas and realizing it at prices
that were marked up far beyond cost of production. Before regulation, gas companies massively
inflated the worth of assets to appear as though utilities were providing more and better service
than they were (Castaneda 1993, 25). By claiming that they were installing more pipelines and
compressor stations and drawing from a greater network of gas wells, the Power Trust raised the
real rates that consumers paid for gas.
The Power Trust could get away with price gouging because it held oligopolistic control
over the circulation of capital through natural gas. Whichever firm first established itself in a
region charged prices that were significantly more than the cost of the service (Herbert 1992,
65). In Marxian terms, not only was the Power Trust realizing value free from competition, it
also was raising prices beyond the value and surplus value crystallized in natural gas. This was
disastrous for capitalist consumers of gas who needed to maintain low expenditures on constant
capital to boost profits. The Trust set profit rates high above costs and defended those rates “by
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all the means, both old and new, which are at their disposal” (Meek 1956, 292). In major
consuming states like Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York, prices rose 14, 22, and 47%
(respectively) in the five years between 1931 and 1935 (Herbert 1992, 61). The Power Trust
justified these rate increases by claiming that costs for the service were increasing, but this was
later shown to be false (Sanders 1981, 38). Throughout the 1920s, gas companies profited greatly
by steadily increasing prices on residential consumers while maintaining low, wholesale prices
for industry (Herbert 1992, 39). With minimal regulation, the Power Trust could practice
discriminatory pricing to maximize profit. Herbert speculates that intra-capitalist cooperation
between the Trust and industries such as steel mills and smelting operations resulted in low gas
prices for industry during this period (Ibid., 37). Bringing prices of gas back into line with their
true value was a crucial step in restoring public faith in the savings that fair market competition
brought to their pocketbooks (Jacobs 2005). The state’s elimination of price gouging also was a
boon to capital, which had suffered from having to pay inflated prices for this vital means of
production.
Enormous write-offs of industry assets were crucial to restoring natural gas prices to a
more accurate reflection of value. Through auditing, the FPC used the NGA’s authority to
eliminate millions of dollars’ worth of assets through write-offs and rate reductions. The FPC
found natural gas companies to be charging unnecessary and exploitative overcharges at a rate of
$34.6 million per year ($600 million in 2017 dollars). 16 In total, between 1938 and 1943, the
FPC eliminated $173 million ($2.5 billion in 2017 dollars) of fictitious holdings from natural gas
companies used to justify higher rates (Ibid.). To take one example, the FPC found that Interstate
U.S. Federal Power Commission. 1943. FPC Orders Interstate Natural Gas Company, Inc. to Reduce Rate for
Natural Gas for Resale for Ultimate Public Consumption By $1,100,345 A Year; Directs That New Schedules Shall
Be Filed and Become Effective May 15, 1943. U.S. National Archives and Records Administration: College Park,
Maryland. Department of Energy records. News and press releases 1934-1999. Box 3. 3 May.
16
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Natural Gas Inc. was claiming asset depreciation at two completely different rates to overcharge
customers and avoid paying taxes. For the purposes of determining how much to charge
consumers, Interstate claimed assets of 11 million dollars and for tax purposes they claimed
assets of four million dollars (Ibid.). 17 Between 1941 and 1945, the FPC made 113 gas and
electric utilities eliminate $820 million (11 billion in 2017 dollars) worth of assets from their
accounts. 18 The last company in this group, Appalachian Power, was carrying reported assets 43
% above their actual cost. 19 Once these “write-ups” were eliminated, the company lost $40
million ($550 million in 2017 dollars). 20 Conor Harrison describes a similar process where the
state voided “written up” asset values in the electrical utility sector, also under the authority of
PUHCA (2013, 179). The state eliminated unnecessary expenses for all capitalists who needed
gas as a means of production when it voided the write-ups. Most companies in the Power Trust
voluntarily complied with the FPC orders, suggesting that state-mandated write-offs were taken
as the price for restoring stable, functioning markets. 21 In sum, to restore the circulation of value
through gas, the state had to disassemble and reform the gas industry to save it from its
oligopolistic structure.
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U.S. FPC 1943.
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Conclusion
Questions of value lie at the heart of current debates over capital-nature relations in
nature-society geography. The moments of valorization and realization of value occur within the
broader circulation process of capital, yet in nature-society geography we tend to focus on the
nature-capital relations at the stage of productive capital when labor valorizes commodities. The
stage of commodity capital, when consumers realize value through the transformation of
commodities into money, can also be a major driver for capital-nature relations. In the case of
natural gas in the 1930s United States, the circulation of capital was blocked for independent
producers, leading them to vent methane (a potent greenhouse gas) directly into the atmosphere.
Four vertically-integrated firms – the Power Trust – used its power over interstate gas pipelines
to block competitors’ commodities from reaching markets. The Power Trust was ensuring that
the value of its commodity capital was successfully realized, by blocking their competitors’ gas
from exchange and value realization. Their competitors – the independents– found themselves
with no ability to realize the value of their gas and opted instead to dump it into the atmosphere
through the process of gasoline stripping. The importance of realization within the wider capital
circulation process is not only a historical-geographical problem. Modern utilities and energy
companies are compelled to realize the value crystallized in fossil fuels, despite the availability
and superiority of renewable energy.
To push beyond the surface appearance of commodities is a perennial project of Marxist
political economy. To grasp the social and socionatural relations necessary to produce goods and
services is to unveil capitalist ways of producing and reproducing life. Critical nature-society
geography maintains a dedication to the socionatural relations behind a panoply of resources
across space, place, and scale. These studies typically examine the productive stage, and in more
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exceptional cases the money stage, of the circulation of capital. My objective in this chapter was
to develop nature-society geography’s engagement with capital circulation, specifically the stage
of commodity capital and the moment of realization, upon which continuing valorization
depends. The sequence of value production and realization is the “determining purpose” that
guides capitalist social relations and capital-nature relations (Harvey 2013, 67).
Value realization was a crucial determinant of natural gas markets in the oligopolistic
1930s United States, but it matters more than ever today. Despite a dire need to transition toward
clean(er) energy to avert worsening climate change, fossil fuel companies are compelled to
realize the value of every cubic foot of natural gas in their reserves. 22 As the opening anecdote
from California illustrated, these commitments to value realization are delaying a transition to
cleaner forms of energy. However, even if the state can assert its power over capital to write off
these assets, value will simply take new forms. Although fossil-fueled societies have a
tremendous need for solar panels, wind turbines, battery storage, and electric cars, capital
demands these use values be produced as values (McCarthy 2015), which pass through moments
of valorization and realization in the broader process of capital circulation. Geography’s
engagements with value theory provide a crucial perspective on how and why the survival of
value poses an obstacle to the survival of life. Capitalists are concerned with surplus value
production above all other concerns, including humanity’s survival on the planet.
The real objective of any left struggle should not be the replacement of one value regime
with another but the abolition of capitalist value itself. Capitalist natures follow a logic that
prioritizes realizing privately held value over the provisioning of socionatural goods that fulfill

They are compelled by their responsibilities to increase shareholder value and not to abandon infrastructure used
to produce fossil fuels that is worth billions.
22
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social needs. Although we live and die by our ability to satisfy physical needs, capital requires
that we relate to nature, and each other, as homogeneous abstractions of our working lives. As
this case illustrates, the pursuit of immaterial value leads to material outcomes that are wasteful,
destructive, and exploitative. Replacing fossil capital with renewable capital would perpetuate
familiar, violent contradictions that produce social injustice and ecological destruction. Naturesociety metabolism under capitalism entails the successful passage of value from valorization
through realization, all within the wider circulation process. Blockages and interruptions in that
process will bring further waste, unnecessary human deprivation, and environmental waste.
Rather than seeking to eliminate blockages in valorization and realization, the productive labor
of society must be spent satisfying human needs in replacement of capital circulation.
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Chapter 3
Beyond the Fractured Environmental State: Capital, Labor, And Natural Gas
Introduction
In 2012, the U.S. was producing more natural gas than ever before through fracking (U.S.
EIA 2017a). Fracking is a technique for extracting oil and natural gas from shale rock formations
using highly pressurized water, sand, and chemicals that has allowed a new oil and natural gas
boom (Sica 2015). In his State of the Union address that year, President Obama highlighted the
broader economic significance of fracking for the economy. “The development of natural gas
will create jobs and power trucks and factories that are cleaner and cheaper, proving that we
don't have to choose between our environment and our economy” (White House 2012). Although
the U.S. had yet to establish a natural gas-powered transportation sector (and still has not, six
years later), Obama was correct that industries throughout the economy benefited from the boost
in natural gas supply and declining price. For example, a new methanol plant slated for
construction in Chile was rerouted to Louisiana because the “outlook” of low natural gas prices
in the U.S. was so bright (Nemec 2012). (The facility now produces two million metric tons of
methanol a year according to its website.) However, he was incorrect in another, deeper respect.
In the case of gas, we can’t choose between the environment and the economy because
one is an essential input to the other. Gas is an essential resource that originates in the
environment and is used to run the economy. In this chapter, I explain how and why the U.S.
came to depend on natural gas, focusing on a crucial mid-1950s Supreme Court decision. I argue
that political ecologies of the state principally study the fractions of the capitalist state that
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regulate “nature-centered industries” 23 (Whitehead et al. 2007; Ioris 2014; Harris et al. 2017).
Some of the most ecologically significant government policies are not always framed as
environmental or are not legitimized on environmental grounds. Decisions over policy based
primarily on the health of the economy as a whole can have long-lasting impacts on the
environment.
Political ecology has an overly narrow conception of the state-environment relation under
capitalism that mirrors an overly limited theory of the capitalist state that emerged in the 1970s.
Marxist state theorist Nicos Poulantzas espoused a “fractionalist” approach to studying the
capitalist state that shares some similarities with political ecology’s empirical approach to the
state. Poulantzas advanced the idea that states represent a condensation of the balance of class
forces, which functions under the hegemony of a dominant class fraction.
The (capitalist) State… is rather a relationship of forces, or more precisely the
material condensation of such a relationship among classes and class fractions,
such as this is expressed within the State in a necessarily specific form…
However, the State is not purely and simply a relationship, or the condensation of
a relationship; it is the specific material condensation of a relationship of forces
among classes and class fractions. (Poulantzas 1978, 128-9)
Simon Clarke criticized this theory for leading to tautological and analytical cul-de-sacs
when it was put into practice by state theorists. Rather than focusing on class fractions à la
Poulantzas, Clarke suggested that attention be given to how the state reproduces a more general –
yet fundamental – social relation of capitalism: the capital-labor relation. Rather than focusing on
how the capitalist state supports capital as-a-whole, Clarke argued, Poulantzas emphasized the
importance of particular capitals (Das 1996, 42). This focus is more in keeping with Marx, who

Boyd et al. categorize “nature-centered production” as the “food, fiber, and raw materials sectors” and give a
convincing argument for why these industries should not be thought of as analytically distinct within a Marxian,
political-ecological framework (2001, 555).
23
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said little about the capitalist state but considered the subjection of labor to capital to be the
foundation of the capitalist mode of production.
The production of absolute surplus-value turns exclusively upon the length of the
working day; the production of relative surplus-value, revolutionizes out and out
the technical processes of labour, and the composition of society. It therefore presupposes a specific mode, the capitalist mode of production, a mode which, along
with its methods, means and conditions, arises and develops itself spontaneously
on the foundation afforded by the formal subjection of labour to capital (1867a,
510).
I argue that political ecology employs a similar “fractionalist” approach by cordoning off
its research gaze to those fractions of the state involved in governing nature-centered industries.
This is a problem because political ecology overlooks the state’s critical role in reproducing
capitalism in general through environmental governance. Natural resources are a critical means
of production under capitalism, and they are also an ecological foundation for the social relations
of production. I explore this argument through a case study of the regulation of natural gas in the
United States. Although gas is a nature-centered industry, the state governed it with an eye
toward keeping the price of labor power low and reducing capital’s expenditures on constant
capital. I precede that case study with a review of the political ecology literatures that regard the
state’s role in capital-nature relations.
Political Ecologies of The State
Despite trends away from state-centered analysis, political ecologists have – with some
consistency – answered Robbins’ call for greater engagement with the state (2003). 24 That said,
recent years have witnessed the emergence of literatures on “environmental governance” that

For the purposes of this review, I define the state as public-sector workers operating within “an ensemble of
socially embedded, socially regularized and strategically selective institutions, organizations, social forces and
activities organized around (or at least actively involved in) making collectively binding decisions for an imagined
political community” (Jessop 2002, 6).
24
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“problematize state-centric” explanation (Bridge and Perreault 2009, 476), preferring to examine
the state in relation to the power of corporations, NGOs, and social movements (Himley 2008).
Quoting state theorist Bob Jessop, Himley notes, “It is precisely this ‘destatization of the political
system’ that the concept of governance seeks to capture” (Ibid., 435). Despite the emergence of
environmental governance – as opposed to environmental government – there has always been
an interest in integrating theories of the state with political ecology, including a recent surge in
scholarship on the topic (Bridge and Jonas 2002; Carter and Zalik 2016; D’Alisa and Kallis
2016; Harris 2017; Ioris 2014; McCarthy 2007; Meehan and Molden 2015; Parenti 2015a;
Robertson 2015; Whitehead et al. 2007). Contemporary political ecologists find the state central
to “the organizational and institutional arrangements through which society-environment
relations are governed” (Himley 2008, 434), and the articulation of these organizational
arrangements is of long-standing interest to the field.
Some literatures have recently called for “political ecologies of the state”; however, this
phrasing seems redundant if we accept Blaikie and Brookfield’s definition of political ecology.
As Robertson mentioned in a recent review (2015, 459), one sentence following Blaikie and
Brookfield’s oft-cited definition of political ecology (“concerns of ecology and a broadly-defined
political economy”) they add, “We also derive from political economy a concern with the role of
the state” (1987, 17). Blaikie and Brookfield intended to situate the decisions of independent
land managers in “chains of explanation” that explained smallholder land use in the context of
state policy and global economic change (1987, 27). They focused on how structures at “higher
levels of influence,” i.e., the state, international financial institutions, and NGOs, condition the
decisions of independent land managers (Bridge 2002, 371). Over time, critics pushed the field
to strengthen the political-economic and state links in chains of explanation by focusing on the
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topics of “control and access” to resources and property (Peet and Watts 1996, 8-9). New
research over the next decade witnessed a shifting toward the “complex relations between Nature
and Society through careful analysis of social forms of access and control over resources” (Watts
and Peet 2004, 4). In these struggles over control and access to resources, the state is both a
persistent “mediator between capital and nature” and a “site of struggle” itself (Robbins 2008,
212). Crucially, “one of the central functions of the state is to provide for the conditions for the
accumulation of capital” (Ibid., 210). Theorists of the state working in the Marxian tradition have
been grappling with this “function” for decades (Das 2006), and some have begun to see the
parallels between state theory and political ecology.
Although nature or the environment was not in their purview, the Marxist state theory
debates of the 1970s and 1980s recently have reemerged as a common point of reference for
political ecologists. Reviewers have pointed out how political ecology lacks a “warranted”
engagement with state theory (Bridge 2014, 126), given state capacities for mobilizing land and
resources and facilitating legal appropriation. Parenti also points out how Marx-inspired naturesociety studies have “not quite linked up with” Marxist state theory (2016, 172). Robertson says
the necessity of a state theory within political ecology is thrown into “sharp relief” with the
development of first-world political ecology and suggests the regulation approach (citing Huber
2013b) as a possible entry point (2015, 462). In his review, Ioris acknowledges the regulation
approach’s strong, historical grounding, before reviewing the widely acknowledged state-theory
debate of the 1970s between Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas (2015). Ioris’s own
theorization of “environmental statehood” builds on the main threads of that historical debate. He
holds that state-nature practices are profoundly affected by “historical and class commitments,”
which arise from a “tacit separation” of state and capital (2014, viii, 9). In their day, both
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Miliband and Poulantzas tried to draw out the intricacies of the unity between state and capital.
The former saw the state as “colonized and primarily represent(ing) the capitalist class,” and the
latter saw the state as “permeated” by capital “in a more systemic manner that connects the
structures of society and the state” (Ioris 2015, 172). Early endorsements of Miliband in political
ecology (Blaikie 1985, 83) have given way to calls for limited engagement with Poulantzas’s
work.
Wainwright and Mann recently said that “we urgently need a study that draws on
Poulantzas’s thought to study climate change and the capitalist state” (2015, 320). Although not
focused on climate change specifically, some nature-society research has drawn on Poulantzas’s
idea that “the state is a condensation of societal relationships of forces” (Brand et al. 2011, 162;
see also Andreucci 2017, 172) and an “outcome of struggle” (Angel 2017, 561). Others suggest
political ecology should engage with Jessop’s strategic-relational approach (SRA) (Robertson
and Wainwright 2013, 899; Whitehead et al. 2007, 44), which Jessop considers an extension and
development of Poulantzas’s state theory. 25
Both Whitehead et al. (2007, 44) and Robertson and Wainwright (2013, 899) borrow
Poulantzas’s recognition that the capitalist state cannot work in unity with capital because the
capitalist class is split into “fractions.” According to Poulantzas, this disunity on the economic
level requires a means of unifying and legitimizing state policy amongst different capitalist class

Jessop explains the evolution of the SRA out of Poulantzas’s work in several places: “I refer to the ‘strategicrelational’ approach. Its basic theme is expressed somewhat obliquely in Poulantzas’s claim that ‘the state is a social
relation’. This suggestion can be reformulated in the proposition that state power as revealed in the conjunctural
efficacy of state interventions is a form-determined condensation of the balance of political forces” (Jessop 1990,
149). “…the influence of theorists, for good or bad, continues as long as their work leaves identifiable traces on the
work of others... his (Poulantzas’s) work remains a critical source for a continuing critical tradition of state theory …
There is also enormous value in his strategic-relational approach. We should approach his work in the same critical
spirit as that adopted by Poulantzas in his own studies: to appreciate its significant theoretical ruptures, to fill its
gaps, to assess its relevance to new problems and theoretical currents, to develop it in new directions” (Jessop 2008,
137-9).
25
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fractions (Benton 1984, 162). 26 Poulantzas argued that a hegemonic fraction existed within the
capitalist class, and it was around this fraction that the state formed as a “material
condensation.” 27 Poulantzas was drawing on the Gramscian notion of a “hegemonic bloc,” i.e.,
“a durable alliance of class forces organized by a class (or class fraction) that has proved itself
capable of exercising political, intellectual, and moral leadership over the dominant classes and
the popular masses alike” (Jessop 1997, 56-7). Jessop speculates that had Poulantzas paid
attention to environmental politics, he would have analyzed how disputes over environmental
policy and issues are shot through with disputes between different fractions of capital (2017,
196). Before we follow Wainwright, Mann, et al.’s suggestions and develop a more Poulantzasinspired political ecology, it might be wise to consult a critique focused on the empirical
applications of Poulantzas’s state-theoretical framework.
When practitioners of Marxist state theory brought Poulantzas’s theories into empirical
inquiries, there were mixed, and not maximally useful, results. Methodologically, a great deal of
“fractionalist” research tried to determine the “hegemonic fraction” in a particular time and place
(Clarke 1977, 43). 28 As Clarke points out, this methodology frequently led to tautological

Benton provides a very helpful overview of structural Marxism, including Althusser and Poulantzas (1984).
Although Poulantzas’s commitment to Althusserian structuralism waned with time, the idea of a dominant
hegemonic fraction around which the state formed remained central to his thinking right up until his premature
death. “With respect to the state, these elements structure a political bloc within which the hegemonic fraction, to
whose specific interests the class state ‘corresponds’, presents itself as guarantor of the general interest of the
dominant classes and fractions, which it concentrates in their political expression (Poulantzas 1965, 107). “The
relation between the capitalist state and the dominant classes or fractions pushes them towards their political unity
under the protection of a hegemonic class or fraction” (Poulantzas 1973, 239). “The (capitalist) State… is rather a
relationship of forces, or more precisely the material condensation of such a relationship among classes and class
fractions, such as this is expressed within the State in a necessarily specific form. … However, the State is not
purely and simply a relationship, or the condensation of a relationship; it is the specific material condensation of a
relationship of forces among classes and class fractions” (Poulantzas 1978, 128-9). “The strategic organization of
the State destines it to function under the hegemony of a class or fraction located within it” (Poulantzas 1978, 137).
28
This wasn’t just a kneejerk reaction to the Miliband-Poulantzas debate. Clarke critiqued fractionalism and
maintained a focus on the wider capital-labor relation in future work. In a monograph on the Keynesian state in the
U.K. he said, “Thus the conflict between the needs of the domestic economy and the interests of multinational
capital is not a conflict between the interests of different fractions of capital, but between the interests of
multinational capital and the needs of the mass of the population” (1988a, 5).
26
27
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thinking. If a policy adopted by the state was in the interest of the hegemonic fraction, then a
fraction of capital proved itself hegemonic once its favored policy was implemented. With no
way to illustrate whether political dominance preceded economic dominance, or vice versa,
fractionalist theory explained every situation at all times, reducing its historical-geographical
utility. For political ecologists interested in empirical rigor, this method would be unhelpful for
analysis at a close level of historical-geographical specificity. 29
Rather than focus on capital’s fractionation, Clarke suggested we focus on how states
facilitate the reproduction of the capital-labor relation in general. There was little theorization of
the relation between labor and capital in fractionalist state theory, which was more concerned
with inter-capitalist class struggle. When Poulantzas’s thought was applied to case studies of
South Africa’s political economy (Morris 1976; Kaplan 1976; Fransman and Davies 1977;
Kaplan et al. 1977), these studies focused on conflicts within the capitalist class rather than the
relation between labor and capital (Clarke 1977, 47). The structural Marxism of Poulantzas and
Louis Althusser held that workers and capitalists both provided träger (support) for capitalist
relations of production (Ibid., 157). Although he later departed from this position, Althusser’s
early works displayed no interest in the politics of Marxist theory, e.g., mass movements,
actually existing class struggle, etc. (Benton 1984, 84). Fractionalist state theory also overlooked
the capitalist class’s shared interest in the state’s facilitation of labor’s subservience to capital
(Clarke 1977, 61). Clarke took the relation between capital and labor to mean the specific,
historical social relation through which capitalism functioned as a mode of production (1977,

29
Poulantzas published some empirical studies but is cited more for his theoretical work. As Jessop explained,
“Poulantzas was concerned with the theoretically typical capitalist state and not with any state whatsoever in
capitalist societies” (1985, 65). Despite this, early adopters of Poulantzas’s approach did have one empirical study to
work from: Fascism and Dictatorship (1974). It could be argued that an empirical study of fascism, which is a
distinct form of political economy, should not have been applied to liberal-capitalist states. Regardless, Clarke’s
critique (1977; 1978) was directed at adopters who followed Fascism and Dictatorship.
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10). He thought, therefore, that Marxist analyses of the state should show how and to what extent
the state reproduces that relation (Ibid.).
The challenge for political ecology, in their attempt to integrate Marxian state theory, is
to show how the state leverages nature-society relations to support exploitation, domination, and
subsumption of labor to capital. This approach should necessarily entail a more explicit politicalecological engagement with class (Huber 2017d) and show how state environmental and energy
policies support the social relations of class under capitalism. Much of the literature on the state
in political ecology has been concerned with relations between the capitalist state and naturecentered industries, which are important fractions of capital. However, I argue here that the
capitalist state relates to nature with an eye to reproducing capitalism as a whole system because
capitalism uses natural resources as critical means of production and socioecological foundations
for the social relations of production. Das (2017b) critiqued Harvey (2003) for a similar reason
when he said Harvey used a fractionalist approach that failed to frame accumulation by
dispossession from the standpoint of the capitalist class as a whole or capitalism as a whole
(2017, 605). In the following case study, I provide an example of how state regulation of a
nature-centered industry was crafted with attention to how it would maintain the broader capitallabor relation across the U.S. economy.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin
Most political ecology does not focus on the judicial branch of the state, despite its
importance to environmental governance (except see McCarthy 2005). This is unfortunate
because the courts can influence how energy and environmental laws are enforced once they are
passed. In 1954, the Supreme Court, in a majority decision (Tussing and Barlow 1984, 100),
extended FPC control over natural gas producers not affiliated with pipeline companies, so-
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called independent producers (Landsberg and Schurr 1968, 204). The State of Wisconsin filed a
complaint with the FPC that Phillips Petroleum Co., a large oil and gas firm responsible for 15%
of all interstate gas sales in the U.S. (Castaneda 1999, 152), was price gouging. The FPC ruled
that Phillips’s rates were outside its jurisdiction because the NGA did not grant them federal
authority to set prices for natural gas companies not directly affiliated with interstate trade, in
this case, interstate gas pipelines. The FPC was correct that Phillips was only producing gas and
not directly involved in transporting it across state borders in a pipeline. However, the State of
Wisconsin sued the FPC and demanded that they intervene to regulate Phillips’s prices under the
NGA’s authority, and the case went all the way to the Supreme Court (Kohlmeier 1969, 194).
Gas consumers argued that the fixity of natural gas’s infrastructure made pipeline
companies captive to producers’ prices; pipelines cost between $40,000 and $100,000 per mile to
build and couldn’t be easily moved in search of lower gas prices from competing production
companies (Sanders 1981, 118). The NGA empowered the FPC to demand that prices of gas sold
through interstate pipelines be kept low for consumers, but by 1940 this level of control was
proving inadequate to the task (Kohlmeier 1969, 193). The AFL-CIO said that independent
producers were increasing prices, and utilities and pipeline companies were passing these costs
along to consumers (see Figure 6). 30 Distribution by public utilities and transmission by pipelines
were already under regulation, but one final link in gas’s commodity chain relied solely on

AFL-CIO IUD (Industrial Union Department). 1958. Folder: 129-D-1 1958. Box: 1018. Series: Central Files General Files. Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library.
30
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Figure 6: Source: AFL-CIO IUD.

market forces to set prices: production, which included many thousands of independent
producers.
Phillips Petroleum Co. was the largest independent natural gas producer in the postwar
U.S. (Kohlmeier 1969). In the oil and gas fraction of capital, “independent” does not indicate a
company’s relative size or influence in the natural gas industry. Rather, independent implies a
production company not affiliated with a transmission or distribution company, i.e., a pipeline or
a municipal utility, respectively. Even oil and gas titans like Exxon, Texaco, and Phillips were
considered independent in the natural gas sector because they produced only gas; they didn’t
move it around the country through underground pipes (Greenberger 1983, 353). This didn’t stop
producers from trying to use the “independent” label to leverage populist sentiment against
regulation (Ibid.). A majority of the court ruled in favor of the state of Wisconsin, and although
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the opinion was unfavorable to the natural gas industry (Herbert 1992, 115), the extension of
regulation over production was a reasonable decision at the time (Castaneda 1999, 154).
Without control over production, the FPC had a limited ability to set “just and reasonable
rates” for gas users as mandated by the NGA (Ibid.). Between 1938 and 1954, the prices charged
by producers to pipelines were being passed along to consumers (Tomain and Cudahy 1992,
206). With no FPC oversight, consumer protection from price gouging by pipeline companies
was cancelled out when producers began increasing prices between 1947 and 1954 (Vietor 1984,
84). Price increases were caused by two interrelated factors: increasing demand in the interwar
years (Ibid.) and utilities extending service into areas that were further from urban centers
costlier to serve (Tussing and Barlow 1984, 102). Regardless, the court decision found that the
NGA’s “basic intent” could only be carried out if production came under regulation (Barber
1981, 262).
Between 1954 and 1970, high demand incentivized gas firms to explore and develop gas
reserves even under price regulation (Castaneda 1999, 179). Eventually, however, Phillips led to
disruptive gas shortages in the winters of 1971-1972, 1973-1974, and 1976-1977 that shut down
schools and factories and left people with no heat at home (Castaneda 1993, 3). Price controls
had disincentivized producers from finding and drilling for new pockets of gas (Castaneda and
Pratt 1993, 8) and simultaneously incentivized producers to sell existing gas supplies to
intrastate pipeline companies, which were not covered by the NGA or Phillips (Castaneda 1993,
167).
Previous analyses of Phillips frame it as a conflict between different fractions of the
capitalist class, specifically Northeastern and Midwestern industrialists versus Southwestern oil
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and gas capital. Political scientist M. Elizabeth Sanders, for example, considered the Supreme
Court’s 1954 decision on Phillips as a win for consuming states in the Northeast and Midwest.
A Supreme Court decision in 1954 made it possible to implement a program that
probably could not have been achieved through legislative means: control of the
prices paid to natural gas producers in the South and West on behalf of urban
consumers in the Northeast, Midwest, and California… The amorphous
supporting coalition of 1938 gave way to a polarized, regionally-based conflict
between producer and urban consumer areas that was essentially a struggle over
the distribution of wealth between two sets of political constituencies… the
producer states believed that their new affluence had been wrested out of the jaws
of a regulatory apparatus illegitimately imposed on them, and they resented the
fact that a product on which their economies depended should be controlled,
while the coal and manufactured goods they imported from other states were not.
(Sanders 1981, 198-9)
In Sanders’s view, Phillips reduced the prices paid by residential consumers, industrial users, gas
utilities, and pipelines in gas-importing states and barred gas producers and their states’
treasuries from further profiting off higher gas prices. Sanders quotes one Southern congressman
who decried Phillips as a “massive regional transfer of wealth” from the gas-producing
Southcentral U.S. to the industrial Northeast and Midwest (Sanders 1981, 114).
Sanders’s regional approach to natural gas politics is “territorially trapped,” i.e., she treats
politics between states primarily as flows between bounded and discrete containers, which
excludes the internal politics within states, including in their workplaces (Agnew 1994, 57).
Rather than aiding Northern and Midwestern industrialists and harming Southwestern gas
producers, Phillips provided capital as a whole with a newly available fossil fuel for use as a
cheap means of production. Cheaper gas provided U.S. capital with two advantages: reductions
in the value of labor power and savings on the cost of constant capital. Despite its appearance as
an intra-corporate, economic ruling rather than an environmental one, Phillips had enormous
environmental consequences. A fractionalist approach to the environmental state misses the
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significant socionatural elements of governance like Phillips that are framed as matters of
economic or corporate law.
The price of fuel affects the value of labor power, specifically when changes in the cost
of necessities for subsistence cheapen the reproduction of the labor force (Christie 1984, 116).
Production of surplus value is the absolute law of the capitalist mode of production, and profits
under capitalism come from the exchange of surplus value materialized in commodities.
Labour-power is sold to-day, not with a view of satisfying, by its service or by its
product, the personal needs of the buyer. His aim is augmentation of his capital,
production of commodities containing more labour than he pays for, containing
therefore a portion of value that costs him nothing, and that is nevertheless
realised when the commodities are sold. Production of surplus-value is the
absolute law of this mode of production. (Marx 1867a, 618)
Workers spend part of their working day producing enough value to cover their
subsistence and the other part (the unnecessary, surplus chunk of their workday) producing value
for the capitalist (Ibid., 218). If the length of the work day cannot be increased, then reducing
labor’s value becomes one of the principle ways capital can increase surplus value (Ibid., 314).
Cheapening labor goes “hand-in-hand” with increasing surplus value (Ibid., 604) because by
reducing the amount of variable capital (v) laid out for workers, the rate of exploitation (surplus
value [s] /v) increases (Harvey 2010b, 164).
Although capital reduces the value of labor power to maximize profits, it still must
contend with the pesky problem of workers’ survival and reproduction. “The value of labourpower is the value of the means of subsistence necessary for the maintenance of the labourer”
(Marx 1867a, 171). The means of subsistence includes things like food, clothing, housing, and,
crucially, fuel (Ibid.). Although the quantities of socially necessary subsistence are historically
and geographically determined, their cost must be covered by workers’ average income to avoid
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starvation, illness, death and reproduce the next generation of workers (Ibid., 172). Capital’s
constant tendency is to force the cost of labor back to the bare minimum threshold of survival.
If labour could be had without purchase, wages might be dispensed with. But if
the labourers could live on air they could not be bought at any price. The zero of
their cost is therefore a limit in a mathematical sense, always beyond reach,
although we can always approximate more and more nearly to it. The constant
tendency of capital is to force the cost of labour back towards this zero. (Ibid.,
600)
In the case of housing, Harvey points out how state intervention happens before capital can
destroy its own labor source (Harvey 1982, 232). My point is that the state intervenes to maintain
labor’s social reproduction through environmental and energy regulation, not only through urban
and housing policies. 31 By reducing the cost of necessities through energy governance, the state
creates opportunities for increasing the rate of exploitation of labor.
Reducing variable capital (v) is just one way to increase surplus value for capital, by
increasing the rate of exploitation (s/v). Environmental/energy regulation that makes fuel cheaper
also increases the rate of profit (s/[c+v]) by reducing the cost of constant capital (c), which
includes the costs of fuel to run machinery. Capital maintains a “fanatical insistence on economy
in means of production” (Marx 1894b, 83) because cheap means of production like raw materials
and fuels will raise profits by trimming the cost of necessary inputs. In his analysis of capital’s
drive to sink the cost of constant capital, Marx quotes an engineer, James Nasmyth, who
describes how innovations in steam and drive shafts allowed for savings in the cost of coal (Ibid.,
96-100).
About ten years ago the extraordinary economical production of power as realised
by the engines employed in the mining operations of Cornwall began to attract
attention… as indicated by the performance of the Cornish engines, as also the
Harvey has elsewhere made the point that cities are already socioecological by dint of all the steel, concrete,
plastic, and asphalt it takes to build them (1996, 186). Political ecology has mostly avoided politicizing the ecologies
within these types of heavy industries, but that’s starting to change (Fry 2013; Huber 2013a; Huber 2017a).
31
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extraordinary economical performance of Woolf's double-cylinder engines, began
to attract increased attention to the subject of economy of fuel in this district, and
as the Cornish and double-cylinder engines gave a horse-power for every 3½ to 4
lbs of coal per hour, while the generality of cotton-mill engines were consuming 8
or 12 pounds per horse per hour, so remarkable a difference induced mill-owners
and engine-makers in this district to endeavour to realise, by the adoption of
similar means, such extraordinary economical results. (Ibid., 98)
Lowering the price of fuels necessary for machinery to function is always attractive to capital
because it reduces the cost of constant capital. By lowering the value of the constant capital,
Phillips made natural gas an attractive fuel for U.S. capital.
This explanation of how the capitalist state allowed capital to become dependent on
natural gas would be missed if we employed a fractionalist approach to the environmental state.
It would be missed because we wouldn’t be looking at the effects of energy or environmental
policy on the cost of reproducing labor power. Political ecologists of the state are more
concerned with fractions of the state that are framed as distinctly environmental e.g.,
environmental protection agencies or farming bureaus. They leave aside the ecological aspects of
environmental or energy policies that are aimed at reproducing the general economy through
sinking the cost of constant capital and the value of labor power. Fractionalist approaches to the
environmental state would consider reducing the cost of constant capital more an economic or
industrial concern than an environmental one.
Sinking the Cost of Labor Power
In ruling for Wisconsin, the Supreme Court forced independent producers under
regulation in the name of protecting consumers from exploitative high prices.
We have held that these sales are in interstate commerce. It cannot be doubted
that their regulation is predominantly a matter of national, as contrasted to local
concern. All the gas sold in these transactions is destined for consumption in
States other than Louisiana. Unreasonable changes exacted at this stage of the
interstate movement become perpetuated in large part in fixed items of costs
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which must be covered by rates charged subsequent purchasers of the gas
including the ultimate consumer. It was to avoid such situations that the Natural
Gas Act was passed. …Protection of consumers against exploitation at the hands
of natural-gas companies was the primary aim of the Natural Gas Act. (Supreme
Court 1954 §11; §18)
After World War II, gas shortages and price increases had consumers clamoring for greater
federal oversight of the gas industry (Sanders 1981, 83). During a shortage in 1947, Leon Gavin,
a representative from Pennsylvania, spoke to the concerns of his district in a House debate on
natural gas regulation.
I come from a district in Western Pennsylvania that has been producing gas for
many years. Last winter it was necessary for us to ration gas, the first time it has
been rationed to my knowledge. I am greatly interested as are my people and the
industrial life of my district in serving an additional supply of gas to supplement
the rapidly depleting gas supply in Western Pennsylvania. (Sanders 1981, 85)
Frank Clement, Governor of Tennessee, spoke in very similar terms against any move to remove
regulations that would keep prices of gas low.
I am making this statement as Governor of the State of Tennessee in the interest
of the more than 240,000 gas consumers in my State who, during the past 5 years,
have become almost completely dependent upon natural gas as the fuel for
domestic consumption in their homes, for commercial use in their business, and
for the industrial needs of their factories. The pipeline from gas-producing States
to Tennessee has become a life line to the economic existence of more than onethird of our State’s total population. (U.S. Congress 1955, 1368)
During the shortages, gas producers reaped greater profits by raising prices, which put great
stress on the ‘industrial and economic life’ of Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and many other
manufacturing places. Natural gas regulation was much more than a regional competition
between different fractions of capital and was more of an issue about the reproduction of daily
life for the proletariat.
Two years after Phillips, Congress passed a bill (Harris-Fulbright) attempting to water
down the ruling by exempting smaller independents from regulation. Letters and telegrams
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started arriving at the White House pleading with President Eisenhower to veto the bill. 32 The
mayor of Fultondale, Alabama, wrote:
My Dear Mr. President. Only you can now defeat the vicious Harris-Fulbright
natural gas bill. The householder, large and small business people, industry, the
whole cross-section of most of our country depend on you for championship in
this. We here are afraid of what could happen. 33
The mayor of Minneapolis said, “For the millions of natural gas consumers in this country we
ernestly (sic) urge you to veto the Fulbright Harris bill. Especially do we raise our voices for the
thousands of GI’s and others whose newly built homes are heated with gas with no provision or
possibility of converting to other fuel.” 34 The mayor of Baltimore wrote, “A veto of the bill will
demonstrate your concern for Mr. (sic) Average Citizen.” 35 From Paris, Kentucky, the major
wrote,
As Mayor of Paris, Kentucky where a large percent of our people depend on
natural gas for cooking, heating, and other comforts, I urge you to veto the HarrisFulbright bill. Since the passage of this bill has taken away the Federal Power
control over prices of natural gas it is going to be extremely hard for our people to
pay the gas bills and feed their families at the same time. 36
Gas regulation was more than a concern of gas producers and the industrialists who
depended on gas to run their factories. The millions of workers and their dependents that
constituted the mass of society knew that gas was an essential part of reproducing daily

Eisenhower eventually did veto the bill after it was revealed that Francis Case, Republican Senator from South
Dakota, had been bribed $2,500 by “gas interests” to sign the bill (Woods 1995, 203). Eisenhower was a supporter
of the bill, and freeing business from government regulation in general, but felt compelled to veto it on account of
the “arrogant” lobbying by the gas interests (Ibid.).
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life. Phillips ensured that laborers could reproduce themselves cheaply, allowing capital
to avoid paying higher wages for the means of subsistence.
Beyond family survival or provisioning for veterans, other writers appealing for
the veto framed natural gas regulation as a class issue. Mayors and unions sent telegrams
to defend Phillips from the Harris-Fulbright Bill, and consumers sent their advocates to
Washington, DC, to speak in person. George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, said, “I
respectfully urge you to veto the Harris-Fulbright bill. The workers of this country feel
there is no moral or economic justification for this legislation which would cost the
nations (sic) gas consumers an additional six hundred million dollars a year.” 37 The
mayor of a suburb outside Minneapolis wrote, “Respectfully urge you veto Fulbright
Harris bill. Incidents of increased gas rates arising from passage this legislature will fall
on those citizens least able to pay and will tend to depress standards of living of great
mass of laborers and white collar workers in our city and rest of country.” 38 The
Chairman of the Detroit Board of Commerce voiced his concern tersely but succinctly:
Industry follows fuel, thus creating jobs. Detroit’s growing commercial
area depends upon abundance of industrial energy, big percentage of
which comes from natural gas. Plenty of gas means expanding pay
envelopes. We respectfully urge that you sustain the decision of both
Senate and Congress on Harris-Fulbright bill and support our increasing
American working force. 39
The mayor of Gadsden, Alabama, wrote,
Grant me leave to bring to your personal attention a matter of very vital concern
to many of our people particularly the working class. I have reference to the
37
Meany, G. to D. Eisenhower. February 9, 1956. Folder: 129-D-1 CON (1). Box: 1019. Series: Central Files General Files. Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library.
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recently enacted Harris-Fulbright Bill pertaining to the Natural Gas industry…
this bill is definitely not, repeat, not in the public interest. 40
Cities like Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Youngstown, Buffalo, Syracuse, and
Louisville sent representatives to Congress to speak on behalf of gas consumers. Wisconsin
Senator Alexander Wiley warned the White House that unregulated producer prices would
burden 60 million natural gas consumers with $200-400 million in additional expenses (Barber
1981, 262). Producer states in the Southcentral and Gulf regions of the country argued that
lowered prices would deprive their state houses of the necessary tax revenues for education and
welfare (Sanders 1981, 116). One producer said, “I’ll sit on the gas for ten years before I let the
boys in Washington tell me what I can sell it for” (Waples 2012, 217). If Congress voted against
them, producers threatened to take gas out of interstate natural gas markets and sell it in
intrastate markets where prices were not regulated. Eventually this did happen, but for reasons of
bureaucratic quagmire rather than producers’ spite.
A fractionalist approach to the environmental state would not consider state action that
reduces the value of labor to be environmental. Both directly and indirectly, Phillips made the
U.S. economy more reliant on natural gas than it might otherwise might have been. However,
fractionalist approaches to the environmental state wouldn’t look at Phillips because it didn’t
involve branches of the state framed as environmental e.g., agricultural ministries, environmental
protection agencies or disaster response administrations (Whitehead et al. 2007, 4). These
perspectives don’t focus in on the ecological effects of state policies framed primarily as
economic, industrial or labor issues. This oversight is a mistake because states use the
environment (energy, resources, etc.) to reproduce labor for capital, and in so doing, facilitate
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consumer demand for fossil fuels and other resources. Although not solely responsible, Phillips
made the U.S. economy more reliant on natural gas thereby locking the U.S. into higher
greenhouse gas emissions (both carbon dioxide from gas combustion and methane from gas
infrastructure leakage).
Savings on Constant Capital
Phillips kept prices for natural gas lower, both directly and indirectly, once it was
implemented. The FPC assigned their examiner, Joseph Zwerdling, to implement the Supreme
Court’s decision, which would prove very difficult for the agency. The hearings that Zwerdling
held for stakeholders on Phillips were 10,000 pages long after transcription (Kohlmeier 1969,
194), and the Commission was understaffed to handle the new workload. Previously, the
Commission regulated 157 interstate pipeline companies (Castaneda and Smith 1996, 148).
Phillips put 4,365 independent gas producers under FPC jurisdiction (Ibid.). One estimate found
that the FPC wouldn’t be able to complete the new caseload until the year 2043 (Tomain and
Cudahy 1992, 206). Phillips’s initial impact was a regulatory quagmire for both the state and oil
and gas producers, one of whom wrote to President Eisenhower.
The excessive and unreasonable delays by the Federal Power Commission put
upon the small independent gas producer who tries to sell his gas to interstate pipe
lines (sic) will put him out of business. A small independent producer with its
money invested in properties which are ready to start producing cannot continue
to wait months and years for the nod of the Commission to start marketing its gas.
It is not regulation - it is suppression. At this very moment much needed fuel is
being withheld from consumers who have to wait unreasonably while the wheels
of the Commission turn ever so slowly or not at all. 41

Walton, R. to D. Eisenhower, May 19, 1960. Folder: 129-D 1959-1960. Box: 1018. Series: Central Files - General
Files. Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library.
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Many independent gas producers began to look for alternate markets for their product while the
“wheels of the Commission turned ever so slowly” (Ibid.).
Companies like the Texas Eastern Corporation began to sell gas to intrastate pipelines
that could pay them more because they were unregulated (Castaneda and Pratt 1993, 111). The
Supreme Court was indirectly responsible for this change, but it was still responsible because
Phillips incentivized oil and gas capital to shift into unregulated markets. Impelled by the
capitalist profit motive, oil and gas firms were forced by state regulations on interstate trade to
seek out more profitable sales within state borders. More profitable opportunities included
marketing directly to industries located within the borders of oil- and gas-producing states like
Louisiana and Texas. Panhandle Eastern Corporation built a plastics factory that became the
world’s second largest producer of polyethylene (the most common form of plastic) by 1960 and
relied on gas as its petroleum feedstock (Castaneda and Smith 1996, 167). Also, in 1960,
National Petro-Chemicals Corp. began producing 300 million pounds of polyethylene per year
using natural gas as a main feedstock (Leeston 1963, 161). By incentivizing sales to intrastate
pipelines, Phillips made a wider fraction of the U.S. industrial sector dependent on gas,
particularly in gas-producing states. During hearings on Phillips, consumer representatives from
the Northeast argued that the South lacked the industrial capacity, and population, necessary to
absorb the nation’s natural gas supply (Sanders 1981, 121). This was untrue. Prior to Phillips,
many major industrial users of natural gas had located or originated in gas-producing states like
Texas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma.
Without significant amounts of coal or water power, the Gulf Coast was dependent on
natural gas as an industrial fuel. By 1950, according to geographer James Parsons, the Gulf
Coast’s utilization of gas as fuel for industrialization was the most well developed in the nation
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(1950, 173). “The future of this vigorous new industrial frontier is vitally dependent on the
petroleum industry’s ability to maintain its excellent production and discovery record for these
preferred fossil fuels (natural gas and oil)” (Ibid., 177). Forty percent of the natural gas
consumed by the U.S. industrial sector was burned in Texas factories, which used access to
cheap natural gas to attract business to the state (Herbert 1992, 120). Herbert attributes a 34%
increase in industrial employment in Texas between 1950 and 1960 to lower natural gas prices
relative to states like Pennsylvania and West Virginia, which experienced declining industrial
employment in the same period (Ibid., 102). Immediately following Phillips, the Empire Trust
Company, a commercial bank, published a brochure exhorting new industries to move to gasproducing states (see Figure 7). The pamphlet showed pictures of newly built ammonia-urea,
glass, and chemical plants in Oklahoma (see Figure 8) and explained,
Producers have huge investments in natural gas reserves, producing wells,
gathering lines, and gas treating plants required to deliver gas to pipelines. As a
matter of plain common sense, they are loath to commit their unsold gas to the
interstate market when the purchasers are powerless to assure the producers the
price they will pay, and the producers may not cease delivering the gas without
the permission of the Federal Power Commission. Even though a contract price is
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agreed upon, there can be no assurance the Federal Power Commission will not
reduce it. 42

Figure 7: Title of promotional pamphlet from investment bank (Source: Empire Trust Company
Newsletter).

Oil and gas capital aggressively expanded markets for natural gas into centers of industry
throughout the nation as a means of maximizing profits in an unregulated part of the industry
(Vietor 1984, 84). Intrastate sales were one way to avoid regulation while providing a valuable
means of production at low prices. In two ways, Phillips made industries more reliant on natural
gas. First, by incentivizing industrial consumers to use gas because it was cheaper than it would
have been without the decision. And second, by incentivizing gas producers to make direct sales
to industries to avoid less-profitable regulated sales. Fractionalist approaches to the
environmental state would more likely focus on the state response to industrial accidents of the
gas industry or gas-consuming factories. They would miss the environmentally-consequential
aspect of this Supreme Court decision i.e., that Phillips made it easier for factories to burn
natural gas. Although this one decision doesn’t explain how the industrial sector in general rose

Empire Trust Company Newsletter, November 30, 1954. Folder: 129-D GAS 1952-1954. Box: 1018. Series:
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Figure 8: Photo caption: “Typical of the new industries taking advantage of large gas
supplies available in Oklahoma is this amonia-urea (sic) plant of Deer & Company
near Pryor. More gas for use in Oklahoma is now offered to industries needing
abundant, unrestricted supplies for fuel or as a raw material” (Empire Trust Company
Newsletter).

to dominate world energy consumption (Huber 2017a, 154), it addresses how state economic
policy has tremendous impacts on problems framed as environmental e.g., climate change.
Natural gas companies also were avoiding direct regulation by making a large portion of
its sales to industries through direct sales. Industries bought large amounts of natural gas “from
the field,” which meant that they avoided transacting with interstate pipeline companies directly,
and these contracts fell outside FPC jurisdiction (Jacobs 1963, 283). The NGA gave the FPC
authority to regulate “sales for resale,” which did include some industrial sales between utilities
and manufacturers but – crucially – did not cover direct sales (Davis 1984, 66). Pipeline
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companies would transport gas from direct sales to industries through the very same lines as gas
that was under price regulation by the FPC (Vietor 1994, 102) (see Figure 9). The difference
between regulated and unregulated gas had nothing to do with the material qualities of the gas or
its method of distribution and everything to do with legal exceptions to existing regulations. The
FPC tried to discourage pipelines’ unbundling of transportation services from more all-inclusive
gas supply contracts, but with limited success (Tussing and Tippee 1995, 148). The Supreme
Court even upheld this distinction between direct sales and sales for resale in Phillips (Supreme
Court 1954, †14). Ultimately, a modest, semantic inconsistency in legal language resulted in
natural gas producers making much higher profits than they otherwise would have by selling
directly to industries. 43 Oil and gas capital took advantage of this loophole by aggressively
marketing gas to the industrial fraction of capital, making capital in this fraction more dependent
on gas than it otherwise would have without Phillips.

It’s difficult to excavate historical rates of profit from thousands of integrated and independent natural gas
producers; however, we know a general level below which profits would not have dipped. Officially, the FPC only
allowed firms to make a maximum of 6.5% return on their investments in regulated trade (Castaneda and Smith
1996, 164), but in practice the FPC allowed rates of return on gas sales “considerably above” 9% (Eckstein 1958,
134), reaching 13% as late as 1970 (Davis 1984, 80), on the eve of severe gas shortages and supply curtailments.
Therefore, logic would dictate that profits through direct sales would have met or exceeded these rates of profit
when considering industries’ consistently high demand throughout the year; otherwise, industrial sales wouldn’t
have been so attractive to gas producers.
43
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Gas suppliers justified direct sales as a benefit to residential customers, specifically to
cover the costs of maintaining compressor stations and other infrastructural equipment during
periods of low residential demand (like warm summers) when space heating was unnecessary.
The industry legitimized direct sales by saying that pipelines operated with increasing efficiency
– thereby providing cheaper prices to consumers – when they ran at volume capacities closer to
100%. 44 The FPC’s own audits found that the cost savings of delivering gas peaked at 60% of
capacity utilization (Herbert 1992, 120) and that further volumes over the 60% mark had no
effect on cost savings. As the FPC’s audits show, the argument that gas producers were selling

Figure 9: Diagram of the traditional gas industry structure. Arrow points out direct sales to industry. Adapted by the author
from Vietor 1994, 102.

The official industry term for this metric is “load factor,” which is less intuitive than a term like volume or
capacity, which this term is basically describing. Regardless, load factor is the relationship between the average
day’s delivery of gas and the maximum day’s delivery of gas over an annual period (Peebles 1980, 71-2).
44
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direct to industrial consumers because it lowered prices for all consumers was false. They were
making direct sales to avoid regulated transactions that limited the profit rate.
Phillips incentivized gas producers to make intrastate sales to industries in states like
Texas and Louisiana but it also incentive producers to increase direct sales to industrial
consumers all over the country. Ten years after Phillips, direct sales had made gas a popular fuel
with industries across the country. United Gas, the world’s largest “handler” of gas, provided
fuel to manufacturers in the Gulf region for producing cement, bricks and tile, lime and other
chemicals, oil (refining), paper, sugar, rubber, etc. (Leeston 1963, 129). Southern Natural Gas
and Texas Gas Transmission grew alongside the petrochemical industry in the Gulf region,
supplying this sector as it experienced explosive growth following WWII (Ibid.). Arkansas
Louisiana Gas took a leading role in attracting industry to Arkansas by offering natural gas at
lower cost than anywhere else in the country (Ibid.). American Natural Gas served Detroit and
Milwaukee, using pipelines built in the late 1940s and early 1950s and shipping gas from Texas,
Oklahoma, Kansas, and Louisiana (Ibid.). Columbia served gas to 2,500 industrial customers
spread over Ohio, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, New York, West Virginia, Virginia, and Maryland
(Ibid., 135). Tennessee Gas Transmission sent gas from Texas and Louisiana to industrial areas
in Chicago and Gary, Indiana. Transcontinental Gas fueled the “rapidly industrializing”
Carolinas, North Georgia, and major cities of the Eastern seaboard (Ibid., 158). Panhandle
Eastern supplied gas to the U.S. industrial heartland in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan for
“metallurgical, ceramic and chemical uses” (Ibid., 162).
A fractionalist approach to the environmental state wouldn’t see how Phillips’s
incentivizing the gas industry to sell fuel to industries was necessarily environmental. However,
by reducing the cost of constant capital through gas law, the state locked industrial capital into a
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high pattern of consumption of this fossil fuel, which – when burned – causes climate change.
The industrial sector is disproportionately responsible for climate change through its energy
consumption (Huber 2017a, 154), and the petrochemical and plastic industries, which are highly
gas dependent, are concentrated within oil- and gas-producing states like Oklahoma, Texas and
Louisiana. None of these critical industrial-environmental relations are explained through a
fractional approach to the environmental state that would view Phillips’s impact more as a
question of economics and industrial location than an ecological one.
Conclusion
Phillips made the U.S. economy more reliant on natural gas than it might otherwise have
been, therefore, Phillips was an ecologically-significant government action that was not framed
as primarily environmental. If I had employed a fractionalist approach to the environmental state,
I would have missed how the Supreme Court allowed industries to become dependent on natural
gas. Political ecologists of the state leave aside the ecological aspects of environmental or energy
policies that are aimed at strictly economic or industrial concerns. Fractionalist approaches to the
environmental state wouldn’t pay attention to Phillips because it didn’t involve agencies framed
as dealing with environmental issues like food safety, pollution abatement or natural disaster
response. Although not solely responsible, Phillips made the U.S. economy more reliant on
natural gas thereby locking the U.S. into higher greenhouse gas emissions in the decades that
followed. Phillips incentivized industrial consumers to use gas because it was cheaper than it
would have been without the decision and incentivized gas producers to make direct sales to
industries to avoid less-profitable regulated sales. Therefore, Phillips made it easier for factories
to burn natural gas and the decision (partially) explains how the industrial sector came to
dominate world energy consumption (Huber 2017a, 154). Policies framed in terms of industrial
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or employment issues need to be recognized as the practices of the environmental state even
though they are not conducted by departments of agriculture, parks or disaster response.
Wainwright and Mann (2015) have pointed out the critical role for states in hastening a
transition away from natural gas and other fossil fuels to slow global climate change. Jobs – the
lifeline of survival for most under capitalism – are tied to the burning of fossil fuels, including
fracked natural gas. State rulings like Phillips facilitated the binding together of employment,
industrialization, and fossil fuels, all while maintaining the profitability of oil and gas producers.
Resistance movements like fossil fuel divestment campaigns and the activist-journalist Naomi
Klein espouse voluntarily starving oil and gas capital of investment and state-sponsored
retraining programs for fossil fuel workers. However, the connections between employment and
fossil fuel burning touch many more workers than just oil and gas workers and affect profits for
many more corporations than just ExxonMobil. Policies framed in terms of industrial or
employment issues need to be recognized as the practices of the environmental state. Despite the
fact that they are not conducted by departments of agriculture, parks or disaster response, state
economic policies carry enormous environmental consequences that demand a critical gaze.
Fossil fuels are an essential component of how much of the U.S. population reproduces
daily lives, e.g., getting themselves from their suburban homes to their workplaces (cf. Huber
2013a). Fossil fuels also constitute the means of production, which combined with labor power,
make much, if not most, commodity production possible in the first place. Without a steady
supply of this essential means of production, capitalists find no use for hiring workers in the first
place. Stopping climate change should entail a referendum on more than the types of energy used
and the fate of workers involved in producing them. Fossil energy is a constitutive ecological
condition for the current constellation of power between capital and labor in modern capitalism.
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Some suggest that saving the planet demands a mobilization of state power that rivals the “total
war” conditions of the U.S. during WWII (Malm 2016, 385). If that were to take place, a
necessary condition of solving climate change would include a renegotiation of social class
relations. Working class survival must be made less dependent on capital’s twin demands for the
free market availability of labor power and fossil fuel energy. Because states will continue to
play a crucial part in producing availability of those resources, socialists should be advocating
for state policies that delink survival of the masses of people from their position as workers in
the formal, waged economy.
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Chapter 4
The “Laborless Fuel”: Coal, Natural Gas, And the Capitalist State in Energy Transitions
Introduction
In the 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump repeatedly promised to revive the coal
industry, a promise that he has reiterated since assuming the presidency. Trump’s overt support
of coal miners was symbolic of his attempt (however disingenuous) to rebrand the Republican
Party as the “party of the American worker” (Pager 2017). Over the last three to four decades,
the U.S. working class has seen its government services and benefits cut, jobs automated, and
wages slashed (Roberts 2016). In areas like Appalachia that have been hard hit by (the
continuing) decline of coal employment, spurred by competition from fracked natural gas, there
has been resistance to energy transitions (ETs) that would decarbonize the economy, unless such
a transition provided new and better opportunities for employment (Healy and Barry 2017,
455). 45
Environmental and labor struggles are frequently at odds (White 1995), which is
unfortunate given the opportunities presented by a socially “just” ET. While the International
Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Union has supported a just ET
(Podobnik 2006, 166), the AFL-CIO rejected the Kyoto Treaty, and unions supported the Dakota
Access pipeline (Medina 2016). The issues of climate change and inequality could be solved
through a decarbonization of energy systems, where workers doing the decarbonization received
high wages and good benefits and many more workers were employed (Barca 2016). There are
plenty of factors that militate against this outcome, least of which is AFL-CIO opposition to

From 2010 to 2016, coal-fired electricity fell from 45% to 30% of utility-scale generation compared to natural
gas-fired generation, which increased from 24% to 34% (Boersma and Jordaan 2017, 2). This change occurred in
response to the flooding of cheap natural gas from fracking into markets served previously by coal.
45
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environmental controls on fossil fuels (Sweeney 2013). However, labor is not united in this
opposition.
Unions have advocated for greening the economy (Snell and Fairbrother 2013) through a
government-sponsored “green New Deal” (Sweeney 2013, 210). Currently, countries with cheap
labor (e.g., China) shoulder the burden of producing renewable energy technologies (solar
panels, wind turbines, etc.) for the rest of the world. Podobnik (2006, 164) anticipated that if
market forces alone would decide the course of the next ET, this is exactly what would occur.
Currently, cheap solar panels flood the world market from the backs and hands of exploited
factory workers in Korea, Singapore, and Thailand (Residential Solar 2015). By incentivizing
domestic production, states could use climate change mitigation as an opportunity to create
good-paying jobs in the U.S. while promoting clean energy. Increasingly, this opportunity is
looking more like a political imperative in U.S. communities dragged down by 40 years of
neoliberal austerity, income stagnation, and job loss (Das 2017a, 2).
A decarbonized energy system would still have its sacrifice zones in places where rare
earths for solar panels are mined (Bonds and Downey 2012) and in polluted industrial sites
where the panels are manufactured (Mulvaney 2013). Decarbonization also would require
“deliberate destabilization and decline of fossil fuel-based industries” that may not lead to the
types of progressive change that many on the left would prefer (Turnheim and Geels 2012, 36).
In the U.K. in the 1980s, for example, the transition from coal to natural gas from the North Sea
was made possible by Margaret Thatcher’s repression of the coal miners’ unions, which were a
vanguard of left politics since WWI (Ibid.).
Much of the scholarship on revolutionizing energy systems has tended to focus on the
politics of the present (Avelino et al. 2016; Meadowcroft 2009; Scrase and Smith 2009; Shove
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and Walker 2007) rather than examine the politics of historical ETs (although see Paul 2018). ET
literatures are better at explaining labor and environmental politics than analyzing the role of the
capitalist state. For example, as I show in a subsequent section of this chapter, state policy on
natural gas allowed oil and gas capital in the Sunbelt to finance a distinctly anti-union, pro-free
market political platform. Gas policy also contributed to the downfall of a vanguard of the U.S.
left: The United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) in the postwar period. Today, the UMWA
is “barely more than a pension administration for retired miners and their families” (Yeselson
2017), but at its peak in the mid-20th century, it was a bastion of working-class power (Podobnik
2006). According to the historian Daniel Yergin (1978, 34), coal represented “old forms of social
conflict that most everybody wanted to forget.” The struggles that Yergin would have us forget
won coal miners a more “egalitarian collective life” (Mitchell 2011, 236). As I show in the
following case, U.S. gas policy that encroached on coal markets was a deliberate strategy by the
capitalist state to “rein in the power of organized labor” by diversifying away from “reliance on
strike-prone coal sectors and toward oil sectors, where it was perceived that labor could be more
easily controlled” (Podobnik 2006, 91).
As some have pointed out, the decline of working-class power is attributable to more than
the coal-oil and gas transition (Huber 2015, 488). Indeed, it’s even inaccurate to say that the U.S.
ever transitioned away from coal when the shift was more sectoral: from coal-powered
transportation (trains, ships) to oil-fueled internal combustion engines (in cars, trucks, planes,
and ships) (Huber 2013a, 176). However, increasing oil and gas production did provide some of
the wealth, and a crucial political arena, for wider political shifts that Huber mentions. As I
show, natural gas production enriched anti-union capital in the Sunbelt, and waves of coal
miners’ strikes motivated capital and the state to seek out alternatives to coal. The skill level
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required of miners gave them more power than other workers (Podobnik 2006, 40-1), but coal
itself – or its physical properties (Mitchell 2011) – was not the basis for coal miners’ militancy.
Mitchell’s argument (2011) mirrors the new materialists, who argue that inanimate objects have
agency in addition to human beings (Malm 2018, 111). As Labban (2013, 15) points out, what
connected the power of labor from mines, through canals and railways, was the class
consciousness that united isolated struggles into a wider struggle by labor against capital. Coal
itself doesn’t do anything. The lives of working people were improved by miners who went on
strike and refused to dig up coal for capitalists unless their demands were met.
Mitchell, and most others, also omits natural gas’s role in replacing and supplementing
coal. This omission stems from a wider problem in energy literatures, where fossil fuels, their
sectoral usage (electricity generation, transportation, heat processing in production, social
reproduction), and their substitutability are conflated (again, see Huber 2013a, 176). For
example, Jones (2016) points out that energy studies are overly fixated on oil to the detriment of
coal. The same fixation leaves out natural gas, misrepresenting its importance as a natural
resource. Oil, coal, and natural gas have different physical properties, which don’t determine
how or why they get used but do make them differently suited for transportation, heating,
electricity generation, and industrial manufacturing.
The threat that coal miners posed to capital is testimony of the specifically class politics
that coal miners practiced so effectively. Like the broader demonization of unions as monopolies
and the rise of neoliberalism (Huber 2013a), the coal to oil and gas transition was a class project
that contributed to the weakening of working-class power and contributed some funding to the
postwar flowering of neoliberal thought. Other scholars working on energy in the Marxian
tradition have examined the links between social class and fossil fuels (Huber 2013a; Deutz
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2014; Deutz and Ioppolo 2015; Malm 2016), but few have focused on the capitalist state
specifically.
In this chapter, I show how gas policy contributed to weakening the power of the UMWA
in the mid-20th century. In making my argument, I also explain why it would be a mistake to
expect a capitalist state to destabilize class relations through an ET. I make this case using
historical materials from the archival records of the United Mine Workers of America located in
the Pennsylvania State University library’s special collection. First, I review literatures on ETs,
pointing out how Marxian state theory can contribute to this growing body of research. Second, I
explain how wealth generated through the transition from coal to natural gas and oil in the mid20th century was used to finance anti-union, neoliberal politics that emerged from the Sunbelt.
Finally, I turn to the effects of natural gas replacing coal as experienced by coal miners, which I
explain in the context of capital and the state’s goals for reducing organized labor’s power over
the economy’s operation.
Energy Transitions, Politics and The Capitalist State
ETs are changes in the “composition (structure) of primary energy supply, the gradual
shift from a specific pattern of energy provision to a new state of an energy system” (Smil 2010a,
vii). Geographers have analyzed ET governance (Calvert 2016; Butler and Parkhill 2017; Hiteva
2017; Kirshner 2017), the social justice of ETs (Baker et al. 2014; Bouzarovski et al. 2017;
Fuller 2017), technological path dependency and “lock-in” hindering ETs (Fry 2013, 130), and
urban ETs (Bulkeley et al. 2011; Jaglin and Verdeil 2017). Geographic analysis shows how ETs
occur in places (Calvert et al. 2017; Darby 2017) within political-economic regions (Coutard and
Rutherford 2010; Truffer and Coenen 2012) and develop unevenly across space (Lawhon and
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Murphy 2011; Bridge et al. 2013; Becker et al. 2016). 46 Recent studies of ETs focus on the
anticipated “green” ET: from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources (Avelino and Wittmayer
2016; Swilling et al. 2016).
For the moment, fossil fuels provide more than 86% of global energy (IEA 2018a), 90%
of U.S. energy (U.S. EIA 2018a), 87% of E.U. energy (EC 2018), and 75% of China’s energy
(IEA 2018b). It would cost trillions of dollars to make the world’s economies carbon-emissions
free (Smil 2010a, 142), a level of investment unprecedented during peacetime. All fossil fuel
electricity generation would have to be replaced, some say with a mix of renewables and nuclear
(MacKay 2008, 157-176). Once new emissions have ceased, accumulated carbon dioxide would
have to be removed from the atmosphere to cancel its warming effect (Kolbert 2017; Parenti
2017). Auto-centric transportation systems, which run almost entirely on oil, would have to be
replaced with electric cars, mass transit, and nuclear-powered ships (MacKay 2009, 118-139). 47
Streams of research funding would have to be made available at levels as high as those that led to
major technological breakthroughs like computers, the internet, and GPS (Mazzucato 2013). The
only entity with the accepted legitimacy and organizational capacity to redistribute power and
resources on this scale is the state (Parenti 2015b).
ET scholars already focus on the state’s role (Juisto 2009; Calvert and Şimandan 2010;
Turnheim and Geels 2012; Newell and Mulvaney 2013; Curtin 2015; Betsill and Stevis 2016;
Broto 2016; Bayulgen and Ladewig 2017; Lockwood et al. 2017; Sovacool 2017). Even analyses
leaning heavily on price incentives and innovation maintain that governments play a key role in

46
Lawhon and Murphy frame their work as “socio-technical transition” studies. I consider an energy transition one
type of socio-technical transition. In a green ET, the technologies used for electrical generation, transportation, etc.,
will have to decarbonize. It’s less clear whether the social relations of energy will transform along with the
technologies. For example, whether a green ET will transform private, for-profit utilities into democratically
controlled public utilities is an open question.
47
It’s unclear how jet engines and modern aviation would survive in a decarbonized world.
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creating new, “niche” markets for renewable energy sources (Fouquet 2010, 6593). As Shear
(2014) and McCarthy (2015) point out, there are no guarantees that state ET policies would be
socially just. For example, Cederlöf (2015) explains how state electrification programs were
designed primarily to end peasant-serf and landlord-tenant relationships in the rural U.S. South,
Soviet Union, India, China, and Cuba to create an urban proletariat. Many on the left favor state
policies that shut down fossil fuel infrastructure (Carton 2017) while protecting jobs (Araújo
2014) and assisting disadvantaged and historically marginalized populations (Baker et al. 2014).
On the other hand, libertarians of the “Green Tea Party” favor eliminating publicly regulated
electrical utilities altogether and reverting to individualized energy systems, e.g., rooftop solar
(Aronoff 2017). Many have adopted a political economy approach to understand the political
forces acting on state ET policy (Podobnik 2002; Goldthau and Sovacool 2012; Baker et al.
2014; Cock 2014; Smits 2015; Kern and Markard 2016; Arent et al. 2017).
Absent from these literatures, however, is any explicit discussion of the capitalist state’s
role in energy transitions, the politics of which depend on the politics of the state itself. Capitalist
states manage state functions in the service of capital (Poulantzas 1975, 187). States will, under
unusual situations, grant concessions to the working class, but for reasons that ultimately serve
the interests of the capitalist class, like expansion of markets for goods and services (Das 2017a,
398). One function of the capitalist state is to provide general material conditions for production
(Altvater 1978, 42), e.g., climate change mitigation (Das 2017a, 394). If climate change poses
enough of a threat to capital, it’s possible the capitalist state will facilitate an ET away from
fossil fuels (Mann and Wainwright 2018). However, there’s no guarantee that such a transition
will be socially just in the sense that it would leave most people better off.
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For example, most people in the U.S. are working class. Kim Moody calculates that the
overwhelming majority – 75% – of the U.S. population are either workers themselves, nonworking spouses and dependents, or are unemployed folks in the reserve army of labor (2017,
41). All class societies contain a working class that is exploited and a non-working class of
exploiters: slaves and masters in slavery, serfs and lords under feudalism, and the proletariat and
bourgeoisie under capitalism (Poulantzas 1975, 22). Under capitalism, the proletariat – most of
society – produces all the goods and services that the whole society needs, and a capitalist
minority controls this production (Das 2017a, 213). Despite capitalists controlling major
decisions within the work process (Wright 1978, 73), the working class struggles against their
control (Wood 1986, 12), leading to a foundational antagonism within capitalism.
The capitalist state maintains order by moderating conflicts that threaten to consume
society, which spring from “irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to exorcise”
(Engels 1884, 208). Class societies like capitalism would not be class societies without hostility
between the two major classes: workers and capitalists. “The separate individuals form a class
only insofar as they have to carry on a common battle against another class; otherwise they are
on hostile terms with each other as competitors” (Marx and Engels 1846, 82). Without an
opposing enemy to be hostile towards, the boundaries around classes disappear. A society where
only one class existed would be a classless society (Ollman 1971, 121). This antagonism
emerges through the social division of labor (Wright 1978, 60), wherein the bourgeoisie seizes
control of the technical and social apparatuses of production (Marx 1885b, 55).
Under capitalism, the bourgeoisie have ownership over “the means of existence in the
broadest sense of the word” (Engels 1845, 376). They can afford to wait out striking workers,
who will starve without work (Das 2017a, 256). Coercion isn’t necessary when workers are
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forced by the “dull compulsion of economic relations” to come to work each day (Marx 1867a,
737). They can either accept the conditions of capitalist work or perish – not much of a choice
really. The means of existence include the means of production, e.g., machinery, factories, and
raw materials, and the means of consumption, e.g., food, shelter, and clothing (Das 2017a, 219).
The bourgeoisie manages the means of production with an intent to extract as much labor out of
the proletariat as it can in a working day (Wright 1978, 67). This imperative explains the
tremendous productivity gains made since the 1980s, as capitalists filled the “pores” (small
pauses) in workdays with more work (Moody 2017, 15). By controlling the means of production,
capitalists can force proletarians to produce a surplus of goods and services which they also own
and control (Poulantzas 1975, 19). The divorce of workers from the means of the protection
through the process of primitive accumulation (Marx 1867a, 714) was anything but natural
(Ibid., 273). It was produced through state laws against game hunting, enclosure of common
lands, and brutal repression, organized and perpetrated by what would become the capitalist state
(Perelman 2000).
The capitalist state tries to maintain social order despite antagonist class relations under
capitalism, which are caused by capitalist control over the means of production. Under
capitalism, energy is a critical means of production, so unless the capitalist state is pushed by the
working class to create policies for a just ET, it will continue serving capital and the capitalist
class first and foremost. I base this claim on the following case study of how the U.S. capitalist
state used gas policy to limit the power of a fraction of the proletariat (organized coal miners)
over the means of production.
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The Rise of The Sunbelt and Anti-Union Politics
The Sunbelt’s rise is one aspect of the broader historical ET from coal to oil and natural
gas. One rough timeline dates the age of coal from 1800 to the 1910s and the age of petroleum
and natural gas from 1880 to the present (Burke 2009, 45-7). As Smits points out (2015, 182),
the weaknesses of ETs as a conceptual tool start to show when scholars (like Burke) begin
applying strict date ranges around complex energy systems, which evade such easy
categorization. Even in countries with access to plentiful oil and natural gas, coal’s decline was
always relative to the dramatic rise of oil and gas (Kern and Markard 2016), as these new energy
resources supplemented, rather than replacing coal outright (Juisto 2009). Plentiful coal allowed
countries such as the U.S. and U.K. to fuel their rapid industrial growth in the 19th century until
alternatives like oil, natural gas, hydroelectricity, and nuclear power arose (Healey 2015;
Turnheim and Geels 2012). Even today, coal remains an essential input in the generation of

Figure 10: Primary energy consumption by source (U.S. EIA 2017b)
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electricity and production of ferrous metals. Regardless, the overall trend in the historical
trajectory of the global energy mix is that coal lost ground to oil and natural gas over the course
of the 20th century.
Coal’s dominance of energy markets began to erode with the development of the internal
combustion engine, which made gasoline a competing transportation fuel (Podobnik 2006, 49)
and the more gradual elimination of coal as a household fuel (Landsberg and Schurr 1968).
When gasoline and fuel oil replaced kerosene as the main products of refined petroleum in the
1910s, they brought new competition to manufacturing and maritime fuels markets previously
served by coal (Ibid., 39). By 1944, U.S. coal deliveries peaked (Ibid., 37), and it was clear that
oil companies had surpassed coal in the fuel markets for shipping, aviation, and automobile
transportation (Podobnik 2006, 49). Between the mid-1930s and the mid-1960s, natural gas
overtook coal in markets for residential and commercial heating, industrial manufacturing, and
electricity generation (Landsberg and Schurr 1968, 48). Following World War II, the share of
U.S. energy coming from natural gas nearly doubled from 17% in 1950 to 32% in 1970 (U.S.
EIA 2017b, 5), overtaking coal’s share in 1958 (Ibid.). Following shortages during the 1970s,
natural gas and coal contributed stable shares of the U.S. energy supply until 2009, when
fracking allowed natural gas to regain market dominance (see Figure 10). The rise in wealth and
influence of the oil- and gas-rich Sunbelt and the relative decline of the coal-rich Appalachian
and Midwestern “Rustbelt” are partially attributable to this historical ET.
In the mid-20th century U.S., coal was the dominant fuel in the older, industrial U.S.
centered in the Appalachians, while major oil and gas fields were located in the Southcentral
U.S. and in California (Landsberg and Schurr 1968). 48 Undoubtedly, the Sunbelt’s low taxes and
Energy historians will note that the first oil fields in the U.S. were located in Pennsylvania (Black 2000), but
production from these fields was overtaken by discoveries in Southcentral U.S. beginning in the early-20th century.
48

97
hostility to labor unions (Heil 1978; Markusen 1978; Davis 1986; Peck 2016), and also unions’
failure to take root there (Ferguson and Rogers 1986), were critical to this region’s growth in the
postwar period. Indeed, the rising level of working-class militance and union organization in the
Rustbelt provided a potent incentive for a spatial fix in the mid-20th century (Smith and Dennis
1987, 164). Additional energy policies, e.g., direct subsidies paid to oil and gas companies, rural
electrification, and cheap air conditioning also allowed the Sunbelt to grow as Rustbelt
economies declined (Thomas 2014). However, oil and natural gas were one of the “pillars” of
post-World War II growth that contributed directly to the Sunbelt’s growth and economic
success (Nickerson and Dochuk 2011). The continuous, strong demand for oil and natural gas
through the 1950s and 1960s brought great wealth and influence to sectors of capital based in the
Sunbelt (Schulman 1994, 219). Plentiful oil and gas along the Texas Gulf Coast became the raw
materials and energy supplies for petrochemical factories, and also provided the fuel necessary to
transport products to market (Feagin 1988, 66). Oil and natural gas were a significant part of the
“cowboy” economy based on agribusiness, defense, advanced technology, oil and natural gas,
real estate, construction, tourism, and leisure (Lash and Urry 1987, 123). While demand was
increasing for the products of the Southern Rim like oil, natural gas, aluminum, and titanium, the
need for Rustbelt coal, steel, and iron was stagnant or declining (Sale 1975, 19). This demand
was facilitated through state regulation that increased Rustbelt consumers’ access to Sunbelt
resources like natural gas (see Chapter 3).
The U.S. Army cooperated with private companies to build two long-distance, largediameter pipelines between the Sunbelt and Rustbelt industries to produce supplies for fighting
WWII (Castaneda 1993). In 1947, the War Assets Administration (WAA) sold them to Texas
Eastern Corporation, which used them to introduce natural gas into markets previously served by

98
coal in the Rustbelt (Ibid., 92). The federal government’s regulatory apparatuses for overseeing
natural gas availability, conservation, and price (including the PUHCA and the NGA discussed
in previous chapters) also spurred demand for gas in the suburbs that were growing around the
nation (Podobnik 2006, 101). On the eve of the passage of the PUHCA, Senator Everett Dirksen
(R-Ill.) warned that coal and utility industries were to be “sacrificed upon the alter of the welfare
of a State like Texas, which is only too anxious to reap the profits that would accrue from the
distribution of billions of cubic feet of natural gas” (Sanders 1981, 38).
The cheap price of natural gas made possible through regulation also was responsible for
the relocation and new growth of industrial production in the Sunbelt (Markusen 1978, 51). The
regional differences that emerged were not the direct aim of these policies but were incidental to
the needs of capital accumulation at various points (Ibid., 53). Despite repeated petitions by coal
companies, coal miners’ unions, and railroads, and despite their own recognition that natural gas
could compete favorably with coal (Castaneda 1999, 128), the FPC declined to intervene in interfuel competition on coal’s behalf (Castaneda 1993, 55). Coal workers’ unions unsuccessfully
lobbied Congress to discourage sales of natural gas to industries that were a key market for coal
(Sanders 1981, 122). As I discuss below, these policies weakened coal producers’ power in
Appalachia but also strengthened the political influence of anti-union, low-tax Sunbelt capitalists
by enriching the oil and gas sector.
The types of “anti-state” politics developed in the postwar Sunbelt, which was
(ironically) economically dependent on defense contracts and natural gas regulation (Markusen
et al. 1991), reflected the ideology of a class of prospering entrepreneurs in the western Sunbelt
who “detested” the liberal elite running the country (Fraser 2016, 106). Excepting the military
arm of the state and defense contracts, this polity wanted to limit the liberal state in economic

99
matters (McGirr 2001). They found their opportunity by the mid-1960s, as the Rustbelt ruling
elite were under assault by inflation and the relative weakening of their economic base in heavy
manufacturing (Henwood 2016, 277). Natural gas companies like Texas Eastern, Tenneco, and
Transco were locally financed, which made the success of Sunbelt cities like Houston
independent from control by Rustbelt power centers (Feagin 1988, 68). The surge in
conservative politics was funded by a relatively young Sunbelt bourgeoisie, including people like
William F. Buckley Sr., who funded his son’s National Review magazine with money made in
the oil business (Henwood 2016, 276). 49
Texan entrepreneurs Harry and Dick Bass used wealth they inherited from their father’s
natural gas business to create a Dallas-based political network for Republican businessmen
“eager to defend capitalism, champion the rights of management, and attack labor unions”
(Miller 2015, 40). They drew together Houston’s business elite that included Herman and
George Brown, the founders of Texas Eastern, and Hugh R. Cullen, oil entrepreneur and founder
of the Liberty Lobby, an anti-communist NGO based in Washington (Feagin 1988, 129). Amidst
cries of corruption and bribery, Cullen flew segregationist Strom Thurmond to the white
supremacist National States’ Rights Party convention in Houston on a private plane (Crespino
2011, 58), where he spoke out in favor of racial segregation and right-to-work labor laws (Robin
2011, 250 §18).
Another Sunbelt entrepreneur, H.B. Earhart, created a foundation in his name that
funneled money made in oil to free-market economists like Milton Friedman, Ronald Coase,
Gary Becker, and James Buchanan in the form of grants and fellowships with his organization
(Phillips-Fein 2009, 46). Between the mid-1960s and 2008, every U.S. president hailed from a
Mitchell (2011) also points out how oil and gas wealth funded the rise of conservative political movements in the
Middle East (p.226) and Europe (p.237) following World War II.
49
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Sunbelt state, and right-to-work laws and tax cuts for the wealthy became commonplace
(Schulman and Zelizer 2008, 6). The wealth and power that accrued to Sunbelt capitalists in the
postwar period was used to finance a specifically anti-union, pro-business politics. The transition
from coal to oil and gas also undermined one of the strongholds of organized labor in the
Rustbelt: coal mine workers.
Natural Gas Competes for Markets with Coal And The UMWA’s Labor
Before natural gas overtook coal’s share of the U.S. energy supply in 1958, the UMWA
knew their industry was at risk from federal regulation disincentivizing coal consumption. When
the Rural Electrification Administration made federal subsidies available for Americans to buy
millions of new gas ranges, no subsidies were offered for automatic coal stokers (Clark 1987,
287). Energy sources were largely substitutable (Landsberg and Schurr 1968, 180), so regulation
that kept natural gas prices low had an enormous impact on consumer decisions over what type
of fuel to burn (Ibid., 148), and markets for coal weakened because of rising competition from
substitute fuels (Nyden 2010, 177). In a report on inter-fuel competition, the FPC concluded that
the essential advantage of gas over coal was “its cheapness” (Olds and Draper 1948, 55). A
UMWA planning document outlining “the future of coal” blamed the “use of natural gas” for
taking “markets previously served by the coal industry.” 50
The losses sustained by coal from natural gas competitions are extremely large.
The fact is that natural gas is cheaper in many market areas on a heat equivalent
basis than either coal or oil. … The maintenance of such low delivered prices has
built up the demand for gas at a rapid rate, which of course will mean a much
earlier exhaustion of the supply than would be the case if gas sold at competitive
level. The policy of the United States, therefore, should be to take such steps as
would bring the delivered prices of gas up to levels where it would compete on a
fair basis with the price of coal and of oil (Ibid.).

UMWA. 1952. Coal: Future of Coal. General Files of the UMWA Journal Office. Box 5. Folder 46. The
Pennsylvania State University Special Collections.
50
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Some say that the coal-natural gas transition occurred in response to urban air quality concerns
(Melosi 2001), but price was just as important, and was even the “principal criterion” for fuel
choice by utilities and other consumers (Landsberg and Schurr 1968, 149). Even coal companies
realized that it was cheaper to transport natural gas by pipeline than to haul coal by rail, but
natural gas had other advantages when it came to production costs. 51
FPC commissioners concluded that it was the “small amount of labor involved in its
production, transportation and distribution” that made gas the “strongest competitor for any
business that it wants” (Olds and Draper 1948, 295). The cost of oil and gas labor totaled only
10% of production costs, while mining labor represented over 70% of coal’s final cost (Podobnik
2006, 48). Union representatives referred to gas as a “laborless fuel” which was threatening coal
miners’ jobs with “each new natural gas hookup” (Clark 1987, 280). 52 In protesting a utility’s
decision to switch from coal to gas, Dr. Walter Polakov, director of the UMWA engineering
department, warned that payroll losses by miners, railroad workers, and truck drivers would total
$1,520,000. 53
In so doing [using natural gas in place of coal] we throw out of work hundreds –
and if the trend increases – thousands of workers in the gas industry, in the coal
mining industry, on the railroads, and in trucking. This proposed substitution
would have the effect of stopping the use of more than 300,000 tons of coal. It
would throw out of employment nearly 300 men in the local gas [coal gas] works.
It would render 400 miners idle who are now engaged in producing this amount of
coal. It would cause the layoff of 415 railroad employes (sic) who are transporting
this coal to St. Louis. It will lead indirectly to unemployment for approximately
300 other workers all having to do in some form or other with all these operations.
This means a total of nearly 1,400 men and a total annual payroll of some
$1,520,000. (Ibid.)
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UMWA. 1953. Coal: Future of Coal: Pursglove Speech. General Files of the UMWA Journal Office. Box 5.
Folder 45. The Pennsylvania State University Special Collections.
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UMWA. 1957. Natural Gas Fight Starts On ‘Hill’: Staggers Ask Amendments to Control Direct Sales, Prohibit
Unfair Dumping of Gas in Coal’s Market. United Mine Workers Journal 68 (10): 5. UMWA. 1965. Thomas scolds
school officials for using high cost gas heat. United Mine Workers Journal 76 (13): 14.
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UMWA. 1939. District 50 Campaigns Against Natural Gas. United Mine Workers Journal 50 (1): 15.
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UMWA officials and politicians from Pennsylvania testified that if natural gas entered
the eastern fuel markets, it would destroy thousands of jobs in their state. 54 Coal miners’ union
representatives were ignored by energy regulators, and as an influential fraction of labor, their
losses through the natural gas transition were a loss to organized labor in general. By prioritizing
cost and efficiency over employment, the FPC set a precedent of energy policy that weakened
the power of labor while strengthening capital’s grip over the energy supply.
John P. Busarello, of UMWA district five, wrote a letter to Pennsylvania’s governor
asking, “in the name of humanity,” for Harrisburg to resist natural gas’s intrusion into the state. 55
Any project that will result in the elimination of the use of coal for consumption
will be to the detriment of every citizen of the state of Pennsylvania. In the name
of humanity use your good offices to protect the miners’ jobs and to stop this
dastardly move on the part of selfish interests whose only purpose is to feather
their own nests at the expense of the coal operators and miners. The miners want
no relief – they want work. The gasification of homes and industries will produce
hardships, poverty and even starvation. (Ibid.)
In speeches and editorials, union officials referred to natural gas sales to industries and electrical
utilities as fuel “dumping” that wasted a relatively scarce resource compared to coal (Landsberg
and Schurr 1968, 149) and threatened “one of the Nation’s great industries” (see Figure 11). 56
UMWA director of research and marketing, Michael Widman, spoke out against fuel dumping in
a statement to a U.S. Senate committee on unemployment.

UMWA. 1944. Economic Outlook for Coal—Future Wage Policies—First Concern of Delegates. United Mine
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Workers Journal 58 (5): 8.
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Statement by the UMWA to the Coal States Governors’ Conference. General Files of the UMWA Journal Office.
Box 7. Folder 36. The Pennsylvania State University Special Collections. UMWA. 1954. Minutes of the First
Session of the Governor’s Commonwealth Fuel Conference. General Files of the UMWA Journal Office. Box 7.
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We are going to ask that the government of the United Statees (sic) help the
citizens of our great republic who live in depressed areas. These men and women
do not seek charity. They demand the right to provide for their families by useful
labor. We do not feel that it is too much to ask our own government to help
people help themselves. After all, billions have been spent to help other depressed
areas of the world. Our money has built roads, factories, mines and the like in
Laos, Germany, Poland, Egypt, and other nations. The list is endless. In every
instance we stood to lose not only our money but even the friendship of their
governments. But the citizens of West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Kentucky and
other coal states are loyal and true Americans. Is it too much to ask a little help
for them in their hour of need? Or is the stranger to be fed while the son goes
begging at the door? Thus, we would like to propose certain remedies for the
severe unemployment in the coal mining areas. If the Congress sees fit to
inaugurate some of them we are sure a positive step forward will be taken in our
economy. 57

Figure 11: oil and gas dumping crushes coal, the nation's basic industry (UMWA
1962).
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Replacing coal with natural gas also was a strategy to weaken the militant class politics
of organized coal mining labor like the UMWA. By the onset of WWI, coal was one of the most
strike-prone industries in both the U.S. energy sector and the overall economy (Podobnik 2006).
Coal miners staged repeated strike waves in 1919, 1922, and the period of 1941 to 1946 that shut
down most of the industry and won them some of the highest wages in any U.S. industry (Ibid.,
71, 88). Coal miners were leaders of workforce revolt, striking much more often than other
industries and for longer periods (Mitchell 2011, 19-20). Even though coal miners represented
less than two out of every 100 persons in non-agricultural employment (Landsberg and Schurr
1968, 26), they could disrupt the whole U.S. economy to call attention to their demands. Miners
also led strikes throughout the early-20th century that paralyzed Britain, Belgium, and Turkey
(Mitchell 2011, 21-24). Coal capital retaliated by automating labor (Podobnik 2006, 83-4) and
relocating mining out of traditional strongholds of organized coal mining in the Appalachians
(see Figure 12). 58

UMWA. 1964. Impact of Coal on the Nation’s Economy. UMWA Research Department records. Box 25. Folder
43. The Pennsylvania State University Special Collections.
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Figure 12: Map of counties deriving income from coal mining (UMWA 1964).

Miners’ power to stop every part of the economy also provided “compelling reason” for
capital in other sectors and the state to support a transition to natural gas (Yergin 1991, 525).
“There was yet another compelling reason to switch to oil: labor strife in America’s coal fields.
Strikes by coal miners, led by John L. Lewis, the combative president of the United Mine
Workers, were virtually an annual ritual” (Yergin 1991, 525). 59 Following the postwar wave of
miners’ strikes, an important number of real-estate developers and property owners installed
natural gas heating systems in new homes (Podobnik 2006, 101). Public opinion turned against

Oil was also used to weaken coal miners’ power in Europe when U.S. aid under the Marshall Plan was directed
towards the building of pipelines, oil refineries, and factories and power plants that used fuel oil instead of coal
(Painter 1984, 361).
59
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the UMWA’s president John L. Lewis following the 1943 strikes (Brinkley 1995, 216), which
also inspired anti-labor sentiment across the nation (Schulman 1994, 81). The WAA decided to
sell oil pipelines built during WWII to natural gas companies for shipping gas from the Sunbelt
to the eastern U.S. after “strident demands” were made that fuel shortages following the “last
work stoppage” in coal mines be avoided in the future (U.S. Congress 1947, 360). The WAA
claimed, “the use of the pipelines for natural gas would keep the Nation from being cold, prevent
industry from shutting down and punish the coal miner for striking.” 60 New Deal administrator
Harold Ickes wrote that natural gas would end the UMWA’s “stranglehold” on the economy
(Castaneda 1993, 81), and according to one New York business writer, gas from the Sunbelt
would reduce “dependence on bituminous coal and the United Mine Workers” (Ibid., 124). The
impetus to abandon coal, then, was a political strategy, but more importantly, it was strategy by a
specifically capitalist state upset with workers’ ability to disrupt the flow of a critical means of
production.
What Type of Class Politics for Future ETs?
The capitalist state used natural gas policy to weaken the UMWA by undercutting coal
markets with cheap natural gas. Waves of coal miners’ strikes following WWII motivated capital
and the state to seek out alternatives to coal. Increasing use of natural gas also allowed oil and
gas capital in the Sunbelt to finance a distinctly anti-union, pro-free market political platform.
When natural gas replaced coal it hurt miners and weakened their ability to organize for their
demands against capital. In the context of the state’s goals for reducing organized labor’s power
over the economy’s operation, replacing coal’s market share with natural gas stabilized the
provisioning of a critical means of production.
UMWA. 1948b. 80th Congress Knifed Labor at Every Turn in Serving Powerful Interests in Reaction. United
Mine Workers Journal 59 (22): 6 and 11-13.
60
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In the 1970s, as labor unions in the Rustbelt were under assault by industrial relocation,
offshoring, and outright repression by employers and the state, the UMWA was organizing tribe
members of the Navajo nation to resist unrestricted energy development (Markusen 1978).
(Despite the use of coal to generate electricity on certain other Native American reservations as
documented by Needham [2014].) Even in their decline, the UMWA allied themselves in
solidarity with ranchers, environmentalists, Native Americans, and workers struggling to stop or
control the incursions of capital against the needs of marginalized communities (Markusen 1978,
59). Geographers interested in historical “counterfactuals” that would have made different
energy futures (cf. Pooley 2010) should take note of the UMWA’s strength of solidarity and
perseverance.
Decarbonization would gain more public support if it were bundled with attractive
visions of alternative futures that included economic survival for the majority of people. A just
transition also must include a radical democratization of the economy where human and
planetary needs are primary and “market forces should not be the ones to decide what ought to
be produced, and how” (Stevis and Felli 2015, 38). Labor unions have suffered many defeats
over the past 40 years, but they are still some of the largest, best-organized power centers for
class struggle, and their support is needed in social movements seeking to address climate
change.
A just ET can avoid enriching the capitalist class, e.g., technology entrepreneurs like
Elon Musk and Bill Gates, who offer individualized and expensive technofixes to what is at base
a social malfunction. A just ET would redistribute wealth away from elites and toward the
greater mass of society, attacking the pernicious socio-political challenge of inequality (Heffron
and McCauley 2018, 75). Any ET will be geographically uneven, as investment flows out of
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fossil fuel extraction and into new regions that provide clean energy. This would require not
different types of policy from a capitalist state but a different type of state. A democracy that
placed people’s needs above the needs of the capitalist class could craft a just ET that consigns
capitalist exploitation to the dustbin of history. By undermining the UMWA with cheap natural
gas, the capitalist state undercut a locus of social justice organizing. Ensuring that future ETs are
just and equitable requires democratic, socialist state energy policy to prevent further erosion of
democratic power in the workplace and civil society.

109
Chapter 5
Igniting the Crucible: Natural Gas Deregulation and The Contradictions of Fordist-Keynesianism
Introduction
In the mid-2000s, television ads in Pennsylvania were promising that natural gas from
fracking would revolutionize transportation by allowing natural-gas powered cars and trucks to
displace gasoline-powered vehicles (McGraw 2011, 86). Fracking is a drilling technique that has
allowed oil and gas production to increase dramatically in states like Pennsylvania, Louisiana,
Texas, and North Dakota over the last decade (Zuckerman 2013). The promised transportation
revolution never happened, and the vast majority of the transportation sector is still completely
dependent on gasoline from petroleum (U.S. EIA 2018b, 38). However, cheap natural gas was a
boon for other sectors that weren’t mentioned in the TV ads: industry and commercial
enterprises (Weinstein 2016). The ads exemplify a more general neglect of industry’s energy
consumption, a silence which is unwarranted given that the industrial sector consumes 52% of all
energy globally (Huber 2017a, 154). In this chapter I will explain how the US capitalist state
facilitated natural gas becoming a much more important fuel for industries and the commercial
sector in the 20th century.
During the postwar, Fordist-Keynesian, period of capitalism natural gas became a much
more widely-available, and indispensable, means of production. Between 1935 and 1980, US
natural gas consumption grew from 1.9 trillion cubic feet to 19.8 trillion cubic feet (Schurr and
Netschert 1960, 130; U.S. EIA 2018b, 85). Over the same period the US natural gas pipeline
“grid” expanded more than 600%; from 167,400 miles (Schurr and Netschert 1960, 127) to
1,051,774 (U.S. DOT 2016, 33). Following World War II, natural gas displaced coal and heating
oil as a source of energy for commercial spaces (U.S. EIA 2018b, 34) and overtook coal’s
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position as an energy source in industrial manufacturing (Ibid., 36). For a brief period from 1960
until the shortages of 1973, natural gas provided more energy to the US industrial sector than any
other energy source (Ibid.), and gas’s dominance persisted in the commercial sector until 1986
(Ibid., 34). 61
As discussed in Chapter 1, gas is used in the industrial sector to produce steel and glass
and to heat-process food and other commodities into finished form (Busby 1999). It is less clear
how gas functions as a means of production in the commercial sector, which Darmstadter et al.
define as “schools, offices, restaurants, apartment buildings, artisans’ shops, department stores,
small-scale construction sites, government buildings, street lighting and also some military uses”
(1977, 61). If we agree with Moody that commercial spaces, transport, and logistics are an
extension of the sphere of value production (2017), then the gas consumed in them should also
be considered a means of production. Gas is essential in the generation of electricity and heating
of commercial spaces where commodities are bought or moved to places where they will be
exchanged for their money equivalents. If we accept Moody’s holistic view of commercial
spaces as extensions of the productive sphere, then gas is an essential input in producing the
commodity up until the moment when it stops being valorized and not-yet-realized value. Once
the commodity is sold and its surplus value is realized in money form then the commodity has
served its purpose as a bearer of private surplus value appropriated by a capitalist. The means of
producing commodities in this sense should therefore include the inputs necessary to run shops,
warehouses, docks and trainyards, which include large amounts of natural gas. Although separate
from the point of production, capital circulates through commercial spaces on its way through

I should mention that gas’s lead on oil in the industrial sector was slight, albeit persistent. Also, both sectors
depended on growing amounts of electricity throughout these time periods, most of which was generated from
burning coal (U.S. EIA 2018b, 40).
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the moment of realization and the money and commodities stages of capital. Without commercial
fractions of capital it is difficult to imagine a functioning productive stage of capital, at least for
very long. In the commercial sector, gas is used to heat warehouses, office buildings, and retail
stores (among others) and to heat water for laundromats, beauty salons, restaurants (for
dishwashing) (Busby 1999, 77).
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. I introduce the notion of FordistKeynesian natures and suggest a production-led (as opposed to consumer- and demand-led)
conception of Fordist-Keynesian natures. In the main empirical section, I dive into the 40-year
period of regulation that greatly expanded the provisioning of natural gas to all users, but
especially to capital. In that narrative, I explain how the contradictions of Fordist-Keynesian gas
policy caused a shortage and how capital clamored for the neoliberalization of the U.S. gas
industry. I argue that exploring Fordist-Keynesianism’s contradictions brings some needed
synthesis to the neoliberal natures literatures by comparing and contrasting the socionatural
relations of these different periods of capitalism.
Fordist-Keynesian Natures
Nonetheless, without the heavy lifting of the Keynesian state over the last two
generations – including everything from government-organized and subsidized
research and development on the far frontiers of science and technology to the
humdrum provision of power, water, and the means of transportation – born
again contemporary capitalism might not have been born again. (Fraser 2016,
215)
Critical nature-society geography frequently examines socionatural process, contestation,
and change happening in the present. One subfield of political ecology in particular, “neoliberal
natures,” emerged a decade ago to explain new processes of commodification, accumulation by
dispossession, marketization, and privatization (among others) in contemporary settings (Bakker
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2009; 2010b; Castree 2008a, 2008b; 2009; Heynen et al. 2007; Mansfield 2009). In recent years,
interventions in that subfield have questioned how neoliberal natures research can be articulated
with “post-neoliberal” political shifts as well as its applicability to “not-quite-neoliberal” places
(Marston 2015; De Freitas et al. 2015). Despite these few modifications, the subfield’s basic
premise, as Bakker described it, has been preserved, i.e., examinations of the “commodification
of new types of socio-natures” and “the search to convert environmental externalities into
sources of profit” conducted as “a global project, mediated by international financial institutions”
(2010b, 726). Scholarship has proceeded in this vein, and the great bulk of neoliberal natures
research is still adequately described by Castree as a body of nuanced, multi-scaled
investigations of ongoing, discontinuous, and interrupted processes of neoliberalization (2008a,
142). 62 However, the rapid expansion of neoliberal natures scholarship – into new areas, new
resources, and using different methodologies – has not resolved one of the subfield’s main
criticisms.
A decade ago, Noel Castree and Karen Bakker debated the synergy of neoliberal natures
as a subfield. Castree suggested that “this literature is, currently, less than the sum of its many
excellent parts” and further, that “only through a loose, generic form of synthesis can the
literature be made sense of as a whole” (Castree 2008b, 171). Bakker responded that the
diversity of case studies reflects the heterogeneity of nature’s biophysical, sociocultural, and
symbolic dimensions, which have “enormous implications for how socioeconomic projects of
resource exploitation play out” (2009, 1785). Castree and Bakker agreed that neither their

A search through the Scopus database gives us a glimpse into the popularity of the neoliberal natures concept.
Results for the terms “neoliberal natures” or “neoliberal environments” and “geography” reveals 676 articles since
2005 that relate nature-society relations to processes of deregulation, privatization, marketization, and replacement
of state institutions with non-governmental organizations, among others.
62
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interchange nor the literature itself helped answer the question of “why the neoliberalization of
nature has intensified in scale and scope” (Bakker 2009, 1790; Castree 2009, 1791). Answering
that question would require, as Castree said, “a systematic attempt to conduct multiscalar,
grounded, empirical analysis with some historical depth” (2009, 1791). In this chapter, I aim to
situate the neoliberalization of natural gas as a response to the contradictions of a previous period
of capitalism: Fordist-Keynesianism. 63
The period of capitalism before neoliberalism was “Fordist-Keynesianism” (Harvey
1990, 124). 64 It is rarely mentioned in neoliberal natures literatures except as a passing reference.
Bakker notes the “irony” that neoliberalization – itself a capitalist “political and economic
project” – is purported to solve crises that “capitalism has played a role in creating” (2010b,
727). According to Bakker, the preceding period of capitalism that “played a role” in creating the
crises that neoliberalism solved (or, more accurately, displaced and postponed) was FordistKeynesianism. McCarthy and Prudham more clearly stake out how the neoliberal revolution
arose in large part because Fordist-Keynesianism fell into stagnation in the 1970s (2004, 276).
Excepting some informal writings by Robertson (2013a; 2013b), most neoliberal natures
literatures don’t trace the historical origins of neoliberal environmental policy, preferring to
focus on the contemporary moment. Goldstein and Tyfield (2018) critique Bina (2013) for a

Critical nature-society scholars have recently developed an interest in Keynesianism (De Lara 2018; Goldstein
and Tyfield 2018; Huber 2013b), which was primarily of interest to economic geographers before (Mann 2017).
64
In this chapter, I will be using the periodization method from the regulation school of political economy and
economic geography (Aglietta 1979; Boyer and Saillard 2002; Tickell and Peck 1992). The strength of periodization
is not its delineation of history into separate and distinct containers. Indeed, lived history in its infinite heterogeneity
and multitudinous forms defies such simple categorization (Huber 2013b, 177). Rather, the goal of periodization is
to establish “long-term patterns of capitalist development” that clarify specific “pathdependent patterns of capitalist
social life” (Ibid.).
63
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limited understanding of the ecological dimensions of Keynesianism. I echo their critique and
argue that it applies to most neoliberal nature literature too.
I agree that neoliberal natures lack cohesion and synthesis (Castree 2008b), and I suggest
that what sets them apart from other political ecological studies is neoliberalism’s relation to
Fordist-Keynesianism. Deregulation – the quintessential process of neoliberalization – occurred
in reaction to previously existing regulatory, institutional forms built around irreconcilable social
and economic imperatives. Fordist-Keynesianism tried to raise the standards of living of the
working class and provide them with public services, but within a market-organized capitalist
economy geared towards the production of surplus value as its one irreducible law (Marx 1867a,
618). Without examining how neoliberalism emerged from the contradictions of FordistKeynesianism, neoliberal natures gloss over the profound problems of postwar capitalism.
Neoliberalism has had terrible impacts through its processes of deregulation, but deregulation
happened because Fordist-Keynesianism was collapsing.
By the 1970s, it was clear that Fordist-Keynesian policies were failing to attain the
growth rates that followed World War II for two decades (Brenner 2010). Fordist-Keynesianism
refers to a historical period between the end of WWII and the 1970s marked by high levels of
economic growth and by state-interventionist programs like the Marshall Plan, and the growth of
the military-industrial complex (Clarke 1988b, 77). 65 Cyclically adjusted net profits, after
deducting stock appreciation and based on net capital stock, remained steady between 11.2 and
12.1% from 1950 to 1969 (Harman 1980, 48). Between 1950 and 1973, the GDP of capitalist
Webber and Rigby rightfully point out that the rise and fall of Fordist-Keynesianism did not proceed evenly
across the global economy (1996). Economies in Southeast Asia maintained high levels of GDP growth, and cities
within more slowly growing nation-states (Los Angeles) experienced rapid growth amid the wider decline (6). Yet
even Webber and Rigby point out that under capitalism, all periods of rapid economic growth, including the postwar
“golden age,” eventually peter out (11).
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countries grew at 4.9%, which is more than double the average rate of growth between 1820 and
1950 and from 1973 to 1985 (Harvey 1990, 132). Harvey’s original analysis has been basically
consistent since Condition of Postmodernity; between 1985 and 2016, average U.S. GDP growth
was 2.6% (WB 2018). The U.S. economy tripled in size between 1940 and 1980 (Peet et al.
2011, 19). Automated mass production was stabilized through the expansion of mass
consumption via new “wants, needs and desires” (Harvey 2014, 275), new social institutions,
and a settlement between capital and labor (Harvey 1990, 124). Organized labor’s power grew
during the 1920s and was a “major force” by the end of the decade (Gold 1977, 134). The TaftHartley Act of 1947 institutionalized a “capital-labor accord” that assured the reproduction of
labor power, while codifying its subservience to capital (Bowles et al. 1986, 132).
The growth of the global economy proceeded in “lock step” with energy use, and despite
periodic slowdowns when energy use declined, the overall trend was unprecedented growth of
energy use tied to the long boom (McNeill and Engelke 2014, 132). Fordist-Keynesianism
demanded massive supplies of raw materials and energy to be “torn from the farthest regions of
nature” (Altvater 1993, 226). Organized labor under Fordist-Keynesianism experienced a
qualitative leap in the degree of wealth and material comfort available to union members (Cohen
2003). This “capital-labor accord” in the post-World War II era depended on oil for fueling
suburban geographies and as a raw material for vital chemicals, plastics, and other materials
(Huber 2013a, 179). The period between WWII and the 1970s witnessed unprecedented
automobile production and housing stock increases (Worster 2016, 142). A cartoon from the end
of the period shows Jimmy Carter giving a televised speech about energy conservation to a
worried-looking couch potato swaddled in energy-consuming appliances (see Figure 13). The
irony was not lost that Carter was telling the public to use less energy after the postwar boom had
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set up society such that everyday reproduction of life was dependent on unprecedented amounts
of energy consumption. Alongside GDP growth came enormous growth in the consumption of
energy, “surface area of settlements, volume of garbage and pollution of air, water and soil”
(Worster 2016, 142). In the words of environmental historian John McNeill,
To sustain the new social arrangements, fields, factories, and offices needed more
fuels, fertilizers, water, wood, paper, cement, ores – more of almost everything
except horses, oats, whalebone, and a handful of other raw materials consigned to
the dustbin of history. All these inputs were converted into energy, foods, goods,
pollution and garbage. Without Fordism, without mass consumption, the
environmental history of the twentieth century would have been much calmer.
(2000, 318)
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Figure 13: Published in The Philadelphia Inquirer, from the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library.

Worster and McNeill are right to call attention to capital’s absorption of greater quantities
of raw materials during the Fordist-Keynesian period, but mass consumption was not the engine
driving this change. The 1920s saw major gains in manufacturing productivity without a
concurrent rise in effective demand, as the proletariat was not paid enough to buy back the fruit
of its labor (Block 2011). Postwar policies like the GI Bill, the Taft-Hartley Act, the Marshall
Plan, and “military Keynesianism” were part of a state strategy to absorb the unprecedented
levels of industrial output set during World War II (Ibid., 37). Mass production created the huge
industrial complexes that gobbled resources at one end and polluted air, water, and soil at the
other (Peet et al. 2011, 19-20). As Harvey relays it, “core regions of the world economy drew in
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massive supplies of raw materials from the rest of the non-communist world” (1990, 132). But
this vacuuming up of resources wasn’t caused by greedy workers drunk with power and high
wages, at least not at first, and not primarily. Rather, Fordist-Keynesian state policies and the
capital-labor compromise were designed to avoid sending the global economy back into a
depression following World War II (Harvey 2005, 21). Fordist-Keynesianism was, in broad
strokes, an attempt to avoid depression by “mass production for mass consumption” (Peck 2000,
63), which was facilitated through state incentives, technological innovation, and institutional
supports. Further production, and Fordist-Keynesian methods for absorbing products, depended
on many resources, energy foremost among them.
Fordist-Keynesianism depended on “accelerated (and unsustainable) super-exploitation
of nature (especially raw materials and non-renewable resources laid down over millennia, such
as fossil fuels)” (Jessop 2002, 80). Scholars studying the Fordist-Keynesian period have noted
particular rules and patterns of regulation – called “institutional forms” – that maintained
economic and social stability throughout the Fordist-Keynesian period (Boyer and Saillard 2002,
339-40; Lipietz 1987, 19; Peck 2000, 62). These included policies that maintained a steady
supply of energy at prices that would guarantee profits for producers of all types and sizes,
including oil companies (Huber 2013b). Institutional forms set production levels at high-enough
rates that energy was made affordable to many more homes, businesses, and massive industrial
operations than before.
Fordist-Keynesian institutional forms made natural gas a crucial means of production
between the 1930s and 1970s. Huber emphasizes oil’s importance as an ecological foundation
for suburban, auto-centric, social reproduction in U.S. capitalism (2013a). Natural gas also was
foundational to social reproduction in the postwar period, and it was also a vital raw material
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consumed in industrial crucibles as a source of heat energy. Energy is a crucial “means of
production” in the Marxian sense (Christie 1980), and during the postwar period the FPC kept
prices for natural gas low, which kept the industrial crucibles well fueled, cheaply. When yearly
shortages began in the 1970s, factories began to shutter their docks, aggravating unemployment
and sending industrial consumers of gas into a panicked mode. To understand how these
shortages occurred in a tightly controlled, regulated market, we must first understand how and
For Whom Natural Gas Markets Worked.
Fordist-Keynesian Gas Provisioning
Fordist-Keynesianism in the U.S. included massive state-facilitated infrastructure
construction. Although the U.S. state in this period is usually associated with Keynesian
monetary and fiscal policies, the welfare state, and the military-industrial complex (Harvey
1990), it also included “mass regulative bureaucracies” devoted to facilitating the “commodityform of social relations” (Hirsch 1991, 143). Natural gas was overseen by a commission, the
FPC, which reviewed, approved, and regulated the construction, cessation of service, and major
contracts of interstate natural gas pipelines between 1938 and 1978. The FPC was composed of
five leading commissioners and a staff of seven hundred and operated under the authority of the
NGA (Vietor 1994, 103). The NGA was part of a wave of New Deal programs and legislation
intended to defend consumers’ economic rights for the specific purpose of saving the capitalist
class system without changing its basic structure (Cohen 2003, 24; Jacobs 2005). When the NGA
was passed, gas producers and pipeline companies acquiesced to regulation in exchange for
stability in the face of a volatile, deflationary, Depression-era economy (Sanders 1981, 58).
Natural gas regulation was broadly similar to other Fordist-Keynesian institutional forms.
Aglietta refers, generically, to “commissions” that oversaw particular industries e.g., land and
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water transport, airlines, electricity supply, and telecommunications (1979, 322). Swyngedouw is
one of the few contributors to the neoliberal natures literature to mention how “FordistKeynesian state-led social and economic policy” in the U.K. included regulation, control, and
investment in water infrastructure (2007, 53). Commissions were designed to limit the market
power of industries with prohibitive entrance costs. Pipelines, and most forms of infrastructure,
are very expensive to build, and when unregulated private capital organizes their production,
monopolies can result (Castaneda 1999). Harvey notes how Fordism included state-directed
public investment toward utilities, including electricity, waste and sewage, water, and natural gas
(1990, 135), for the purposes of ensuring stable economic growth through rising material living
standards. Jessop also mentions how Fordist-Keynesianism promoted the development of “the
general infrastructural conditions for nationwide diffusion of mass consumption” (2002, 77).
Pipeline Grid Expands
Natural gas departs from Harvey’s and Jessop’s general descriptions of state-facilitated
Fordist-Keynesian infrastructure provisioning in two important respects: it was never managed
as a public utility, and the expansion of its pipeline infrastructure facilitated mass consumption
and mass production. The FPC expedited an order-of-magnitude scale expansion in natural gas
provisioning to industries and the commercial sector during this period. As mentioned above,
between 1935 and 1980, U.S. natural gas consumption grew from 1.9 trillion cubic feet to 19.8
trillion cubic feet (Schurr and Netschert 1960, 130; U.S. EIA 2018b, 85), and the U.S. natural
gas pipeline “grid” expanded more than 600%, from 167,400 miles (Schurr and Netschert 1960,
127) to 1,051,774 (U.S. DOT 2016, 33). 66 (See Figure 14). Enormous demand came from

Unlike most other forms of linear infrastructure with nodular connections, the U.S. pipeline system is more like a
“grid” than a network. As Makholm discusses, “it is a misnomer to call a nation’s or continent’s pipeline system a
network as one used the term for telecommunications networks or electricity transmission networks (where electrons
66
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factories and other businesses, where natural gas was always a desirable fuel because of its
cleanliness, ease-of-use, convenience, and price (Landsberg and Schurr 1968, 47). Within the
first 10 years of the implementation of the NGA, nominal prices for gas declined, while wartime
consumption drove prices for coal and oil up 70% and 80%, respectively (Sanders 1981, 61).
War created demand for gas in hundreds of steel mills, chemical, metallurgical, and rubber
factories in Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Maryland, and Appalachia (Castaneda and
Smith 1996, 123). In the 1930s and 1940s, a third or more of natural gas consumption came from
manufacturing (Schurr and Netschert 1960, 551), and between 1960 and the shortages of 1973,
natural gas became the single most important source of power for industrial and commercial
users in the U.S. (U.S. EIA 2018b).

Figure 14 Major natural gas pipelines in 1932 (left), and in 1980 (right). Adapted from Sanders 1981.

Shifts in technology, and the growing availability of gas, allowed for more gas to be used
to heat interior space. Beyond air and water heating, natural gas fueled the crucibles used to heat,
treat, and smelt raw materials in the production of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, glass,
chemicals, paper, and food (Busby 1999, 81-87). Natural gas was an essential fuel for steel
manufacturing, as a supplement to coke in steel furnaces, and in the annealing process: a method
flow at the speed of light in unpredictable ways). Pipelines are really no more networks than the collection of ropes
on a square-rigged ship is a network” (2012, 17).
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of strengthening steel by using heat to maintain an even temperature across gradually cooling,
newly rolled steel. Gas also was used to melt and temper glass at temperatures of 1540°C, dry
automobile finish, and process dry plastic resin into polyester and nylon (Busby 1999, 84).
Natural gas is indispensable for fertilizer production (Huber 2017a; 2017c) and is used for
cleaning, cooking, boiling, baking, drying, and canning unprocessed food crops into
consumables. The FPC’s policies made much more gas available to many more industries during
the Fordist-Keynesian period but also contributed to the shortages that emerged in the 1970s.
During the period of regulation the infrastructure for provisioning natural gas expanded
massively.
Contradictions Emerge
In the winters of 1971-1972 and 1973-1974, interstate pipeline companies were not able
to deliver the gas they had promised their customers. The situation worsened throughout the
decade and by the winter of 1976-1977, there were widespread gas shortages, especially in the
Northeast U.S. (Richardson and Nordhaus 1995, 63). The resulting scarcity was not one of real,
physical scarcity, as gas supplies in unregulated intra-state pipelines were plentiful and cheap.
Northeastern consumers were deprived of gas because Southwestern producers could get higher
prices by selling locally in more “lucrative” intrastate markets (Sanders 1981, 153).
Government-set prices were not allowed to rise in response to the increased demand. The
shortages of natural gas through interstate pipelines signaled an unwillingness on behalf of gas
producers and pipeline companies to accept the low prices set by the state. As Lee C. White,
former FPC chairman, said, “You’ve got to understand these guys we’re dealing with in the gas
industry, they’re not bad guys, but just guys who follow the rules of the game – to maximize
profits” (Phillips 1974, 764). When ABC’s 20/20 blamed oil companies for half a million in job
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losses, Mobil Oil took out full-page ads in the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles
Times, and Washington Post countering that shortages were the fault of the government-set
prices that were not incentivizing production (Mobil 1978). When L.F. Laird attended an energy
conference in Washington, D.C., he solicited comments from oil and gas companies on their
explanation for the shortages. The CEO of an independent oil company in New York explained
how prices set by the FPC disincentivized exploration for the firm. “Our company was the
second most active gas explorer in the Northern Appalachian Basin in the late 50s and early 60s,
but when costs rose it became obvious to us that the 1954 frozen prices simply didn’t justify
continuing, so we actually stopped all exploration in the basin.” 67
The shortages were caused by FPC pricing policies that affected oil and gas firms’
profits. The FPC fixed the maximum rate of profit that could be garnered by interstate natural
gas sales to prevent “exploitation of customers” and ensure “fair and reasonable” prices for
consumers (Makholm 2012, 127; Sherrill 1983, 540). The FPC judged prices to be fair and
reasonable if they covered the production costs and provided a 5.7 to 6.5% return on investment
(Castaneda 1993, 31). Without the incentives of a greater-than-6% return on investment, gas
companies didn’t make the necessary investment to explore and produce new reservoirs (Tussing
and Barlow 1984, 106). Under capitalism, the replacement of old production techniques and
equipment, as well as technical innovation, is driven forward by individual capitalists seeking a
competitive advantage over each other.
This process is what Marx called the pursuit of “relative surplus value” and was achieved
by lowering the amount of value required to produce a given amount of value relative to the
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general rate of productivity of all capitalists (1867a, 434). In practice, it is achieved through
some combination of lowering the cost of the reproduction of labor power or increasing the
productivity of labor power through new technologies. By capping the profit rate, the FPC
eliminated the possibility that gas companies could earn excess profits – over and above the 57% limit – relative to their competitors, thereby stifling gas exploration and production
innovation (Tussing and Barlow 1984, 106). Instead of being used to find and produce more gas,
the charges customers paid went to paying off old equipment, gas field leases, or administrative
expenses. Rather than paying for all the labor required to produce more gas in different places
using more productive technologies, gas customers were paying for all the “past labor” that went
into developing older gas fields with less-productive technologies.
Industries Become Dependent
Another unintended consequence of limiting the rate of profit was that it incentivized the
expansion of natural gas service into new areas. What seemed like a failure of regulated
enterprise to bring gas to market in the 1970s was really a success of government-regulated oil
and gas capital to create massive demand for gas. In the preceding decades, the FPC limited the
profit rate of transmission companies (pipelines) to a “fairly uniform percentage of the
depreciated rate base” (Peebles 1980, 63; Tussing and Barlow 1984, 60). Without the power to
raise prices on individual sales and under a fiduciary responsibility to their share owners to
maximize profit, pipeline companies aggressively pursued a strategy of increasing overall sales
by increasing their customer base (Makholm 2012, 132). Eventually, transmission companies
grew well beyond the anticipated demand in pursuit of increased earnings (Peebles 1980, 63;
Tussing and Barlow 1984, 113). Regulated natural gas commerce produced a situation where
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capacity far outstripped demand, making gas an extremely attractive fuel for utilities and
industrial users.
The “compulsive need for expansion” on the part of the pipelines brought down prices
and created new customers for gas, replacing coal or heating oil (Peebles 1980, 63). However,
the system went into crisis as soon as the abundant supply of natural gas sold at lower prices than
competing fuels ran out (Ibid., 62). Regulation forced natural gas companies to pursue profit by
increasing their number of customers instead of increasing the price on each unit of gas sold.
This made natural gas supply cheap, but it also failed to provide the high prices that brought
exploration and production of new gas fields (Tussing and Barlow 1984, 104-105). When
supplies of cheap gas ran short, the newly expanded customer base – including a panoply of
industries – reacted with visceral persistence in their demand for more gas.

Figure 15: Wall Street Journal advertisement paid for by the Ohio Governor's Office

In 1975, Ohio governor James Rhodes sponsored a full-page advertisement in the Wall
Street Journal that proclaimed, “Natural gas now, or… Industrial Wasteland, The Misery of
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unemployment must not become a way of life in America!” (Rhodes 1975) (see Figure 15).
Reports on unemployment caused by gas shortages had been reaching the White House before
and during Gerald Ford’s presidency. In 1974, Pennsylvania congressman Bud Shuster sent a
telegram to President Ford decrying the “critical situation” in Pennsylvania, where gas shortages
led to 2,000 workers losing their jobs. 68 The plant manager of Ohio Brass sent a telegram to the
White House asserting “Gas is essential to the economy” and protesting the “government
inflicted depression” that risked putting 800 workers out of work. 69 A year later, Pennsylvania
governor Milton Sharp reported in another telegram to the president that 15,000 workers were at
risk of unemployment. 70 In New Jersey, it was even worse – there, 17,000 workers in the glassmaking industries were facing pink slips (Hurley 1975). 71
In a series of letters between the owner of a steel plant and White House staff person
Roland Elliott, the capitalist wrote, “Mr. Elliot, are you sure that industry can usually switch to
alternate fuels? Prove it!!! It costs like hell to do so.” 72 In 1975, Alaska Senator Ted Stevens sent
a letter to his colleagues in Congress naming 103 businesses and corporations, including Jeep
Corporation, R.J. Reynolds, and Heinz, that supported immediate deregulation of natural gas
prices. 73 On November 24, 1976, National Steel presented President-elect Carter with pricing
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data showing 100% increases between 1971 and 1976 and also informed him, “Currently, our
steel division is operating at a loss.” 74
Precise estimates of unemployment caused by natural gas shortages are difficult to pin
down; perhaps the best source for these comes from Energy Secretary James Schlesinger’s daily
natural gas status reports. These reports compared unemployment data from three different
sources: The Department of Commerce, State Governments, and natural gas distribution
companies. In 1977, a year before natural gas was deregulated, shortages were causing as many
as 1,567,000 workers to be furloughed or laid off. 75 Schlesinger claimed that 15 states were
affected by the shortages, all east of the Mississippi and including major centers of industrial
manufacturing like Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Kentucky (see Figure
16). 76 Disruptions in gas supply caused unemployment to spike because many industries and
smaller businesses started using gas as an input because of its low price, which was an effect of
government regulation that kept prices low directly and indirectly. Without gas to fire their
furnaces, melt raw materials or heat interior space, many businesses could not operate and had
no need of labor power so they fired workers temporarily or permanently.
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Figure 16: Map from the Jimmy Carter Library.

Era of Regulation Closes
The passage of the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) on November 9, 1978 began a long,
slow process of unwinding federal controls. After 18 months of debate (Richardson and
Nordhaus 1995, 63), proponents of deregulation defeated senators from California, Nevada, and
Iowa, whose consumers who had become dependent on cheap gas under FPC price controls
(Sanders 1981, 134). An article in National Journal proclaimed that the passage depended on a
coalition of “bartenders, bankers and bakers.” 77 A more accurate explanation would be that the
industries that consumed gas joined with gas producers to demand deregulation in the face of
scarcity.
77
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In September 1978, the White House compiled a list of corporate interests that supported
the natural gas bill. They included 54 major corporations, from manufacturing to banking and
insurance, and more than 20 agricultural associations. 78 Direct support came from the CEOs of
Chrysler, 3M, Grumman (the defense contractor), and the textile manufacturer Burlington
Industries, among others. 79 A month before the passage, Robert B. Keane, a food company
executive, sent a telegram to a conglomerate of bakeries, telling them to “write their
congressman immediately” in support of the bill and to have their union leadership join them in
their message. 80 A group of 10 oil and gas producers from Houston sent telegrams to their
senators and congressmen, entreating their support. 81 The manager of a cannery in Walla Walla,
Washington, called on Congress to support the NGPA, saying “it assures a source of natural gas
for agriculture and the food industry both of which are of vital importance to our stomachs.” 82 In
the end, the Carter administration succeeded in passing the NGPA by assembling an array of
manufacturers, farmers, and producers who depended on natural gas for their operations and
would voice support for any bill that held promise of boosting supply.
Although deregulation brought an end to the gas shortages, its long-lasting impact was to
turn natural gas from a resource that had some state controls to a fully market-driven commodity.
Between the mid-1980s and 2000, the FERC (the successor agency to the FPC) established new
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regulations, which transformed gas markets into free exchanges that automatically functioned
without direct government intervention. By 2000, natural gas was provisioned by a network of
thousands of traders who were linked at various nodes of marketplace exchange and who
communicated through the price signal. The price of gas in spot trades reflected the value of gas
at any particular time, and with pipelines offering contracts in capacity, monopoly market control
was no longer a concern (Tussing and Tippee 1995, 253). Government regulation, so influential
in the formation of the massive market for gas in the postwar period, was drastically pared back,
with the FERC downgrading its role to a “reactive” agency (Makholm 2012, 27).
Conclusion
Patterns of natural gas consumption set during the Fordist-Keynesian period paved the
way for deregulation. Internal contradictions in the institutional form of gas regulation allowed
whole sectors of the economy – 200,000 industrial firms, according to one count – to become
dependent on natural gas for energy (Ellis 1978, 1). Capitalist relations of production became
ecologically founded on fossil fuel use under Fordist-Keynesianism, which also was the case
with regard to oil (Huber 2013b, 181). In the process, natural gas became vital as a means of
production.
Contradictions emerged between Fordist-Keynesian regulations that kept gas cheap for
industrial and commercial consumers while also limiting gas producers. These contradictions
eventually led to shortages, which brought the era of regulation to a close. Assuring that
industrial and commercial capital had adequate supplies of natural gas demanded the
deconstruction of the Fordist-Keynesian institutions that placed great power in the state’s hands.
The NGA granted a publicly accountable institution authority to determine where, when, and
how much gas was needed in particular places. With deregulation, state power over energy was
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lost, while the legacy of state-facilitated patterns of high natural gas use remained. This has
enormous repercussions for nature-society relations in the neoliberal period.
Institutional forms of Fordist-Keynesianism locked the U.S. into a mode of production
and social reproduction that are dependent on burning fossil fuels. Ceaseless, compounding daily
news of global sea level rise, drought, flood, hurricanes, and melting sea ice implore a transition
toward renewable forms of energy. However, this would depend on a form of collective selfmanagement by the great mass of society, which would force an economy-wide switch away
from these fuels at unprecedented speed and expense. Calculations of the cost of abandoning
fossil fuels, and the infrastructure associated with using them, and replacing them with
renewable generating capacity range in the trillions of dollars (Smil 2010b, 142). Also, any
transition would entail new rounds of primitive accumulation in rural areas to make way for
millions of new wind turbines and thousands of solar, tidal, and wave energy generators
(McCarthy 2015, 2492). Mitigating climate change fairly would, therefore, necessitate an
economy-wide referendum on how, why, and for whom we burn fossil fuels. Unfortunately, the
legacy of deregulation has been to eject collective forms of social control from natural gas
governance. The FPC was a flawed institution, but at least it was answerable to social demands.
Its replacement – the free market – is answerable to holders of private property who find profit in
supplying social demands. As long as employment, standards of living, and economic survival
are wedded to burning fossil fuels, demand will never cease. If it’s profitable, capital will never
stop pumping our economy full of fossil fuels and our atmosphere full of climate-changing
gases.
Looking back on Fordist-Keynesianism from an environmentalist’s position, it’s easy to
condemn this period for locking the U.S. into habits of high resource consumption. However, it’s
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also inspiring to imagine a world where masses of working people held a greater measure of
democratic power over the U.S. energy system. One of neoliberalism’s great ironies is that
although it is sold as a system that provides greater freedom, less of humanity shares in those
freedoms than under the previous ideology of Fordist-Keynesianism. Under FordistKeynesianism, the state and capital complied with the demands of organized workers much more
so than they do today. As Simon Clarke explained, “While Keynesianism was the ideological
expression of the attempt of capital and the state to respond to the generalized aspirations of the
working class in the post-war boom, neoliberalism is the ideological expression of the
subordination of working class aspirations to the valorization of capital” (1988b, 86).
Under neoliberalism, state-managed provisioning has been exchanged for marketmanaged provisioning: state planning, rationalization, and standardization in exchange for their
private-sector equivalents (Harvey 2014, 136). At the precise historical moment when society
must confront a system of energy production that required decades of state intervention and
organization to construct, we have rejected decision-making structures that extend beyond the
profit imperatives of private owners. As Birch and Siemiatycki point out, we are living in a
world where “systemic planning is constrained, as are systemic solutions to critical problems that
we face” (2016, 19). Fordist-Keynesianism’s use of natural gas to support the capital-labor
accord left us with an economic metabolism that consumes massive amounts of cheap energy.
An alternative system of energy use should be less concerned with perpetuating capital and more
concerned with fulfilling social needs now and in the future.
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Conclusion
Energy is an essential means of production within capitalism, and because of that,
capitalist states use energy policy as a brake on capitalists’ tendencies to either monopolize
energy markets or engage in ruinous competition. I make this argument by examining the
decades of U.S. gas regulation that took this resource from a fringe source of energy to a
mainstream one. I show how the state reestablished conditions for successful circulation of
capital through moments of valorization and realization in natural gas markets during the Great
Depression. I explain how in the postwar period, the state governed natural gas for capital as a
whole instead of fractions of capital. I argue that the state allowed gas into markets previously
served by coal because it strengthened capital’s control over the means of production. Finally I
show how state gas law throughout the Fordist-Keynesian period locked industrial and
commercial capital into patterns of high natural gas consumption.
These case studies matter because the threat of climate change demands new explanations
for how energy policy emerges. In the 1930s U.S., a set of social forces and crises pushed
forward state energy regulation. However, the state’s primary objective in regulating natural gas
was to serve capital with an essential means of production. Climate policy that stops and reverses
climate change will most likely destroy fractions of capital that produce fossil fuels and
drastically upset capitalism as a whole, which is dependent on fossil fuels in a multitude of ways.
It is important that civil society push actors within the state to delink energy production and
consumption from the profit motive. Doing so would change the character of the state’s relation
to energy from a capitalist one to a socialist one and that is required for continued human
flourishing.
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Many cannot explain why it is so difficult to shift away from fossil fuels in an era of
climate change because they misidentify the subject of “fossil fuel addiction.” Commentators say
that the addicted subject is all of humanity (Clark 2013; Thompson 2014; Saxifrage 2017;
Tollefson 2018) or some wide cross-section of the human species, like the developed world
(Suranovic 2013; Klare 2014) or the developing world (Akshat 2017). Some narrow the blame to
China, conveniently forgetting that decisions to locate industrial production in China were made
by capitalists seeking cheaper labor costs and looser environmental restrictions (Leather 2017).
Also, as the “chimney of the world,” China can’t be made to shoulder all the blame for emitting
GHGs through the production of goods consumed by the entire world (Malm 2016, 327). A more
accurate assessment wouldn’t seek blame in one particular polities, despite the fact that some do
have more responsibility than others (offshoring industrialists foremost among them). More than
any grouping of people, the subject of fossil fuel addiction is capital: a social and socionatural
relationship geared toward the production, realization, and reproduction of surplus value.
In this dissertation, I have shown how the state facilitated the formation of the U.S.
natural gas system to reproduce capital. Energy policy was not primarily a response to the needs
or demands of “humanity” or “its citizens” for energy. The state used energy policy to save the
capital form (M-C-M'), which depended on gas as a crucial means of production. Energy policy
serves a process (capital) rather than social needs, but that can change, and it must change, soon.
To have a 75% chance of not warming the planet by 2°C, humanity would have to avoid emitting
540 gigatons of CO₂ (or 25 gigatons of its equivalent in CH₄) between now and 2050 (Smith
2016, 45). Burning all the fossil fuel reserves currently appraised by energy companies would
release 3,000 gigatons of CO₂ (Ibid.). Essentially, there is enough coal, oil, and natural gas
buried in the ground to raise Earth’s average temperature between 16 and 25°C (Malm 2016,
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361). However, leaving it buried in the ground, as Smil reminds us, would deprive humanity of
86% of its energy supply (2015a, 206). An entirely new energy infrastructure is needed,
comparable to the creation of the railroads, the interstate highway system, personal computers,
the Internet, and the space program – a wholesale technological revolution (Shellenberger et al.
2008).
Mitigating climate change demands a state response because only states can force the
planned redistribution of resources that will be required (Battistoni 2015). “Climate change will
bring extreme weather and attendant emergencies of a scale that are too large, chaotic, and
destructive to be addressed primarily by the private sector, community-based volunteerism, or
assembly-style horizontal social movements like Occupy” (Parenti 2015a, 829). Absent some
form of state regulation limiting markets, the best forms of addressing climate change under a
market system are for non-owners to lobby left-leaning institutional shareholders and pension
funds (‘owners,’ in publicly traded energy companies) to divest from fossil fuels (Klein 2014,
353-358). These efforts to win more public control over the fossil fuel economy should not be
dismissed, but they also are purely voluntary and reversible, creating moralizing public relations
moments for institutions (universities, churches, etc.) while leaving fossil capital intact (Parenti
2012).
To solve climate change, levels of state intervention in energy markets will have to meet
and very possibly exceed those of 20th century U.S. natural gas regulation. Future models of
energy regulation will have to not only intervene in markets to make them function but make
them function in such a way that (1) meets growing energy demand while (2) keeping Earth’s
climate habitable for vast swaths of humanity. Considerable public funding for energy projects
on levels not seen since the postwar period would have to be made available (Malm 2015, 183).
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The physical, financial, and organizational infrastructure of fossil capital will have to be
destroyed, or at least allowed to wither and fade, at levels seen only during war or economic
depression (Malm 2016, 359). Annual cuts in GHG emissions may require rationing,
requisitioning, and punishment of transgressors that threaten annual emissions targets (Malm
2015, 187). Decisions about the economy may have to be withdrawn from the market and
democratically planned, more in line with socialist or social-democratic forms of government
(Phillips 2015, 227). It could be that energy companies will be nationalized in the process, a
situation already in place in many countries, including the liberal-capitalist Norway. Or, energy
companies will have to be renationalized following neoliberal deregulation, as is currently under
discussion by the U.K.’s Labour Party (Gowan 2018).
Energy is essential for any type of production, capitalist or not. Future states will have to
craft policies that facilitate energy production for different forms of political economy after
capitalism ends. If capitalism is about “production for production’s sake” (Marx 1867a, 595) and
if energy is a critical means of production, then capitalist societies use energy for the sake of
using energy. Obviously, this cannot continue when so much of our energy comes from fossil
fuels, and fossil fuels are dangerously destabilizing the global climate. State energy policy in a
post-capitalist world should prioritize consuming energy to produce goods needed for people, not
for capital. Whatever direction future energy policy will take should ultimately be up to more
people than just capitalists and the capitalist state. Here are some suggestions to aid in that public
decision-making process.
Under capitalism, energy policy is directed toward the production of profit. Under
Fordist-Keynesianism, social democracies like France and the U.K. preserved the profit motive
in the wider economy while nationalizing energy, resulting in bureaucratic and oppressive state
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apparatuses (CSE 1979, 32). Non-capitalist state energy policy could provision energy according
to social need and bypass the profit imperative altogether. A planned energy economy that is not
run by entrepreneurs competing in chaotic markets would be a saner way to provision a resource
that is incredibly necessary but is altering our global climate significantly. In the near- to
medium-term, national-level planning and nationalization of the energy sector could seriously
slow climate change and could be a good option, if it had a firm end-date enforced by the
coercive branches of the state. Federal energy planning should end as soon as the worst impacts
of climate change are avoided because state direction is not a good long-term replacement for
market provisioning. Socialist energy policies must become democratic in nature so that energy
needs can be planned in line with social needs.
Statization is not much of a replacement for capitalism, if the statists in charge of energy
start operating like capitalists, i.e., by dumping carbon into the atmosphere to cut corners and
enrich themselves. Poulantzas distinguished between statization and socialization in his
discussion of nationalization.
Now, however much one differentiates between statization and nationalization,
the nobility of the second term should not make us forget that, in a capitalist
regime, all nationalization is distinct from effective socialization, and that this
constitutes the really fundamental distinction. By transferring the means of
production from the possession and economic ownership of capital to the real
control of the workers, socialization entails not only a change in state power, but
also substantial modifications in the relations of production and the state
apparatus. In the long run, only socialization can be a genuine alternative to
statization. (1978, 175)
In the long term, the goal of energy policy should be a radical democratization of energy. Such a
scheme fits with Block’s suggestion that energy (and transportation, communications, and
housing) be taken out of the market and coordinated by many more people than it currently is
under capitalism (energy company executives and utility company managers). “In order to make
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reasonable decisions about production and consumption in these areas, it is necessary to have
greater citizen input and develop new forms of coordination among management, employees,
consumers and various levels of government” (Block 1987, 140). Democratizing energy
provisioning may sound vague at a national level, but it could take the form of an everyday,
mundane, local government institution. We could turn the energy sector into a federally funded,
locally run board of commissioners like the department of parks and recreation or the local
school board. Except these institutions would have the actual power and resources they need to
build power plants, power lines, and other expensive construction projects.
Only history will tell how humanity will respond to climate change, but state intervention
in private markets will be essential. Humanity can be better prepared for the coming changes by
familiarizing ourselves with how energy governance for key resources like natural gas operated
in the past. If we choose, past experiences can be our guide to improving upon the state-energy
relation under capitalism, or whatever form of political economy follows it. As I have shown, the
state regulated natural gas to serve capital with an essential means of production at prices that
allowed for profit maximization. Climate change demands the destabilization of many fractions
of capital that are currently profitable because they burn fossil fuels. Therefore, to stop, and
begin reversing climate change, civil society must push actors within the state to prioritize
planetary survival and social needs for energy over capitalists’ need for profit. With the aid of
our states, our species may be able to create a more stable future – not for capital – but for all
humans, flourishing, in a habitable climate.
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